Competition policy newsletter No 2, June 2000 by unknown
EC 
COMPETITION 
POLICY 
NEWSLETTER 
Editor: 
Henrik 
Mørch 
Production 
& Layout: 
Vicky 
Hannan 
Address: 
European Commission, 
C150, 00/158 
Wetstraat 200, rue de la Loi 
Brussel B-1049 Bruxelles 
Tel : +322 2957620 
Fax : +322 2955437 
Electronic Mail: 
X400: C=be;A:rtt;P:cec; 
OU=dg4;S=info4 
Internet: lnfocomp@cec.eu.int 
World Wide Web: 
http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dg04/ 
ISSN 
1025-2266 
c o m p e t i t i o n po l i cy 
NEWSLETTER 
Published three times a year by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission 
2000 
number 2 
June 
Also available online: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/newsle/en/index.htm 
Contents 
Articles 
1 "Who will be in the driver's seat?", by Mario 
MONTI, Commissioner of the European 
Commission, responsible for Competition 
8 The Commission's review of the Aluminium 
merger wave, by Dimitri GIOTAKOS, Merger 
Task Force 
24 Horizontal agreements on energy efficiency of 
appliances : a comparison between CECED and 
CEMEP, by Manuel MARTINEZ-LOPEZ, DG 
COMP-F-1 
26 The Grand Alliance, by Eric FITZGERALD, DG 
COMP-D-2 
27 Plaintes contre des droits exclusifs en matière 
de jeux de hasard rejetées, par Maija LAURILA, 
DG COMP-D-3 
28 The Commission's assessment of the Eurovision 
system pursuant to Article 81 EC, by Andrés 
FONT GALARZA, DG COMP-C-2 
Opinion and comments 
34 Le dégroupage de la boucle locale : un pas de 
plus dans la libéralisation des 
télécommunications. Exemple de 
complémentarité entre la régulation sectorielle 
et les règles de concurrence du Traité, par 
Christophe de LA ROCHEFORDIERE, DG 
COMP-C-1 
Anti-trust Rules 
41 HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION 
AGREEMENTS: Ensuring a modem policy, by 
Joachim LUCKING, DG COMP-A-1 
Mergers 
45 Case N°: COMP/M. 1672 - Volvo/Scania, by Dan 
SJÖBLOM, Merger Task Force 
48 Main developments between 1st January and 30 
April 2000, by Anna PAPAIOANNOU, Walter 
TRETTON and Neil MARSHALL, Merger Task 
Force 
Liberalisation and State intervention 
55 Long-term supply agreements in the context of 
gas market liberalisation: Commission closes 
investigation of Gas Natural, by Mariano 
FERNANDEZ SALAS, DG COMP-E-3 
State Aid 
59 Main developments between 1st January and 30 
April 2000 
Information Section 
68 Competition DG Staff list 
70 Documentation 
97 Coming up 
98 CASES COVERED IN THIS ISSUE 
Beyond the EU's Block exemption 
By Mario MONTI, Commissioner of the European Commission 
responsible for Competition 
speech delivered at Forum Europe Conference: 
"Who will be in the driver's seat?" 
on 11 May 2000, Brussels 
INTRODUCTION 
Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to address this conference on 
automobile distribution in the new millennium. You have given this 
conference the somewhat provocative heading "Who will be in the 
driver's seat?". There is an obvious reply to this question: it should be the 
consumer who is in the driver's seat! 
However, before the consumer can get behind the wheel of his or her new 
car, the car has to be transferred physically and legally from its birthplace, 
the factory, via an importer and/or a dealer to the buyer. It is this 
distribution process at the beginning of the "life" of a new motor vehicle 
involving the manufacturer, the distributors and the consumer, on which I 
will focus. 
The "highway code" for this process is the EC block exemption on motor 
vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, Regulation 1475/95. Even if 
this code is - from the legal point of view - not compulsory, all vehicle 
manufacturers use it as a de facto binding framework for their distribution 
system. This Regulation dating from 1995 will expire at the end of 
September 2002. 
Everybody would like to know of course what is going to happen to our 
"highway code" for motor vehicle distribution after this date. This will 
have to be decided after the Commission has adopted its Evaluation Report 
on the current Regulation. The Report has to be published by the end of 
this year. To discuss the future framework without first establishing 
whether the existing Regulation has worked would be to "put the cart 
before the horses". 
ARTICLES 
The future of motor yehicle 
distribution is a hot topic for 
several reasons: 
First, many changes have 
taken place since 1995 and 
more are likely in the near 
future. To give some 
examples: 
• Manufacturers are about to 
re-organise their distribution 
systems in order to make 
them more efficient: after 
having obtained considerable 
cost savings from the 
suppliers of car components, 
manufacturers are now 
turning their rationalisation 
efforts to the distribution 
sector, which accounts for 
30% of the cost of a new car. 
• In particular, many 
manufacturers are reducing 
the numbers of their dealers. 
The reorganisation of the 
distribution network of 
DaimlerChrysler in France or 
the ending of all Honda 
dealer contracts in Germany 
are examples of this. 
• E-commerce is a new and fast 
developing distribution tool: 
However, up to now, use of 
the Internet in the automobile 
sector has been limited to a 
virtual showroom. Actual 
sales via Internet are 
practically inexistent. 
• As regards consumers, a 
motor vehicle is an expensive 
purchase and consumers pay 
attention to prices. In view of 
the price differentials across 
Europe, new information 
technologies and the 
increased mobility of 
consumers, there are now real 
possibilities for consumers to 
shop around and to try to find 
the best deal. 
In order to get a good deal, 
consumers sometimes wish to 
buy a car abroad, either 
directly or via a so-called 
intermediary. I should 
mention that consumers 
strongly and rightfully 
criticise the functioning of the 
Internal Market if they are 
unable to find a dealer who is 
willing to supply them or if 
they are discriminated against 
in relation to national 
consumers. In our experience, 
this still happens in too many 
cases. In this respect, I would 
mention the campaign by the 
British Consumers' 
Association, who told me that 
British car buyers feel that 
they are being "ripped off' 
and sent me some 20,000 
protest notes signed by 
British consumers. I believe 
that such consumer actions 
cannot be ignored when we 
discuss the "highway code" 
for motor vehicle distribution. 
It seems quite revealing that 
such radical consumer action 
appears to be limited to the 
car sector. 
Secondly, the subject of 
today's conference is of great 
interest to those involved 
because the "highway code" 
for motor vehicle distribution 
is now under review by two 
European 
authorities: 
competition 
• As you know, my Directorate 
General for Competition is 
preparing an Evaluation 
Report on the Block 
Exemption Regulation for 
motor vehicle distribution 
and servicing agreements', 
which is due to be published 
by the end of this year. As 
this evaluation process is well 
advanced, I would like to use 
today's forum to give you an 
insight into our preliminary 
factual findings. I again stress 
that this report will focus on 
the current regime for motor 
vehicle distribution and will 
not contain proposals as to 
the future framework. 
• On 10 April, the UK 
Competition Commission's 
report on motor vehicle 
distribution in the United 
Kingdom was published by 
the Secretary of Trade and 
Industry, Mr. Stephen Byers. 
The Competition Commis-
sion found that there is an 
urgent need for a radical 
change in view of the 
negative effects the "highway 
code" generates on car prices 
in the United Kingdom: the 
UK Competition Commis-
sion's radical suggestion is to 
prohibit selective as well as 
exclusive distribution agree-
ments in the car sector. 
In view of these findings, Mr. 
Byers has ordered as a first step 
See Article 11 of Regulation 
1475/95. 
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a number of interim measures 
aiming at lowering resale prices 
immediately. However, he also 
clearly said that more drastic 
measures are being discussed 
with the European Commission. 
Let me now turn to the 
preliminary findings of my 
Department in the current 
evaluation exercise. 
WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS 
OF THE EVALUATION ? 
The parameters with regard to 
which this evaluation is carried 
out are those on which the Block 
Exemption Regulation has been 
based when it was adopted for 
the first time in 1985 and then 
amended in 1995, after some 
serious "fine tuning". 
As to the three main 
assumptions on which the 
Regulation is based: 
The first assumption relates to 
the existence of effective 
competition in the motor 
vehicle industry. 
• As regards competition 
between car manufacturers, 
so-called inter-brand 
competition, the six largest 
manufacturers in Europe 
(Volkswagen, Peugeot/ 
Citroën, Renault, General 
Motors, Ford and Fiat) 
together have a market share 
of about 75% of the European 
car market. We are therefore 
in an oligopolistic situation. 
Moreover, most motor 
vehicles are distributed in the 
same way. via exclusive and 
selective dealers who are 
subject to the same types of 
restrictions. This aggravates 
the oligopolistic effect. 
However, it cannot be denied 
that the availability of 
between 2000 and 4000 car 
versions in each country 
under about 50 brands with 
ever shortening product 
cycles indicates that there is 
competition in the car market. 
Increasing concentration in 
the industry (for instance the 
concentrations Ford/Volvo, 
Renault/Nissan, or Daimler-
Chrysler/Mitsubishi) and the 
planned co-operation between 
General Motors and Fiat 
indicate, however, that we 
have to remain vigilant as 
regards competition at the 
manufacturing level. 
As regards competition 
between dealers belonging to 
the same network, so called 
intra-brand competition, car 
distribution agreements give 
dealers only limited scope to 
develop this kind of 
competition. One reason for 
the limitation of real price 
competition is the form of the 
dealer's remuneration, which 
is based on a standard 
manufacturer discount, giving 
large or small dealers almost 
the same margin. 
Competition between dealers 
also seems to be dampened 
by the allocation of exclusive 
sales territories, the exclusion 
of independent resellers and 
the banning of certain types 
of active marketing. These 
restrictions prevent dealers 
opening subsidiaries or sales 
and service outlets outside 
their contract territory and 
becoming larger and more 
efficient in this way. 
As regards intra-brand 
competition in trade between 
Member States, i.e. 
competition among dealers of 
the same brand but located in 
different Member States, 
competition seems to be even 
more limited: the practice of 
manufacturers agreeing sales 
targets with their dealers, 
which are focussed on 
national sales, and the 
practice of allocating new 
vehicles to the dealers based 
on such targets, gives dealers 
only limited possibilities to 
engage in parallel trade. 
Therefore, dealers are limited 
in their capacity to contribute 
to the creation of an Internal 
Market for motor vehicles, in 
which consumers' freedom to 
purchase new cars across 
borders should be a reality. 
Moreover, the UK 
Competition Commission has 
found, and the preliminary 
findings of my Department 
tend to confirm this, that 
manufacturers' ability to end 
dealer agreements with only 
two years notice, seems to 
make it wise for dealers not 
to pursue a sales policy which 
their manufacturers dislike. 
This is all the more the case, 
because dealers cannot easily 
shift to another brand: 
normally all sales territories 
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are already "occupied" by 
other dealers.' 
Based on these findings, it 
seems to me that the first 
assumption on which the 
Regulation is based and 
which relates to the existence 
of effective competition in 
this sector seems to have 
become - to a certain extent -
questionable. 
The second assumption is that 
car dealers must also provide 
after-sales services. 
To put this in simpler words: 
some say there is a "natural link" 
between the sale of motor 
vehicles and after-sales services. 
In competition jargon, this is 
tying, which is normally 
considered as a serious 
restriction of competition. 
According to recent indications, 
the existence of such a link is 
becoming more and more 
questionable, though it was used 
to justify the right of 
manufacturers to oblige all their 
dealers to offer after-sales 
services. I note that the UK 
Competition Commission also 
expressed serious doubts in its 
Report as to whether such tying 
is not excessive and contributes 
to make car distribution less 
efficient than it could otherwise 
be. 
No technical reasons seem to 
exist for such a link: the so-
called pre-delivery inspections 
of new vehicles could be carried 
out by the manufacturer or the 
haulier, who delivers a new car 
to a dealer. 
Looking at this "link" from the 
viewpoint of the dealers, based 
on the information available, the 
sale of new cars is not very 
profitable. By contrast, the after-
sales services are the main 
source of their revenue. 
Therefore, today's dealers will 
normally wish not only to sell 
cars, but also to provide after-
sales services. 
Moreover, consumer expecta-
tions may suggest that a good 
dealer has to provide after-sales 
services. 
Based on the above the right 
given to manufacturers to force 
their dealers both to sell cars and 
to provide after-sales services, 
seems to have become 
questionable. The question 
whether or not such a right is 
still justifiable, is however 
complex and needs to be 
analysed carefully. 
The third assumption on which 
the Regulation is based says 
that brand specialists are 
needed for the repair of motor 
vehicles. 
I will briefly address this 
assumption. It is true that today's 
vehicles are more and more 
complex and contain electronic 
devices, such as onboard 
diagnostic systems. This 
technical trend is likely to 
increase in the future in view of 
new safety and environmental 
requirements. This suggests that 
the maintenance and repair of 
new cars can be done by 
specialists, who are closely 
connected to the manufacturer 
and who have the necessary 
diagnostic equipment needed to 
provide the full range of after-
sales services. 
However, one may question 
whether these specialists need to 
be dealers or service outlets 
belonging to the network of a 
manufacturer. If independent 
repairers really would have full 
access to all technical 
information, as required under 
the present Regulation, these 
undertakings would be perfectly 
able to repair and maintain 
modern motor vehicles, as is also 
recognised by recent studies. 
In conclusion: For all three 
assumptions on which the 
current regime is based, it seems 
to me that one can have some 
doubts as to whether they still 
hold true today. 
Let me now turn to the 
objectives pursued by the 
Regulation. 
The Regulation has four 
objectives. 
The first objective is to 
strengthen dealers' indepen-
dence, to give them more 
leeway for their activity - in 
view of strengthening by this 
competition at the dealer level. 
The most important provisions 
of the Regulation which seek to 
achieve this objective are those 
which allow dealers freedom to 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 
ARTICLES 
determine the prices and sales 
conditions at which they sell 
cars, to use spare parts of 
matching quality or to give them 
a say on the annual level of sales 
targets, stocks and number of 
demonstration vehicles. 
However, from where we are 
today in our assessment, it seems 
that these measures have not had 
the desired effect for dealers or 
on competition. As 
manufacturers have the right to 
select their dealers based on 
quantitative criteria, and because 
dealers cannot grow by opening 
new sales outlets or new garages, 
today most dealers are small or 
medium sized undertakings. 
Moreover, since dealership 
contracts can be terminated upon 
two years notice, manufacturers 
can largely control dealers and 
end the contracts of dealers 
whose commercial behaviour 
they dislike. 
Dealers' leeway to decide on 
their commercial policy is 
further limited by the margin 
system, which is common to all 
manufacturers and importers and 
used throughout the European 
Union: the margins of dealers 
are nearly the same everywhere 
and large dealers cannot obtain 
bulk rebates similar to those 
granted to fleet buyers. 
Therefore, dealers have little 
freedom to set their prices at 
different levels from other 
dealers in the same network. 
The system of agreed sales 
targets and the planning and 
product allocation based on these 
targets do not seem to allow 
dealers to react to changes in 
demand with sufficient 
flexibility; it creates rigidities in 
the market, which are highly 
unsatisfactory. To give an 
example: if foreign consumers 
want to order cars from a dealer, 
he is quite often unable or 
unwilling to sell cars for export 
within reasonable delivery times, 
since his sales target and product 
allocation is in most cases based 
on his normal business within 
his sales territory. 
As regards dealers' right to sell 
vehicles of different makes, so 
called multi-marketing, the 
Regulation allows manufacturers 
to impose conditions, which - for 
most dealers - make this right 
economically unattractive. 
Therefore, not many dealers use 
this right to sell cars of different 
makes. 
The second objective of the 
Regulation relates to better 
access for spare part 
producers to dealers. 
According to the information 
received, most vehicle 
manufacturers seem to limit the 
freedom of spare part producers 
to supply spare parts directly to 
dealers belonging to the 
manufacturers network2. It is 
indeed surprising to see that 
manufacturers seem to flout the 
Regulation in a way which is 
According to the information 
received from car part producers, 
car manufacturers ask their suppliers 
not to sell such parts as spare parts 
(which match the quality of original 
parts) to the dealers directly. 
close to falling under one of its 
black clauses3: by such 
behaviour they risk loosing the 
benefit of the Regulation for 
their whole distribution network. 
In sum, the objective of giving 
spare part producers better 
access to dealers does not seem 
to have materialised in practice. 
The third objective of the 
Regulation relates to putting 
independent repairers in a 
better position to compete in 
the after-sales market 
As regards the position of 
independent repairers, which the 
Regulation aims to strengthen by 
giving them access to original 
spare parts, my Department has 
found, that the independent 
repairers are generally content 
with their ability to source spare 
parts. 
Independent repairers should 
also have access, on a non-
discriminatory basis, to all 
technical information needed for 
the repair and maintenance of 
cars. To this end, a black clause4 
was introduced into the 
Regulation in 1995. 
Although pragmatic solutions 
seem to have avoided major 
problems in the past, car 
manufacturers do not appear to 
have implemented transparent 
procedures for giving 
independent repairers unre-
3 Article 6 pt. 10 of Regulation 
1475/95. 
4 Article 6 pt. 12 of Regulation 
1475/95. 
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stricted access to technical 
information at reasonable prices 
as required under the Regulation. 
If this is the case, it is a major 
draw back, because 
technological knowledge is used 
to hinder independent repairers 
from doing their job. If 
independent repairers work 
without this knowledge, this 
would lead to safety problems 
and also environmental damage. 
It works also against the 
European Directive relating to 
air pollution by emissions of 
motor vehicles adopted on 13 
October 1998. This provides that 
all manufacturers have to give 
full and unrestricted access to 
technical information upon a 
reasonable fee to all repairers. 
The fourth objective relates to 
materialisation of the Internal 
Market objective in favour of 
consumers and the impact of 
intermediaries' activity on the 
development of parallel trade. 
As the Commission's car price 
reports show, prices are still set 
on a national basis and vary 
considerably from one Member 
State to the other. 
A recent test case for the 
functioning of the internal car 
market is the case of the United 
Kingdom. Prices for domestic 
buyers are, as you know, very 
high in this Member State if 
converted into euros, compared 
to other markets with similar car 
taxes. 
Reasons for the price differential 
between UK prices and prices on 
the Continent include, on the one 
hand, the appreciation of the 
Pound Sterling against the euro, 
and, on the other the fact that 
right-hand drive vehicles are 
more expensive because the 
numbers of such cars are smaller 
than the numbers of similar left-
hand drive cars. It is true that 
both reasons are not attributable 
to the car manufacturers. 
However, UK prices could only 
rise to these actual levels 
because, it seems, non-British 
manufacturers do not decrease 
their UK prices. Instead of using 
the cost advantage they have -
due to their production outside 
the UK - to lower prices and to 
try to increase competition and 
their market share in the United 
Kingdom, foreign manufacturers 
prefer to earn greater profits and 
to sell less cars in this country, 
as the UK Competition 
Commission found in its report. 
Moreover, parallel trade by final 
consumers has clearly not been 
sufficiently significant in 
quantitative terms to put 
downward pressure on British 
prices. Manufacturers also seem 
to use the possibilities given to 
them by the Regulation to agree 
sales targets and on this basis to 
allocate new vehicles to their 
dealers in a rather rigid way and 
with the focus on the local 
demand in the territory of each 
dealer. This induces dealers to 
discriminate in favour of 
consumers from their own 
Member State against foreign 
buyers. 
Moreover, it is apparent that 
manufacturers are not too 
pleased if dealers engage in 
parallel trade and dealers are 
afraid to displease their 
manufacturer. Therefore, I do 
not attach too much importance 
to the fact that parallel trade into 
the United Kingdom has tripled 
for some manufacturers in the 
last two years. What matters is 
that it is still insufficient to put 
downward pressure on prices in 
the United Kingdom. 
Finally, car intermediaries, who 
purchase a new car in a foreign 
Member State in the name and 
on behalf of a final consumer, 
often face just the same 
problems as the consumer in 
finding a dealer who is willing to 
supply. 
Two other points have been 
highlighted by the evaluation 
exercise of my Department. 
The Regulation has not been 
applied properly by the car 
industry 
Apart from the well-known case 
against Volkswagen, where the 
Commission imposed a record 
fine of 102 Million ECU for 
restrictions of parallel trade, you 
may be aware that my 
Department had to investigate 
similar alleged infringements of 
other car manufacturers such as 
Opel Netherlands, Daimler-
Chrysler, Peugeot/Citroën and 
Renault and a case of resale 
price maintenance relating to the 
new Volkswagen Passat in 
Germany. However, these cases 
are still under investigation and 
any comment from me on their 
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outcome would amount to 
speculation. 
This all indicates however, that 
the car manufacturers at least do 
not seem to have much respect 
for the "highway code", which is 
very generous towards them. 
Such misconduct will of course 
also play a role in the evaluation 
exercise under way. 
Another point relates to new 
marketing or distribution 
methods. Here the question we 
have to ask is, are they possible 
under the Regulation? 
The Internet is a new marketing 
tool, which creates important 
opportunities in the car sector as 
elsewhere. However, it is not 
only a tool for creating a virtual 
showroom. It can also give 
dealers and intermediaries new 
business opportunities. Because 
it knows no geographic barriers, 
the Internet allows dealers to 
promote their sales beyond their 
contract area and is therefore a 
tool which could very much help 
to integrate national markets into 
a wider Internal Market. 
However, if we look at the 
Regulation and the two 
Commission Notices relating to 
car distribution, we can see that 
they are not at all adapted to a 
marketing tool like the Internet. 
More worryingly, my 
Department has had quite a few 
contacts with manufacturers and 
operators and it seems that the 
existing rules are used by some 
manufacturers to prevent a 
smooth development of this new 
tool, where there is demand from 
dealers and consumers. 
The question of the sale of cars 
via supermarkets is even more 
delicate. Although there is 
demand from supermarkets to 
sell motor vehicles, none of them 
has so far succeeded in obtaining 
regular supplies from a 
manufacturer. 
CONCLUSIONS ON 
EVALUATION SO FAR: 
THE 
If I may return to the picture I 
introduced at the beginning of 
my presentation when I 
compared the motor vehicle 
Block Exemption Regulation to 
a "highway code". 
• Based on the work 
undertaken so far by my 
Department, it would seem 
that the assumptions on 
which this "highway code" is 
based are at least 
questionable. As regards the 
objectives pursued by the 
Regulation, it seems that 
most of them have not been 
achieved. In particular, it 
seems that the main driver of 
the distribution process is still 
the manufacturer and that 
dealers do not have much 
freedom as regards the way in 
which motor vehicles are 
distributed. Moreover, the 
code has not contributed to 
integrate the national markets 
and, more regrettably, it has 
not been properly 
implemented by many 
manufacturers, as the 
procedures against manufac-
turers for infringements of the 
Regulation show. 
• If I may come back to the 
subject of this conference: 
"Who is in the driver's 
seat?", the following picture 
probably best describes the 
current situation, with only a 
little exaggeration: 
• The manufacturer is in the 
back seat of the car and gives 
instructions to his chauffeur, 
the dealer, on how to drive 
down the distribution 
highway to the consumer, 
who buys the car. The 
manufacturer finally manages 
to bring the car down to the 
consumer, but not always, it 
seems, in the fastest, most 
economic and smoothest way 
possible: moreover, all too 
often the manufacturer 
appears to instruct the dealer, 
who should really be the one 
responsible for driving the 
car, to do things which are 
outside the "highway code". 
In addition, according to 
consumers' expectations, the 
European "highway code" 
seems not in all respects the 
best-possible solution to 
bring a new car to the 
consumer. 
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THE COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE 
ALUMINIUM M EG ER WAVE 
By Dimitri GIOTAKOS, Merger Task Force 
After the recent merger wave in 
the oil industry5 which lasted 
from August 1998 to March 
2000, the Commission has 
reviewed under the Merger 
Regulation concentrations in the 
aluminium sector, which could 
be qualified as the aluminium 
merger wave. These were the 
three-way merger between the 
Canadian aluminium producer 
Alean, the Swiss Algroup 
(Alusuisse) and the French 
Pechiney, on the one hand, and 
the merger between the U.S. 
aluminium producers Alcoa and 
Reynolds, on the other. As a 
result of the merger 
investigation, the three-way 
merger of Alean, Alusuisse and 
Pechiney - which would have 
created the world's leading 
aluminium company under the 
name APA - did not materialise, 
as Alean and Pechiney decided 
to cancel their agreement in the 
light of the Commission's 
opposition to the operation. 
However, the other half of that 
merger - Alcan/Alusuisse - was 
authorised with undertakings. 
The following cases were notified to 
the European Commission and 
reviewed under the Merger 
Regulation: BP/ Amoco; 
Total/Petrofina; Exxon/ Mobil; BP 
Amoco/Arco and TotalFina/Elf 
Aquitaine. 
Finally, the merger between 
Alcoa and Reynolds was 
authorised after the parties and 
the Commission agreed on a set 
of substantial undertakings. 
Through its review of these 
cases, the Commission had the 
opportunity to investigate 
thoroughly all the stages of the 
aluminium supply stream, from 
raw materials, such as bauxite 
and alumina, to finished 
products, such as aerosol cans 
and other packaging materials. 
This provided the Commission 
with a complete picture of the 
sector and enhanced its 
administrative efficiency in 
dealing with subsequent 
transactions in the same sector or 
in other related sectors (such as 
users).6 Moreover, these cases 
gave rise to some interesting 
analyses on product market 
definition and on the competitive 
assessment of mergers. 
The purpose of this article is to 
set out the most important 
features, from a competition law 
This is particularly true for the 
current investigation into a merger 
between producers of beverage cans, 
which use as a raw material 
aluminium can body sheet, one of 
the products that the Commission 
examined in-depth in Alean/ 
Pechiney 
point of view, of the 
Commission's analysis of the 
above cases. This is particularly 
important as far as the 
Alcan/Pechiney case is 
concerned, as no decision was 
adopted (nor will any be 
published) after the withdrawal 
of the notification by the parties 
before the legal deadline. 
Two mega-mergers, 
notifications 
three 
The first important feature of the 
above cases is that, while from 
an industrial point of view two 
mergers were under way - APA 
and Alcoa/Reynolds - from a 
jurisdictional point of view, the 
Commission received and 
reviewed three separate notifi-
cations - that is, Alcan/Alusuisse 
(case COMP/M.1663, decision 
of 14 March 2000), Alean/ 
Pechiney (case COMP/M.1715, 
aborted) and Alcoa/Reynolds 
(case COMP/M.1693, decision 
of 3 May 2000). This is so 
because the APA merger was 
structured in such a way as to 
give rise to two concentrations. 
Indeed, the notification 
requirement of the APA merger 
was triggered by two separate 
and independent public offers 
that Alean launched, one for the 
shares of Alusuisse and the other 
for the shares of Pechiney. 
Although in the minds of the 
three companies involved a 
three-way integration was the 
final aim of their merger, the two 
offers were not conditional upon 
each other, to the extent that one 
could proceed without the other. 
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The Commission considered the 
two transactions as constituting 
distinct and stand-alone 
concentrations, which had to be 
notified separately. 
The separate notifications did 
not prevent the Commission 
from assessing the ultimate 
competitive effects of a three-
way combination. In other terms, 
the structure of the deal was not 
aimed at circumventing the 
Commission's assessment of the 
global effects of the three-way 
merger, by assessing, and 
authorising, each one of the 
transactions separately from the 
other. Rather, this structure was 
motivated by other 
considerations, such as national 
labour laws (Works Council 
approvals in France and in 
Switzerland). However, it goes 
without saying that, from a 
tactical point of view, the choice 
of this structure for the deal 
would spread the risk of the 
whole of it being blocked. 
Indeed, after a four-month Phase 
II investigation in both cases, the 
Commission decided to 
authorise one of them 
(Alcan/Alusuisse) and was 
prepared to block the other 
(Alcan/Pechiney). Had the 
parties submitted one single 
notification, none of the two legs 
of the three-way deal would 
have gone through. 
Summary of the Commission's 
decisions 
In Alcan/Alusuisse three 
affected markets were 
investigated, namely alumina tri-
hydrate or ΑΤΗ, a flame 
retardant material; lithographic 
sheet, a flat rolled product used 
in the offset industry ; and semi­
rigid aluminium containers, a 
packaging product used for 
petfood, human food, airline 
catering, etc. 
In alumina trihydrate. the 
substantial combined market 
share of the merged firm would 
have resulted in the creation of a 
dominant position in the EEA 
market. In order to eliminate it 
and to restore the competitive 
conditions prevailing prior to the 
merger, the parties proposed to 
divest one of the two 
overlapping ΑΤΗ plants, namely 
the one operated by Alusuisse at 
Martinswerk, Germany. 
In lithographic sheet, the merger 
would have resulted in a 
duopolistic dominant position 
held by the merged firm and its 
main competitor, VAW. The 
resulting duopolistic structure of 
the market was supported, 
amongst others, by the 
symmetrical market shares of the 
two competitors and their 
structural link in the Norf joint 
venture in Germany. These, and 
other elements pertaining to the 
nature of the product and of the 
relevant market, could have 
induced the two competitors into 
collusive behaviour which could 
have substantially restricted 
competition in the relevant 
market. In order to eliminate 
such a likelihood, the parties 
proposed to divest the 
overlapping production facility, 
namely the Star aluminium 
rolling mill operated by 
Alusuisse at Bridgenorth, the 
UK. This measure removed the 
competitive overlap, dispelled 
any possible doubts as to the 
creation of a dominant duopoly 
and restored the competitive 
conditions prevailing prior to the 
merger. 
In semi-rigid aluminium 
containers, the high market share 
of the merged firm and the 
absence of alternative 
competitive responses led the 
Commission to conclude that the 
transaction would have created a 
dominant position in this market. 
In order to eliminate any such 
likelihood, the parties proposed 
to divest machines (as well as 
lamination technology, customer 
contracts and contract-related 
equipment) that produce semi­
rigid aluminium containers. The 
capacity of these machines 
amounted to the overlap brought 
about by the merger. This 
measure removed the 
competitive overlap and set forth 
the conditions for the potential 
purchaser to become a viable 
and long-term competitor in the 
manufacture and supply of semi­
rigid aluminium containers. 
In Alcan/Pechiney, the 
Commission conducted an 
enquiry into five affected 
product markets, namely two flat 
rolled product markets and three 
packaging markets. The flat 
rolled product markets 
concerned were can body sheet, 
a raw material used in the 
production of beverage cans, and 
food can stock, similarly used in 
the production of food cans. The 
packaging markets were 
aluminium cartridges, used to 
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pack sealants and adhesives used 
in the car and construction 
industry, flexible packaging for 
processed cheese and aerosol 
cans. 
In can body sheet, the 
Commission found that the 
market for aluminium can body 
sheet is separate from that for 
tinplate (steel) can sheet, in 
which case the merger would 
have resulted in a substantially 
high combined market share. 
Only four suppliers of this 
product are active in the relevant 
geographic market (the EEA), 
namely, apart from the parties to 
the merger, VAW of Germany 
and Elval of Greece. The 
Commission could not regard 
them as a competitive threat to 
the possible exercise of market 
power by the merged firm. Elval 
was too small and regionally-
focused to capture market share 
from the merged firm; and VAW 
produced all of its beverage can 
body sheet at the Norf joint 
venture (jointly controlled with 
Alean) and would be linked to 
the merged firm through that 
joint venture. As a result of its 
capacity constraints and its 
impossibility to remove them 
without the consent of its Norf 
partner, VAW's incentives to 
compete would have diminished 
significantly after the merger. 
Moreover, the arrangements on 
the cost allocation between the 
two partners at Norf gave the 
merged firm the possibility of 
raising VAW's costs, by simply 
re-arranging its product mix at 
Norf. This was considered to 
represent a credible threat of 
retaliation at the disposal of the 
merged firm. Under these 
circumstances, the most rational 
course of action to be followed 
by VAW was to align its 
behaviour on that of the merged 
firm and become a price taker. 
No mitigating circumstances to 
the market power of the merged 
firm were found to exist. 
Consequently, the Commission 
considered that the 
Alcan/Pechiney transaction 
would have created a dominant 
position in the market for 
beverage can body stock. 
The merger would have created a 
dominant position in the market 
for food can sheet. Although 
food cans are made of either 
tinplate or aluminium, 
aluminium and tinplate can sheet 
were found to constitute two 
separate product markets of EEA 
geographic dimension. The 
combined market share of the 
merged firm would have been 
substantial whereas the next 
competitor, VAW, would have 
five times smaller a market 
share. However, as for beverage 
can body stock, VAW's 
incentives to compete would 
have been reduced as a result of 
its participation in the Norf joint 
venture. The remaining 
competitors were small, 
capacity-constrained and unable 
to capture market share from the 
merged firm without heavy 
investments in capacity and 
quality. As a consequence, the 
Commission considered that the 
concentration would have 
resulted in the creation of a 
dominant position in the market 
for food can sheet in the EEA. 
The merger also raised 
competition problems in three 
packaging markets, namely 
aluminium cartridges, aerosol 
cans and flexible packaging for 
processed cheese (cheese foil). 
Although Alean does not 
produce aerosol cans and cheese 
foil, the merger would have 
brought together the respective 
businesses of Pechiney and 
Alusuisse (which Alean was 
authorised by the Commission to 
acquire), in those products. 
In aluminium cartridges, the 
Commission found that the 
merger would have created the 
dominant producer and supplier 
of aluminium cartridges in the 
EEA. 
As far as aerosol cans were 
concerned, the Commission 
found that tinplate and 
aluminium aerosol cans do not 
belong to the same product 
market. There is a specific 
demand for aluminium aerosol 
cans, motivated by the superior 
characteristics ofthat metal. The 
merged firm would have had a 
considerable share of the 
aluminium aerosol cans market, 
six times higher than its nearest 
rival. Moreover, it would have 
controlled by far the largest 
share of overcapacity, which 
exceeded the production capacity 
of any of the smaller suppliers, 
placing thus the merged firm in 
the best position to win a price 
war. The Commission concluded 
that the proposed concentration 
would have led to a dominant 
position in the EEA market for 
aluminium aerosol cans. 
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Finally, in the market for cheese 
foil, the merged firm would have 
had a large market share, three 
times that of the nearest rival. 
The merged firm would have 
been the only supplier with 
dedicated production lines for 
cheese foil which would have 
given the new company a 
considerable cost advantage over 
rivals. The Commission 
concluded that the proposed 
concentration would have led to 
a dominant position in the EEA 
market for lacquered aluminium 
foil for the packaging of cheese. 
Although the parties proposed a 
series of undertakings that could 
alleviate the Commission's 
concerns in almost all the 
product markets, they were 
unable to sever their link with 
VAW - their immediate 
competitor in the flat rolled 
product markets - by disposing 
of their 50% participation in the 
Norf joint venture. Such a 
disposal was perceived as a deal-
breaker and the parties 
eventually decided not to 
proceed with their merger and 
notified to the Commission the 
cancellation of the 
Alcan/Pechiney leg of the three-
way merger (for more details, 
see below: chapter on 
undertakings). 
Finally, in Alcoa/Reynolds, the 
Commission identified competi-
tion concerns in relation to three 
product markets: the merchant 
market for smelter-grade 
alumina (SGA), the market for 
commodity alumina hydrate and 
that for high purity P0404 
aluminium. 
Smelter-grade alumina is the raw 
material used by smelters to 
produce aluminium metal. The 
merging parties' combined 
assets (alumina refineries) and 
global production capacity 
would give them an outstanding 
position as the largest supplier of 
SGA to competing smelters. 
Moreover, the merger would 
bring under the control of the 
merged firm the lowest-cost 
refineries in the world, those 
located in the Darling Range, a 
geographic area in Australia. 
Combining the refineries which 
were already in the portfolio of 
the merging companies with the 
lowest-cost refineries would 
have resulted in the merged firm 
being capable of controlling the 
entry and future development of 
competitors in this market. This 
meant Alcoa/Reynolds would be 
able to increase capacity or 
output at a very low cost to 
discourage entry or expansion by 
competitors at times when 
alumina prices are high. In order 
to address these concerns Alcoa 
proposed to divest Reynolds' 
share in one of the Darling 
Range refineries, namely, the 
Worsley refinery. This was the 
only Darling Range asset that 
Reynolds would have contri-
buted to the merged firm. 
Therefore, its divestiture remo-
ved the competitive overlap. 
In relation to commodity 
alumina hydrate (used as a raw 
material for the production of 
detergents as well as in the 
purification of water), the 
merger would have created a 
dominant position in the EEA 
market. The parties offered to 
divest Reynolds' overlapping 
activity in the EEA, namely its 
50-percent stake in Aluminium 
Oxid Stade GmbH, a German 
alumina refinery controlled 
jointly with VAW. The removal 
of the competitive overlap 
eliminated the dominant position 
that would otherwise have been 
created in the commodity 
alumina hydrate market in the 
EEA. 
Finally, in relation to P0404 high 
purity aluminium, the merger 
would have created a vertical 
relationship conducive to 
vertical foreclosure of a 
downstream competitor. P0404 
is a particular grade of primary 
aluminium metal, used in the 
manufacture of aerospace 
aluminium alloys. Alcoa is a 
producer of such alloys whereas 
Reynolds is the outstanding 
producer of P0404 and a supplier 
to Alcoa's only competitor in the 
aerospace alloys market, namely 
McCook Metals. As a result of 
the merger and given the 
absence of any ready reply by 
other smelters to commit to the 
production of P0404 for 
McCook's needs, McCook ran 
the risk of losing its supplies of 
P0404 raw material and, 
therefore, could have been shut 
out from the downstream 
aerospace alloys market. To 
address this concern, Alcoa 
offered part of a smelter that 
currently produces P0404 to a 
third independent party. This 
will enable the acquiring party to 
supply P0404 to non-integrated 
manufacturers of aerospace 
alloys in sufficient quantities so 
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as to cover a potential growth in 
the demand for aerospace alloys. 
Specific issues raised by the 
aluminium mergers 
The review of the aluminium 
mergers raised a number of 
specific issues of interest to 
competition law practitioners. 
These are outlined in the 
following paragraphs. 
1. Flat rolled products may 
not constitute one single 
product market 
First of all, the Commission had 
the opportunity to revisit its 
previous product market 
definition in relation to flat 
rolled products.7 Flat rolled 
products (FRPs) are semi-
finished products that are 
produced in aluminium rolling 
mills. They constitute the raw 
material for the manufacture of 
several finished aluminium 
products (ranging from industrial 
aluminium plate to household 
foil). FRPs comprise over fifteen 
categories of products, some of 
which correspond to a specific 
end application, whereas some 
others may be multi-purpose 
products (a large part of the 
latter is stockist material which 
cannot be allocated to specific 
sectors). 
The crucial requirement of an 
aluminium rolling mill is to be 
able to produce as many types of 
7 Alcoa/Alumix (case N° IV/M.675, 
21 December 1995); Alcoa/Inespal 
(case N° IV/M.1003, 24 October 
1997); VAW/Reynolds Metals (case 
NOIV/M.1110, 19 May 1998) 
FRPs as possible, so as to 
optimise its product mix - that is, 
to shift production to those FRPs 
which at a given place and time 
offer higher rolling (profit) 
margins. It is, therefore, very 
tempting to argue that FRPs 
constitute one single relevant 
market, because of the high 
degree of supply-side 
substitutability. However, this 
finding was not confirmed by the 
in-depth investigation in the 
APA cases. This has shown that 
the conditions of competition are 
not the same across all the types 
of FRPs, which may justify the 
distinction of certain types of 
FRPs as separate product 
markets. 
Firstly, the degree of supply side 
substitutability varies from one 
FRP type to another. In general, 
aluminium rolling mills produce 
a range of FRPs, the so-called 
product mix. Different types of 
FRPs sell at different prices and 
their relative profitability is 
reflected in the rolling margin 
(that is, the profit margin 
resulting from rolling a 
particular type of FRP). Each 
rolling margin 'contributes' to 
the overall profitability of the 
mill. As the ultimate goal of a 
mill is to maximise its 
profitability, aluminium 
producers try to optimise the 
product mix of their mills, by 
producing the highest-margin 
types of FRPs within the 
availability of their rolling and 
finishing equipment. However, 
not all the mills are equipped to 
produce all types of FRPs. Thus, 
when it comes to several specific 
types of FRPs - such as in 
particular those of concern in the 
APA cases, i.e., beverage can 
body stock, food can stock and 
lithographic sheet - only a few 
mills in the EEA are capable of 
producing them. Those types of 
FRPs are products relatively 
difficult to make and, as a result, 
they require a high degree of 
management commitment, 
workforce discipline and 
different operating practices. In 
addition, the rolling margins 
achieved in producing these 
types of FRPs may be lower than 
in other, more standardised 
types. The high quality 
requirements and the relatively 
small rolling margins have 
dissuaded several mills from 
setting up production processes 
that would enable them to 
include those products in their 
product mix. All the more so 
considering that the buyers of 
such types of FRPs require their 
suppliers to pass stringent 
qualification tests that may last 
several years before a long term 
commercial relationship is set 
up. Therefore, although the 
supply-side substitutability 
argument seems relevant in 
respect to the standard FRPs 
categories (standard sheet, 
plates, foil stock, etc.), it was not 
supported by the market 
investigation with respect to 
products such as those dealt with 
in the APA cases. Rolling mills 
not currently active in the 
production of those types of 
FRPs could not start competing 
in those markets in a timely and 
immediate fashion, even in case 
of a non-transitory increase of 
5%-10% in the rolling margins. 
Therefore, on the supply-side, 
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the presence of a large number 
of mills could not influence the 
competitive conditions 
prevailing in those types of FRPs 
which were defined as distinct 
product markets. 
Secondly, the conditions of 
competition in those distinct 
markets were not influenced by 
the existence of aluminium mills 
outside the EEA. One could have 
argued that the FRPs geographic 
market is not limited to the EEA 
but also comprised Eastern 
European countries, Turkey, as 
well as Russia and the CIS. In 
earlier decisions in the 
aluminium sector, the 
Commission had defined the 
markets for FRPs as being at 
least EEA-wide. In the APA 
cases, the investigation on the 
concerned FRP types showed 
that competition took place at 
the EEA level. Import duties 
vary from 7.5% to 12%. Even if 
some non-European countries 
have duty-free access to the EEA 
market, for customers the 
geographic market for those 
types of FRPs was determined 
more by the quality and 
technological guarantees of the 
producers and by the need for 
just in time deliveries and short 
lead times. Long distance 
transportation required a very 
good control of the supply chain 
management, stocks and 
logistics. As non-EU producers, 
but also some smaller EU-based 
producers, reportedly had a 
lower level of supply reliability, 
customers were required to hold 
larger inventories for their 
supplies from Eastern European 
countries and Turkey, relative to 
the average rate of sales of their 
finished goods, than for their 
supplies by incumbent EU-based 
suppliers, including the merging 
parties. The larger inventories 
increased the customers' 
working capital related costs and 
therefore their unit costs. For this 
reason, almost no imports 
whatsoever had been recorded in 
the EEA from Russia, Turkey or 
the Eastern European countries, 
in particular for the types of 
FRPs mentioned above. 
As far as other types of FRPs 
were concerned, imports from 
Russia and the CIS in 1998 
amounted to 0.7% of EEA 
consumption, whereas those 
from Eastern European countries 
and Turkey to less than 5%. The 
categories of FRPs that were 
produced at rolling mills in these 
countries comprise the 
following: standard lxxx, 3xxx 
and 5xxx sheet; building sheet; 
foil stock; plate and heat treat, 
that is seven out of at least 
fifteen categories of FRPs. 
In conclusion, the Commission 
did not accept the argument that 
FRPs should constitute one 
single product market. This 
product market definition set out 
clearly that supply-side 
substitutability does not only 
refer to the technical ability to 
shift production around various 
products (which would then 
constitute one single market), 
but also to the economic 
feasibility to perform such a 
switch in a timely and immediate 
manner as well as to the 
acceptance of the product by the 
market place (which takes into 
account accreditation and other 
qualification procedures that 
may limit the readiness of the 
switching). 
2. Aluminium and steel 
(tinplate) beverage can 
body sheet are distinct 
product markets 
Can body sheet is used in the 
manufacture of aluminium 
beverage cans. However, as 
beverage cans are made of either 
aluminium or steel, the question 
that arose was whether the raw 
materials, aluminium and steel 
can body sheet, belonged to the 
same or to two separate product 
markets. 
The Commission concluded that 
the two raw materials do not 
compete against each other. This 
could appear to be in 
contradiction with a recent 
Commission decision following 
an in-depth investigation 8, 
where it had been stated that 
"aluminium is considered by 
most of the customers as a direct 
substitute for tinplate" in that 
"major European can 
manufacturers are able to make 
beverage cans out of both 
tinplate or aluminium". 
Nevertheless, this precedent did 
not bind the Commission for the 
purposes of product market 
definition in the Alcan/Pechiney 
case. The above statement was 
not part of a product market 
definition analysis, but of the 
competitive assessment of the 
notified operation. It was used to 
Case N° 1V/ECSC. 1310 - British 
Steel/Hoogovens (15 July 1999) 
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prove that the said operation 
would not lead to the creation of 
an oligopolistic dominant 
position held by manufacturers 
of tinplate can body stock, given 
the potential competition 
stemming from aluminium. 
Therefore, the statement did not 
consider the immediate 
substitution effect between 
tinplate and aluminium in the 
presence of a small but 
significant non-transitory 
increase in the relative prices of 
the two materials, which is the 
test that the Commission uses in 
order to delineate relevant 
product markets (SSNIP test). 
Aluminium and tinplate 
beverage cans have an 
approximately 50:50 share in the 
EEA.9 Based on this split 
between aluminium and tinplate 
cans, one could argue that the 
two raw materials compete 
against each other and that the 
reason for the market penetration 
of tinplate lies in its price 
differential compared to 
aluminium, a structurally more 
expensive metal. One could also 
argue that can makers have a 
choice between the two metals 
and take decisions on the basis 
of their relative prices; that can 
makers can and do switch their 
can manufacturing lines from 
aluminium to tinplate, when the 
economics of aluminium become 
9 This is average EU data which does 
not reflect the substantial 
differences of aluminium or tinplate 
penetration in individual Member 
States. For instance, in some 
countries (Nordic countries. Greece, 
Italy) only aluminium beverage cans 
are sold. 
unattractive; and that, based on 
their switching threats, can 
makers may discipline the 
pricing of aluminium can body 
stock suppliers. Overall, one 
could argue that aluminium and 
tinplate can body stock compete 
for market share and therefore 
belong to the same product 
market. 
However, the Commission's 
market investigation has 
indicated that there are several 
reasons limiting the 
substitutability between 
aluminium and tinplate can 
stock. 
- Technical advantages 
Aluminium is a lighter metal 
than steel. The same goes for 
aluminium can body stock and 
of course for the can itself. 
Lighter cans contribute to the 
reduction of transport and 
handling cost for can makers, 
bottlers and retailers. In addition, 
the number of cans obtained 
from a kilogram of aluminium is 
double that obtained from a 
kilogram of tinplate. This 
significant logistic and handling 
advantage of aluminium over 
tinplate influences the choice of 
can makers and fillers. 
- Mechanical properties and 
marketing considerations 
The mechanical properties of 
aluminium are superior to those 
of tinplate. Aluminium offers a 
better formability (e.g., 
aluminium cans can be 
embossed and shaped), which 
may become a driving factor in 
the choice of a bottler and 
therefore of a can maker. Of all 
the metallic cans, aluminium 
ones offer better printing quality. 
This may contribute to a better 
marketing of a brand of 
beverage. Brand owners would 
use aluminium for marketing 
reasons (launch of new products 
and brands, re-positioning of 
existing failing brands, etc.) as 
well as for some particular 
designs, colours and decorations, 
where tinplate cannot offer the 
same appearance as aluminium. 
Finally, aluminium cans offer 
more brightness and metallic 
effects, which reportedly play a 
significant role in attracting the 
consumer. 
- Environmental considerations 
Environmental reasons, in 
particular recycling and the 
resulting high value of 
aluminium scrap, keep 
aluminium and tinplate well 
apart. As opposed to tinplate 
cans, used aluminium beverage 
cans are more attractive to the 
aluminium mills as they are 
uncontaminated metallurgically 
and can be re-melted to become 
again aluminium cans. Tinplate 
cans have been regarded as less 
attractive to recycle, as 
aluminium has a greater scrap 
value, which enters into play in 
the perception of the consumer 
and most importantly in the 
economics of can manufacturing. 
- Price factors 
The deciding factor for the 
choice of can makers is not only 
the relative price of the metal. In 
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their choice, can makers are not 
only driven by own cost 
considerations, but also by two 
other factors, that is, the demand 
of their customers, the bottlers, 
on the one hand, and their 
existing infrastructure of can 
manufacturing lines, on the other 
(all the can makers have a mix of 
aluminium and tinplate lines, 
although in different 
proportions). Bottlers show 
preferences for one or the other 
metal, according to endogenous 
(i.e., marketing) or exogenous 
parameters (i.e., recycling 
constraints or incentives). Thus, 
can makers are not free in their 
choice of material, but have to 
accommodate their customers' 
requirements and their own 
profitability. 
One could argue that because of 
their ability to respond to 
changes in relative prices, can 
makers would produce more 
tinplate cans and fewer 
aluminium cans on their existing 
lines, in case of a supra-
competitive increase in the price 
of aluminium. In response to this 
argument, it has to be considered 
that the ability of can makers to 
switch from one metal to the 
other is constrained by the 
demand stemming from their 
customers, the bottlers. As 
explained above, the latter place 
orders for a mix of aluminium 
and tinplate cans, or in some 
countries, for aluminium cans 
only (all-aluminium countries). 
Since they pay practically the 
same price for their cans, 
irrespective of the material used, 
their choice of the material is not 
driven by cost considerations but 
by other factors, as those 
mentioned above (marketing, 
environmental, etc.). For the can 
makers to replace aluminium 
cans with tinplate cans, they will 
have to persuade their customers 
to accept this change. However, 
the bottlers will not accept this, 
primarily because of their own 
reasons (marketing, environ-
mental) and secondarily because 
they pay almost the same price 
for both types of cans. 
Therefore, the argument that can 
makers may switch their 
aluminium lines into the 
production of tinplate cans is not 
relevant, as it does not consider 
whether, independently of the 
prohibitive switching costs, the 
bottlers would accept such a 
switch for cost reasons. 
The Commission's investigation 
has shown that the relative prices 
of aluminium and tinplate can 
body sheet do not track each 
other. Aluminium is more 
volatile than steel and shows 
price variations that are not 
reflected in the price of tinplate. 
The Commission examined the 
price evolution of the two 
materials over the last seven 
years and concluded that 
aluminium has not been 
constrained by the relative price 
of tinplate, but rather followed 
the London Metal Exchange 
(LME) trends. 
One could also argue that can 
makers have switched from 
aluminium to tinplate in the past, 
as a result of variations in the 
price of aluminium. Indeed, two 
can makers switched six lines to 
tinplate, in 1996, as a result of a 
price increase in aluminium. 
Because of the exceptional 
circumstances that prevailed in 
the LME aluminium prices at 
that time, the Commission did 
not consider the 1996 switches 
as being characteristic of any 
price competition between the 
two raw materials. Further to the 
Memorandum of Understanding 
between aluminium producing 
countries of 1994, the LME 
entered into a sharp and 
uncontrolled price increase of 
more than 50% compared to the 
levels prevailing in 1993. As the 
price of primary aluminium 
surged, the attractiveness of 
tinplate was enhanced. As a 
result, six can lines in the UK 
and Italy were converted from 
aluminium to steel. These 
conversions were neither easy 
nor irreversible. They are, 
indeed, an isolated case and no 
further conversions of lines has 
taken place since that date. 
These conversions were 
motivated by the steep and 
artificial increase of the LME 
price and, in some way, they 
reflected the discontentment of 
end users of aluminium towards 
what they perceived as a 
permanent aluminium over-
pricing. Given the exceptional 
circumstances prevailing 
between 1994 and 1996 (i.e., the 
significant price increase of the 
LME), these conversions of lines 
were not characteristic of the 
dynamics of the can maker's 
choice between aluminium and 
tinplate can body stock. Would 
the LME prices have increased 
by 5% to 10% (as they had in 
previous years), it would be 
doubtful whether such 
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conversions would have 
occurred. Can makers questioned 
about the economics of the 
switches said that the decision to 
switch lines was a major long-
term business decision, which 
had very significant cost 
implications and which had to be 
taken with up to 12 months lead-
time. 
It can be concluded from the 
foregoing that the conversion of 
lines from aluminium to tinplate, 
and vice-versa, was not an easy 
alternative for can makers in 
case of an increase in the relative 
costs of metals. Conversions 
have occurred in the past under 
exceptional circumstances and 
have probably helped can 
makers to increase their leverage 
in their negotiations with 
aluminium producers. However, 
they are neither likely to 
constitute a common feature of 
the market nor a credible threat 
to suppliers to defeat or 
discourage a 5% to 10% price 
increase in aluminium can body 
stock. 
- Manufacturing costs 
The relative prices of the metals 
are not the only indicators of 
their relative competitiveness. 
Can makers must also take into 
account the can manufacturing 
cost of each metal, that is, the 
cost associated with the 
production of a beverage can. 
The cost structure of can 
manufacturing contains features 
that tend to equalise the final 
cost for both metals, 
notwithstanding the significant 
initial price difference in the 
input metal. 
In general, aluminium can 
manufacturing cost is only 3% to 
5% higher than tinplate can 
manufacturing cost, although the 
price of aluminium can body 
stock may be 30% higher than 
that of tinplate. The differing 
cost structure is due to several 
advantages that aluminium 
presents in its transformation 
process. The most important are: 
decoration and coating, where 
tinplate requires extra internal 
coating and extra external 
decoration; utilities, where 
tinplate costs are higher 
(although washer chemicals for 
aluminium are environmentally 
difficult to handle); depreciation 
is lower for aluminium as fewer 
machines are used; spoilage and 
scrap value, where tinplate has 
higher spoilage rates and 
aluminium has much higher 
scrap value; metal cost, where 
tinplate is cheaper at delivery 
stage, but total costs are similar. 
Aluminium producers, however, 
do not take their pricing 
decisions on the basis of their 
customers' manufacturing cost, 
but rather on the basis of the 
metal price that they will charge 
to can makers. Thus, a given 
increase in the aluminium can 
body stock price does not imply 
the same increase in the 
manufacturing cost of beverage 
cans. For instance, a 5% to 10% 
price increase in aluminium can 
body stock will result in a 3% to 
7% increase in the cost of 
manufacturing an aluminium 
beverage can. This is so because 
several items in the aluminium 
can manufacturing cost structure 
can compensate the higher price 
of aluminium. For example, 
aluminium entails lower 
manufacturing costs than tinplate 
and, more particularly, it has a 
much higher scrap value than 
tinplate. Overall, a price increase 
between 5% to 10%, and the 
resulting lower increase in the 
manufacturing cost, would not 
necessarily be defeated by a 
switch of can makers to tinplate. 
Overall, the Commission's 
investigation has shown that 
aluminium presents objective 
characteristics that detach it from 
possible competition from 
tinplate; that aluminium and 
tinplate can body stock prices do 
not track each other neither do 
they present any price 
correlation; that switching can 
manufacturing lines to tinplate is 
not easy and when it happened it 
was prompted by an exceptional 
increase in the price of 
aluminium; that the loss of 
demand for aluminium generated 
by such switches was too small 
compared to the percentage of 
the price increase; and that 
aluminium suppliers can price 
discriminate against can makers. 
For all these reasons, the 
Commission took the view that 
aluminium and tinplate can body 
sheet form two separate product 
markets. 
3. The assessment of the Norf 
joint venture (Alcan/VAW) 
Another crucial feature in the 
Commission's analysis was the 
existence of Aluminium Norf 
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GmbH ("Norf), a 50:50 joint 
venture rolling mill between 
Alean and VAW, which would 
have become APA's immediate 
competitor after the merger. 
One could argue that Norf is not 
a classical production joint 
venture but a time sharing 
facility, which would not restrict 
competition between the parent 
companies as a result of the 
merger. It has been structured in 
such a way, as to minimise the 
information flow between the 
parents. Thus, one parent could 
not anticipate the competitive 
actions of the other. 
Competitively sensitive 
information, i.e., information on 
the parents' own customer bases, 
selling prices, quantities of 
finished product delivered, etc., 
is out of the scope of the joint 
venture, and therefore remains 
out of the parents' reach. 
Moreover, as the final product 
differentiation may take place at 
a later stage for certain products 
and could even be done at mills 
other than Norf (e.g., 
lithographic sheet), ultimately 
one parent could not know the 
exact product mix nor the 
differing cost basis of the other 
parent. Finally, since the Norf 
arrangements do not involve 
profit sharing between Alean and 
VAW, it is not rational for the 
parents to engage in collusive 
behaviour. 
The Commission considered that 
the degree of interdependence 
stemming from the joint 
operation of Norf prevents it 
from qualifying as a simple time 
sharing facility. In substance, 
Norf operates as a production 
joint venture. The Commission's 
analysis took into account the 
co-operative aspects of its joint 
operation, in particular, the 
governing principle of consensus 
between the parents, resulting 
from the various agreements 
concerning the operation of 
Norf. The large amount of 
industrial co-operation to be 
achieved between the parents is 
an indication that the degree of 
integration of the parents in Norf 
goes beyond what could be 
characterised as a time sharing 
facility. Norf is the only rolling 
mill joint venture world-wide10. 
When it was set up, it was 
considered to be a rather risky 
project as it was already 
generally accepted that it could 
only be operated at a sufficient 
level of efficiency if both parents 
would 'pool together'. At Norf, 
there are joint production 
facilities and one single labour 
force serving the needs of both 
parents in the same way. In 
terms of the costs pertaining to 
the operation of Norf, it has, so 
far, been in the interest of both 
parents to reduce them by 
10 There exists another rolling mill 
joint venture between Alean and 
ARCO in Logan, USA. However, 
this is not comparable to Norf in 
many respects. First, ARCO has 
divested its aluminium activities and 
the Logan mill is only managed by 
Alean; second, the Logan mill is 
much smaller in scale and therefore 
less complicated to operate than 
Norf; and third, Logan can only 
produce can body and end stock 
and, therefore, even if it were jointly 
run, it would not entail such a 
complex management of two 
different competitive product mixes. 
maximising the utilisation of the 
assets. Although each parent 
determines its product mix by 
himself, the required production 
process is determined by the 
Norf management. For example, 
the production routing of all 
products being manufactured at 
Norf is evaluated by the 
common technical staff of the 
joint venture. At Norf, there is 
one common department 
responsible for determining the 
production sequences for both 
parents, which makes its 
technical findings available to 
both parents. According to many 
analysts, it would not have made 
economic sense to jointly build 
and operate Norf if a certain FRP 
type produced by one of the 
parents would be produced 
differently by the other parent. 
At Norf, there are several 
dedicated production lines 
(including both the hot and cold 
milling process and the finishing 
machines, such as the slitters) for 
the various types of FRPs that 
Norf can produce. The 
dedication of lines stems from 
the common interest of both 
parents to reduce their common 
costs. Therefore, up to now, 
there have been joint programs 
by the parents to reduce, through 
standardisation, the number of 
alloys and specifications used in 
the production of various types 
of FRPs. Such a common 
approach responds to the 
expectation by the parents that it 
should lead to the minimisation 
of complexity costs and to the 
generation of economies of 
scale. The current optimisation 
at Norf is based upon the 
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suggestions made by the Norf 
management to the parents. The 
parents will then agree on such 
standardisation, in the interest of 
maximising the utilisation of the 
assets and of minimising costs. 
Finally, investments in Norf and 
the determination of the proper 
technology have, so far, been 
jointly agreed by both parents. 
For the foregoing reasons, it can 
be concluded that the Norf joint 
venture is not a time-sharing 
facility. Consequently, the 
Commission considered that the 
presence of the two largest EEA 
producers of FRPs in a joint 
structure which manufactures 
products in which the merged 
firm would acquire important 
market positions, might pose 
competition problems. These 
would stem from the legal 
structure of Norf and the 
resulting de facto co-operation 
between the parents; from the 
strong dependence of VAW on 
Norf and its capacity constraints 
in other rolling mills; from the 
possibility of Alean to veto 
investments proposed by VAW; 
and from the ability of the 
merged firm to raise VAW's 
costs and hence decrease its 
ability to compete. Overall, the 
asymmetrical capacity 
constraints in favour of the 
merged firm, and the credible 
threat of retaliation on VAW 
would have created a situation 
where collusion among the 
parents of Norf would be 
sustainable in the long run. This 
situation is analysed here below. 
Firstly, the legal structure at 
Norf requires a constant 
consensus-based co-operation 
between the parents. For Norf to 
be able to effectively continue its 
operations after the merger, the 
parents would have to agree on 
several aspects concerning the 
production process. This would 
have increased the transparency 
and predictability in the 
competitive strategies of the 
parents. For instance, technical 
and financial co-operation 
between the parents would have 
been necessary in order to carry 
out, under unanimous decision-
making, the implementation of 
business plans. Not only major 
investments would have required 
the consent of both parents, but 
also routine operations would 
have created opportunities for 
co-operation (e.g., maintenance 
and modernisation works). The 
argument concerning the 
limitations to the exchange of 
information between the parents 
disregarded the difference 
between a pre-merger situation 
and a post-merger one. The 
question was whether the 
competitive situation would 
change following the proposed 
merger. In that respect, one may 
argue on an ex-post basis, that in 
a pre-merger situation the 
exchange of information did not 
prevent two joint venture 
partners from competing 
effectively with each other. By 
contrast, the post-merger relation 
between the same parents is a 
matter of the future, to be 
assessed in the context of the 
market structure likely to prevail 
following a notified 
concentration. In the present 
case, after the merger, for Norf 
to be able to effectively continue 
its operations, the merged firm 
and VAW would have to agree 
on several aspects concerning 
the production process. 
Secondly, the merger would alter 
VAW's incentives to compete. 
Ultimately, VAW would have 
more incentives to align its 
competitive behaviour on that of 
the merged firm rather than 
compete aggressively against it. 
This stemmed from the 
combination of two factors: 
VAW's strong dependence on 
the output of Norf and its 
capacity constraints, on the one 
hand, and the possibility of 
Alean vetoing expansion or 
other investments (the latter in 
conjunction with the 
overcapacity of the merged fimi, 
which would have the largest 
under-utilised rolling capacity in 
the EEA), on the other hand. 
VAW was found to be totally 
dependent on Norf for a number 
of FRPs (beverage can body 
stock and end stock, lithographic 
sheet, brazing sheet, etc.). Prior 
to the merger, Alean was also 
dependent on Norf; however 
after the completion of the APA 
merger, the combined entity 
would no longer depend on Norf, 
as additional hot rolling capacity 
would be brought along by the 
other merging partner. If VAW 
decided to compete fiercely 
against the merged firm with a 
view to capturing additional 
market share, it would need to 
increase its rolling capacity. 
Thus, VAW would need to reach 
an agreement with the merged 
firm. The latter could have 
blocked such an investment if it 
18 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 
» ARTICLES 
had perceived that this would 
enable VAW to compete against 
it. 
Thirdly, economic theory sug-
gests that the firms' asymme-
trical capacity constraints affect 
the degree of collusion in the 
short run, as well as in the long 
run. This is further enhanced 
through the possibility of a 
credible threat of retaliation. In 
the APA cases, the existence of 
asymmetric capacity in favour of 
the merged entity and the 
existence of de fado punishment 
mechanisms, stemming from the 
functioning of Norf, would 
affect the incentive of VAW to 
engage in a price war. 
The condition relating to the 
asymmetry of capacity 
constraints was illustrated by the 
fact that the merged finn would 
have the largest over-capacity in 
the EEA. The condition relating 
to the credible threat of 
retaliation was illustrated by the 
asymmetry in the degree of 
dependence of VAW and the 
merged firm on Norf. The 
merger would enable the merged 
firm to raise rival VAW's costs. 
Because of the additional rolling 
mills it would acquire from its 
merging partners, the merged 
firm would be more flexible on 
the supply-side to shift 
production to and from Norf 
than was the situation for Alean 
prior to the merger. Therefore, 
the merged firm could increase 
VAW's costs at Norf while re-
organising its production around 
the merged firm's new rolling 
system (it was announced that 
such a post-merger re-
organisation would result in cost 
savings of several hundred 
million dollars). Ultimately, the 
benefit of raising VAW's costs 
is that VAW would be forced to 
charge higher prices to 
customers, and this would 
increase the demand for the 
merged firm's output, thus 
enabling it to raise the prices. 
Alternatively, if VAW decided 
not to increase its prices, it 
would suffer a decrease in its 
profitability. 
The way in which the merged 
firm could increase VAW's costs 
while re-organising its product 
mix at Norf could be described 
as follows. As mentioned above, 
the functioning of Norf is based 
on the common optimisation of 
the parents' product mix. Any 
change in the product mix is 
likely to alter the cost situation at 
Norf. Under certain circum-
stances, the change in the cost 
structure may be more harmful 
for one parent than for the other. 
For instance, as the costs to be 
borne by each partner are based 
on the factual level of utilisation 
of the facilities, should the 
merged firm decide to re-
distribute some FRPs away from 
Norf, or to replace certain FRPs 
with others, VAW would have to 
bear the costs arising out of the 
unused capacity, dispropor-
tionately. Any change in the 
product mix of Norf would 
impact on the operation of the 
production process and of the 
accompanying equipment (i.e., 
cast house, types of alloys, scrap 
chain, number of passes, 
finishing equipment, etc.). This 
would disturb the cost sharing 
equilibrium on the basis of 
which Norf has been able to 
optimally function to date. 
Additionally, in the day-to-day 
operation of Norf, the parent 
companies would have to pool 
together to work efficiently. The 
diminution of the relative 
commitment by one parent 
would impact negatively on the 
profitability of the other. Given 
VAW's strong dependence on 
Norf, it was more likely that a 
relaxation of the merged firm's 
commitment to Norf would raise 
VAW's costs and affect its 
ability to compete. 
However, one could contest the 
economic rationale of such an 
attempt to raise the other 
partner's costs so as to weaken 
its competitive position post-
merger. A strategy consisting in 
raising rivals' costs would be 
sound if the deterioration of the 
rival's cost basis were greater 
than that of the merged firm's. In 
the APA cases, a re-allocation of 
the product mix of Norf would 
not make economic sense if it 
had as a result to leave the 
merged firm's share of Norf 
unutilised, as this would amount 
to a severe opportunity cost. 
Thus, a change in the product 
mix of Norf, or the re-
distribution of certain products 
away from Norf, would have to 
be compensated by keeping Norf 
re-loaded. The Commission 
calculated the impact on the 
marginal cost of VAW and of 
APA as a result of the re-
allocation of two of the affected 
product markets (i.e., lithogra-
phic sheet and beverage can 
body stock) away from Norf and 
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the re-loading of Norf by other 
types of FRPs. 'In the case of 
lithographic sheet, it was 
estimated that both parents' 
marginal costs would increase 
and that VAW's costs would 
increase slightly more in 
comparison to those of the 
merged firm. In the case of other 
FRP types, in particular, 
beverage can body stock, the 
increase would be more sharp 
for VAW, as the re-allocation of 
that product away from Norf 
would have resulted in cost 
savings for the merged firm and 
a cost increase for VAW. 
Overall, the resulting cost 
difference to the detriment of 
VAW would have been quite 
important (between 5% and 
10%). 
The Commission did not agree 
with the argument that a cost 
punishment on VAW would 
inflict a dissuasive cost increase 
to the merged entity. Under both 
re-allocation scenarios in the 
preceding paragraph, VAW's 
cost penalty was bigger that the 
merged firm's. Nor could the 
Commission accept that VAW's 
cost variation was too small to 
prevent it from competing 
aggressively. The margins 
achieved in the rolling business 
are minimal. Therefore, a small 
scale variation in the cost basis 
may have significant 
consequences on the 
competitiveness of a producer. 
As a result, VAW would not be 
keen to engage in a price war. It 
would, on the contrary, align its 
behaviour on that of the merged 
firm, in the expectation to 
maximise its profits at a given 
output through higher prices 
rather than higher market share. 
In addition to that, and quite 
apart from the situation of 
dependency of VAW vis-à-vis 
Norf, the fact remained that any 
attempt on the part of either the 
new entity or VAW to gain 
market share at the expense of 
each other would necessarily 
have an immediate effect on the 
rate of capacity utilisation and 
the product mix at Norf and 
consequently on the cost 
structure of both parties. The 
veiy existence of Norf thus 
modified the incentives of the 
parties to compete. Furthermore, 
the very fact that the cost basis 
of all FRP types manufactured at 
Norf would be the same for both 
parties, diminishes, by itself, the 
amount of price competition that 
the parties could realistically 
implement vis-à-vis each other. 
Furthermore, the merged firm 
and VAW competed with each 
other in a multitude of other 
markets. The prospects for 
retaliation in such other markets, 
stemming from multi-market 
contacts, could provide a further 
rational reason for the alignment 
of strategies between the merged 
firm and VAW. 
As a consequence of the 
foregoing elements, the 
Commission considered that the 
existence of Norf would 
significantly reduce competition 
between the merged firm and 
VAW. In accordance with the 
approach which must be 
followed in the context of 
merger control, the Commission 
assumed the most rational course 
of action which, in the markets 
analysed in the APA cases, 
would be the alignment of the 
competitive strategies of the 
merged firm and VAW. 
4. Undertakings that were 
unable to form the basis for 
an authorisation in 
Alcan/Pechiney 
In order to address the 
Commission's concerns as to the 
cohabitation of APA and VAW 
in the Norf joint venture, the 
parties proposed to remain a 
joint partner in Norf, in 
exchange for loosening the joint 
venture link. The parties 
proposed undertakings in order 
to remove (i) the concerns about 
the flow of confidential 
information between the parent 
companies, by putting in place 
confidentiality obligations and 
firewalls between the parties and 
VAW; (ii) the concerns about 
Alcan's possibility to raise 
VAW's costs by changing its 
product mix at Norf, by 
proposing to amend the current 
Norf cost allocation formula so 
as to ensure that no action of the 
parties would negatively affect 
the costs to be borne by VAW at 
Norf; and (iii) the concerns 
about Alcan's right to block 
investments aiming at expanding 
VAW's capacity at Norf, by 
proposing to amend the 
provisions relating to capacity 
expansions and allow any party 
to expand capacity at Norf 
unilaterally. 
Overall, the parties offered 
undertakings which provided for 
20 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 
ARTICLES 
the amendment of its existing 
joint venture agreements with 
VAW. However, these 
undertakings could not be 
performed by the parties alone 
but could only be implemented 
with the prior agreement of 
VAW. Besides the fact that these 
undertakings were not self-
executing, the Commission did 
not consider them able to 
eliminate the risk of collusion at 
Norf. Firstly, the undertaking 
relating to the veto right on 
investments concerned only 
investments related to the 
installation of new facilities at 
Norf (i.e., a new rolling mill). 
All the remaining investments 
were not caught by the 
undertaking (i.e., de-
bottlenecking of current 
capacities, maintenance work, 
modernisation of working 
methods and other day-to-day 
improvements). Moreover, the 
undertaking was qualified, in 
that the parties would not veto 
any expansion by VAW 
provided that such expansion 
would not "adversely affect the 
existing operations of the other 
party at Alunorf'. This provision 
would be subject to 
interpretation and highly likely 
to give rise to vivid discussions 
between the parties and VAW. 
Secondly, as to the undertaking 
to put in place "stringent 
confidentiality procedures" at 
Norf, the Commission 
considered that besides the fact 
that such 'firewalls' could not be 
effectively monitored, any 
confidentiality procedures with 
respect to production schedules 
and sales forecasts could 
adversely affect the functioning 
and competitiveness of Norf. 
Indeed, if the parent companies 
were selective as to the 
information they would pass on 
to the Norf production staff, then 
Norf could not co-ordinate and 
optimise its production process 
in advance but would have to 
wait for each individual order 
put by the parents up to the total 
capacity which they are entitled 
to use. Consequently, no 
standardisation with respect to 
the alloys, routing or other 
production processes would be 
possible, due to the fact that no 
forecast business plan could be 
established. Ultimately, this 
would harm only VAW, as 
APA's relative dependence on 
Norf would be reduced after the 
merger owing to the other rolling 
mills that the merging partner 
would bring together. 
Overall, the clearest undertaking 
would be the disposal of Alcan's 
50% stake in Norf. This, 
however, appeared to be a 
difficult task for Alean and 
eventually led the Commission 
to consider a prohibition 
decision. Prior to its adoption, 
Alean and Pechiney decided to 
put an end to their merger plans 
and formally withdrew their 
notification. 
5. The product market 
definition and the 
competitive assessment in 
Alcoa/Reynolds 
The last of the aluminium 
mergers the Commission had to 
decide on was the merger 
between U.S. aluminium 
producers Alcoa and Reynolds. 
This case raised interesting 
issues in terms of both product 
market definition and 
competitive assessment of 
mergers. These issues were 
raised in the analysis of the 
smelter-grade alumina market. 
Smelter-grade alumina (SGA) is 
a raw material to produce 
primary aluminium. It is a white 
powder that comes out of the 
refining process of bauxite. SGA 
is then smelted into aluminium 
metal, through an electrolysis 
process that takes place in 
aluminium smelters. 
The Commission found that 
some of the aluminium 
producers in the world, such as 
the parties to the merger, are 
integrated vertically, from 
bauxite mining, alumina refining 
and aluminium smelting, to the 
production of FRPs and other 
finished aluminium products. 
The vertical integration in this 
industry suggested that there are 
two types of demand for SGA: a 
captive demand (i.e., alumina 
consumed internally by 
integrated firms) and a merchant 
demand (i.e., surplus alumina 
that is not used internally by 
integrated firms and which is 
made available for sales to third, 
non-integrated, parties). Three-
quarters of total alumina 
production is used captively. The 
Commission conducted a 
detailed investigation to check 
whether such 'captive' alumina 
could be diverted to the 
'merchant' market, in case of a 
5% to 10% increase in the price 
of 'merchant' alumina. The 
results of the investigation 
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suggested that this would not be 
the case, notably because of the 
huge economic penalty that 
integrated aluminium producers 
would incur by reducing the 
level of SGA supplies to their 
own smelters. Based on its 
calculations, the Commission 
found that the opportunity cost 
of unutilised smelter capacity 
would be higher than any 
possible profits stemming from a 
diversion of 'captive' SGA to 
third-party sales. As a 
consequence, the Commission 
considered that since 'captive' 
SGA is out of the scope of the 
'market', it could not influence 
competition in the market for the 
sales of SGA to third parties and, 
therefore, decided to exclude it 
from the relevant product 
market. The latter would 
comprise only merchant SGA, 
that is alumina which is indeed 
the object of sales and therefore 
of price negotiation. It is in this 
area that the Commission 
decided to investigate the effects 
of the merger. 
The Commission then examined 
the conditions under which SGA 
'merchant' sales are made. 
Supplies of SGA to third parties 
are made either through long-
term contracts (usually ranging 
from 5-10 years) or through spot 
sales (contracts than run for less 
than a year). The former are 
motivated by the desire of 
smelters to ensure in advance a 
satisfactory level of SGA supply 
over a long period of time. The 
latter are sales made mainly to 
Russian, CIS and Chinese 
smelters, as well as to other 
smelters that may run into 
temporary shortage of raw 
material. Quite importantly, the 
spot sales are made at a certain 
price, which reflect the 
conditions of supply and demand 
in the SGA market. The shortest 
the SGA market, the higher the 
spot price, and vice-versa. As a 
consequence, the spot market 
was often used as a reference 
price for the negotiation (or re-
negotiation) of long-term 
contracts and as a reliable 
indicator of supply and demand 
equilibrium. 
One could argue that, since the 
Commission excluded from the 
relevant product market 'captive' 
SGA sales, on the basis that 
these cannot influence the 
competitive conditions on the 
free market, it should also 
exclude from the relevant 
product market long-term 
contracts of 'merchant' SGA, 
since future SGA production 
committed under long-term 
contracts will not become 
available for sales to the free 
market for a long period of time. 
This argument could be true, if 
long-term contracts contained a 
fixed-price mechanism. 
However, the great majority of 
long-term contracts featured a 
price range, which allowed their 
counterparts to re-negotiate them 
throughout their duration.11 The 
' ' The Commission identified one 
long-term contract which featured a 
fixed-price with up-front payment. 
The quantity of SGA concerned was 
obviously out of the scope of 
competition in this market. As a 
consequence, the Commission did 
not include the corresponding SGA 
price range is a percentage of the 
daily aluminium LME quotation 
(e.g., 11% to 14% of LME). 
Such contracts include a put-call 
clause and the seller or the buyer 
may exercise their option 
according to the LME price, 
their own financial position and, 
most importantly, according to 
the conditions of supply and 
demand in the SGA market (i.e., 
long or short market). This price 
flexibility, built into such long-
term contracts, led the 
Commission to consider that 
there is still scope to exercise 
market power throughout the 
duration of such contracts. 
The existence of the spot sales, 
as an indicator of the 
competitive situation in SGA, 
was one of the most important 
features of the Commission's 
analysis of the merger. The 
Commission found that the spot 
price was very sensitive to SGA 
output variations and that a small 
cutback in SGA production 
could heavily influence the spot 
prices and, ultimately, the 
put/call mechanics built into the 
long-term contracts.12 The next 
task was, therefore, to examine 
whether the merged firm would 
have, as a result of the merger, 
the possibility of unilaterally 
provoking variations in SGA 
quantity in its calculation of the 
relevant product market. 
1 9 
' - This conclusion was also supported 
by a real-life experiment : an 
explosion in an alumina refinery in 
the U.S.A., in July 1999, reduced 
the amount of world-wide SGA 
output by 2%, which in turn led to 
an immediate increase in the spot 
price of 34%. 
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output, thus exercising market 
power in the negotiation or re-
negotiation of long-term 
contracts. 
The merger would bring together 
a series of alumina refineries 
belonging to Alcoa and 
Reynolds. The most important 
element in this respect was that 
the merger would bring under 
the control of the merged firm 
alumina refineries located in the 
lowest end of the alumina cost 
curve.13 Moreover, Reynolds 
would bring in a refinery located 
at the highest end of the cost 
curve. The Commission was, 
therefore, led to examine 
whether the control of the top 
and bottom ends of the alumina 
cost curve by the merged firm -
which would also become the 
largest SGA producer world-
wide - would confer it the ability 
to control the economics of the 
market, notably through the 
possibility to deter entry or 
expansion by competing alumina 
refineries. 
According to the base-load 
facility theory, the control of 
low-cost plants would confer the 
ability to bring spot prices down, 
through capacity or output 
expansions, whereas according 
to the swing-facility theory, the 
control of high-cost plants would 
confer the ability to raise prices 
through shut-downs. These two 
theories featured in the 
13 The four refineries located in the 
Darling Range, a geographic area in 
Australia, where Alcoa controlled 
three and Reynolds one refinery, 
respectively 
Commission's analysis, which 
concluded that the merged firm 
could, by a mere announcement 
that it will increase or decrease 
its SGA output, influence the 
spot prices and therefore the 
long-term contacts mechanics. 
As a result, the merged firm 
could 'regulate' the entry or 
expansion of competing SGA 
producers. For instance, each 
time a competitor intended to 
increase capacity, the merged 
firm could announce an increase 
in its output. This would be a 
credible threat, since by 
controlling the base-load 
facilities, the merged firm could 
expand its capacities at a very 
low cost. This would, in turn, 
bring the SGA spot price down, 
and as a result it would affect the 
net present value of the planned 
investment of rival firms. 
Ultimately, the lower return on 
investment would discourage or 
at least postpone the rivals' 
planned expansions. 
Inversely, by controlling the 
swing facilities, the merged firm 
would have the ability to raise 
SGA prices independently of its 
competitors or customers, by 
temporarily closing them down. 
From a corporate finance point 
of view, such a temporary shut-
down of high-cost refineries 
could only be profitable to the 
merged firm, since on top of the 
benefit of idling a low-margin or 
unprofitable plant, this would 
also ensure increased margins at 
the level of the low-cost 
facilities. However, most 
importantly, the increase in the 
SGA spot prices would benefit 
the merged firm in relation to the 
price negotiation (oi- re-
negotiation) of long-term SGA 
supplies, of which it controlled 
the largest part world-wide. 
On the basis of the above, the 
Commission concluded that the 
acquisition of Reynolds by 
Alcoa would confer upon the 
merged firm the ability to 
exercise market power in the 
merchant market for SGA. In 
order to alleviate these concerns, 
the parties agreed to divest the 
two critical refineries that 
Reynolds would contribute to the 
merger, namely, the low-cost 
Worseley refinery in the Darling 
Range (Australia) and the high-
cost refinery in Sherwin, Texas 
(USA). This remedy removed 
completely the overlap in the 
SGA market and restored the 
competitive conditions prevai-
ling before the merger. 
It would be unfair not to mention 
that this successful merger 
review and remedial action was 
conducted by DG COMP's 
Merger Task Force in close co-
operation with the Antitrust 
Division of the U.S. Department 
of Justice. The intensity of the 
co-operation, which the merging 
parties welcomed and assisted by 
providing relevant waivers for 
the exchange of information, 
should serve as an excellent 
example of the way in which 
foreign antitrust agencies will 
have to co-operate in the 
framework of the growing 
globalisation of the economy. 
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Horizontal agreements on energy 
efficiency of appliances a 
comparison between CEC ED and 
CEMEP 
By Manuel MARTINEZ-LOPEZ, DG COMP-F-1 
On 15 Mai 2000, the 
Competition Directorate-General 
closed its examination of an 
agreement concluded under the 
aegis of the European 
Committee of Manufacturers of 
Electrical Machines and Power 
Electronics (CEMEP) and 
notified between January and 
April 2000 by some of the 
participants14. In general, the 
agreement aims at improving the 
energy efficiency of the products 
manufactured and sold by the 
parties. The examination 
revealed that the agreement was 
not capable of appreciably 
restricting competition and the 
parties have been informed 
accordingly through an 
administrative letter15. 
The CEMEP agreement aims at 
gearing the EU market towards 
higher efficiency motors thereby 
saving energy in their operation. 
These environmental objectives 
are similar to those of an 
agreement regarding domestic 
washing machines notified by 
CECED and ultimately 
1 4 OJ C 74 of 15.3.2000, p.5. 
15 IP/00/508 of 23.5.2000. 
exempted by the Commission16. 
However similar the objectives, 
the Commission concluded that 
the CECED agreement was 
caught by the prohibition of 
Article 81, paragraph 1, though 
fulfilling the conditions for an 
exemption. A comparison 
between both cases illustrates 
therefore how the restrictions by 
which a similar environmental 
objective is attained are 
determinant in the assessment of 
this type of horizontal 
agreements under Article 81, 
paragraph 1. 
The CEMEP agreement 
concerns Standardised low 
voltage motors ("SLV 
motors")17. SLV motors are 
widely used for pumps, 
ventilators and compressors. In 
addition to monitoring assured 
by CEMEP, the agreement 
1 6 Commission decision of 24.1.2000 
(not yet published). EC Competition 
Policy Newsletter, February 2000, 
p.13. 
17 Motors covered by the CEMEP 
agreement are defined as totally 
enclosed, fan ventilated, three phase 
A.C. squirrel cage induction motors 
ranging from 1.1 to 90 kW with 2 or 
4 poles, rated for 400 V-line, 50 Hz, 
SI duty class in standard design. 
consists basically of two 
commitments: 
(a) By 31.12.2000 at the latest, 
SLV motors covered by the 
CEMEP agreement will be 
classified under efficiency 
classes 1 (high), 2 or 3 
based upon objective 
criteria. The information on 
the efficiency class must be 
made available in 
catalogues and rating plates 
using a common logo. Such 
labelling element was 
present as well in the 
CECED agreement, which 
was however based on 
existing EC labelling of 
washing machines pursuant 
to Commission directive 
(EQ95/12/CE18. 
(b) Taking 1998 and 1999 as 
reference years for, 
respectively, 4-pole and 2-
pole SLV motors under 
class 3, the parties commit 
themselves to jointly 
reducing by at least 50% 
their joint sales of 
efficiency class 3 SLV 
motors in the EC by 
31.12.2003. A joint target is 
also set forth in the CECED 
agreement, though defined 
differently, i.e. a weighted 
average of energy efficiency 
for all the products sold 
(0.24 kWh/Kg load)19. 
1 8 OJL 136 of 21.6.1995, p. I. 
l y The technical definition is 
interchangeable in practical terms: 
changes in the composition of joint 
sales under various energy-
efficiency categories, result in a new 
weighted average efficiency and a 
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Unlike CECED, parties to 
the CEMEP agreement 
enjoy considerable discre-
tion as to how they 
contribute to the attainment 
of the joint target. 
The parties to the CEMEP 
agreement hold a major 
proportion (80%) of the EC 
market, like CECED's (95%). In 
both agreements, future 
participation by non-members is 
unrestricted. Both agreements 
affect mainly the composition of 
output, not the total amount of 
such output. However, the 
achievement of the CECED 
target results mainly from 
individual obligations placed on 
the parties as to their production 
and sales of different energy 
classes. As a matter of fact, the 
Commission singled out in its 
CECED decision the individual 
commitment not to manufacture 
or import machines pertaining to 
certain energy-efficiency classes 
as having as its object the 
restriction of competition, also in 
regard, notably, to the parties' 
market share, the non negligible 
share of output directly 
concerned, likely price increases 
in the short run and the 
importance of the energy-
efficiency class as a product 
attribute in the market 
concerned. In other words, 
competition actually takes place 
on energy-efficiency to a non-
negligible extent and the 
CECED agreement provides 
new weighted average efficiency is 
necessarily brought about by 
changes in such composition, ceteris 
paribus. 
each party with the certainty that 
competitors will not meet 
demand for lower efficiency 
machines. 
Parties to the CEMEP agreement 
notified to the Commission are 
not bound by similar 
commitments as to then-
individual behaviour in the 
market regarding production and 
sales. Beside the scope of the 
provisions, their economic 
context is also different. There is 
no widely established definition 
of energy efficiency of SLVs 
present in the market and, 
accordingly, competition does 
not appreciably take place on 
this product characteristic. 
CEMEP actually makes visible a 
product attribute which allows 
for product differentiation. In 
contrast, the definition and 
labelling of energy-efficient 
washing machines was already 
claerly established and often 
stressed in advertising when the 
CECED agreement was entered 
into. The magnitude of parties' 
production subject to technical 
upgrading in CEMEP is 2.5 
times higher than in CECED, 
since class 3 SLV motors 
currently account for 70% of 
total EC sales. However, the 
range of price increases which 
could be expected from such 
upgrading is considerably lower. 
SLV motors are furthermore 
purchased by industrial users. 
Moreover, third party production 
and imports not subject to the 
agreement, which could act as a 
competitive constraint, play a 
greater role in the SLV market 
than in that for washing 
machines. 
In view of the foregoing and 
consistent with the assessment 
that the agreement could be 
granted negative clearance, it is 
not necessary to examine 
whether the conditions of Article 
81, paragraph 3 are fulfilled and, 
in particular, whether the 
CEMEP agreement contributes 
to technical and economic 
progress and whether a fair share 
of the benefits resulting from 
improved environmental 
conditions accrue to consumers. 
Both this conclusion and the 
analysis in this case are fully in 
line with similar cases dealt with 
in recent past20. 
20 See cases COMP/37.231 ACEA (IP 
98/865 of 16.10.1998), 37.634 
JAMA and 37.612 KAMA (IP 
99/922 1.12.1999). 
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The Grand Alliance 
By Eric FITZGERALD, COMP-D-2 
On 30 March 2000, the 
Commission, applying Article 7 
of Regulation 870/95,21 decided 
not to oppose exemption of the 
Grand Alliance consortium 
agreement. This decision was the 
last decision to be taken under 
Regulation 870, bringing the 
total number of exemptions 
granted under that regulation to 
eleven. The block exemption 
provided for in Regulation 870 
has subsequently been renewed 
by Regulation No 823/2000,22 
with minor amendments, for a 
further period of five years. In 
accordance with the transitional 
arrangements provided for in 
Regulation 823, the Grand 
Alliance will benefit from 
exemption for the life of that 
Regulation; i.e. until April 2005. 
The Grand Alliance consortium 
comprises the carriers Hapag-
Lloyd Container Linie GmbH, 
Malaysia International Shipping 
Corporation BHD (MISC), 
Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK), 
Orient Overseas Container Line 
Limited (OOCL) and P&O 
Nedlloyd. Although the Grand 
Alliance operates joint liner 
shipping services on several 
major trade lanes, exemption 
was sought only for the 
9 1 
- ' Commission Regulation 870/95 of 
20 April 1995 - OJ No L89 of 
21.4.95, p. 7. 
-*■ Commission Regulation (EC) No 
823/2000 of 19 April 2000 - OJ 20 
April 2000. 
consortium's service between 
ports in Northern and Southern 
Europe and ports in the Far East. 
All Grand Alliance lines operate 
within the Far Eastern Freight 
Conference (FEFC) on the Far 
East trades. Article 6(1) of 
Regulation 870 provided that a 
consortium operating within a 
conference, in order to benefit 
automatically from exemption, 
must possess a share of the direct 
trade between the range of ports 
it serves of less than 30%.23 As 
the Grand Alliance exceeded this 
threshold, 24 it applied for 
exemption under the simplified 
opposition procedure provided 
for in Article 7 of the 
Regulation. Under this 
procedure, which has been 
maintained, with minor 
amendments, in Regulation 823, 
a consortium with a trade share25 
exceeding the above threshold 
but below 50%, will be deemed 
exempt unless the Commission 
raises objections within six 
months of notification. 
With regard to the Grand 
Alliance notification, one 
element gave the Commission 
- J In Regulation 823. the words 'trade' 
and 'trade share' have been replaced 
by 'market' and 'market share'. 
The exact figure is confidential. 
Amended to 'market share' in 
Regulation 823. 
some cause for concern. The 
FEFC lines together have a 
significant share of the total 
volume carried by container 
vessel on the Far East trades. 
While independent lines 
certainly offer some competition 
to the conference lines, it is not 
as strong as that provided by 
independents on most other 
major trades. This, together with 
the fact that individual service 
contracts - which provide some 
assurance of competition 
between carriers - are not a 
feature of the Far East trades, led 
the Commission to request the 
Grand Alliance to supplement its 
notification with further and 
more detailed evidence of 
effective competition.26 
Following an extended 
examination, the Commission 
was finally satisfied that the 
members of the consortium are, 
and will remain, subject to 
effective competition. Evidence 
was provided, inter alia, of 
frequent switching by shippers 
both as between the members of 
the Grand Alliance and as 
between these lines and other 
lines. The lines were also able to 
provide proof of considerable 
fluctuation of the market shares 
of the individual Grand Alliance 
lines over a relatively short time-
span. Both of these elements 
indicate that there is substantial 
competition on service, if not 
-" It is a condition of exemption that 
the consortium members are subject 
to actual or potential effective 
competition, either on price or 
service or both (Article 5 of 
Regulations 870 and 823). 
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price, between the consortium 
members and between these lines 
and outsiders (other conference 
lines and independents). 
As the consortium clearly 
fulfilled all other conditions for 
exemption set out in Regulation 
870/95, the Commission 
accordingly decided 
oppose exemption. 
not to 
Plaintes contre des droits exclusifs en 
matière de jeux de hasard rejetées 
Par Maija LAURILA, DG COMP-D-3 
Le 21 mars 2000, dans le cadre 
des procédures d'infractions 
présumées, la Commission a 
décidé de suivre les propositions 
de la DG Concurrence et de 
classer cinq plaintes alléguant 
des infractions notamment aux 
règles de concurrence par 
certains Etats membres 
(Autriche, Grèce) en matière de 
la réglementation des jeux de 
hasard. 
Ces décisions étaient motivées 
notamment par les principes 
découlants de la jurisprudence 
assez récente de la Cour de 
justice (voir arrêts du 21 
septembre 1999 dans l'affaire C-
124/97 Läärä concernant des 
machines à sous et du 21 octobre 
1999 dans l'affaire C-67/98 
Zenatti concernant la collecte de 
paris). Selon cette jurisprudence, 
les Etats membres jouissent 
d'une large marge d'appréciation 
quant à l'organisation des 
activités dans ce secteur et quant 
à la protection qu'ils souhaitent 
accorder aux citoyens. En effet, 
selon la Cour, une autorisation 
limitée de ces jeux dans un cadre 
exclusif, qui présente l'avantage 
de canaliser l'envie de jouer et 
l'exploitation des jeux dans un 
circuit contrôlé, de prévenir les 
risques d'une telle exploitation à 
des fins frauduleuses et 
criminelles et d'utiliser les 
bénéfices qui en découlent à des 
fins d'utilité publique, s'inscrit 
dans la poursuite des objectifs 
d'intérêt public. En outre, la 
question de savoir s'il est 
préférable, plutôt que d'octroyer 
un droit exclusif d'exploitation à 
un organisme, d'adopter une 
réglementation imposant aux 
opérateurs intéressés les 
prescriptions nécessaires, relève 
du pouvoir d'appréciation des 
Etats membres, sous réserve que 
le choix retenu n'apparaisse pas 
disproportionné au regard du but 
recherché. 
Cette jurisprudence concerne 
certes l'interprétation des règles 
du marché intérieur et plus 
précisément de la libre prestation 
des services et non des règles de 
concurrence. Néanmoins, la 
Commission doit en tenir compte 
en appréciant une plainte 
alléguant une violation des 
règles de concurrence 
communautaires du fait de la 
même législation nationale. 
Comme la Cour a en principe 
admis une limitation de l'offre 
des jeux de hasard dans l'intérêt 
public ainsi que l'existence d'un 
droit exclusif dans le but de 
contrôle, la Commission ne peut 
considérer que les règles de 
concurrence s'opposent à de 
telles circonstances. En 
l'absence d'un abus identifiable 
d'une position dominante et de 
toute autre violation entraînée 
par les droits spéciaux ou 
exclusifs en question, la 
Commission ne pouvait donner 
suite aux plaintes susvisées. 
Toute personne souhaitant 
présenter une plainte à la 
Commission en cette matière est 
désormais invitée à mettre en 
évidence l'abus de la position 
dominante dans le chef de 
l'entreprise détenant le droit 
exclusif ou spécial, faute de quoi 
sa plainte est susceptible d'être 
classée sans suite. 
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THE COMMISSION'S ASSESSMENT 
OF THE EUROVISION SYSTEM 
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 81 EC 
Andrés FONT GALARZA, DG COMP-C-2 
I ­ INTRODUCTION 
The Commission exempted on 
10 May 2000 the Eurovision 
system from 1993 until 2005. 
This is a new significant episode 
in the long and complicated 
history of the Commission's 
assessment of the Eurovision 
system pursuant to article 81 EC 
which has been marked by the 
conflicting interests of European 
public and commercial 
broadcasters and the 1996 Court 
of First Instance' s annulment of 
the Commission's decision 
which exempted the Eurovision 
system. 
This article intends to give an 
overview of the Commission's 
reasoning behind the just granted 
exemption. The interpretation 
and the legal implications of the 
above­mentioned ruling of the 
Court of First Instance are not 
addressed in this article. 
II CHRONOLOGY/ 
BACKGROUND 
The European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU) is an association of 
radio and television 
organisations which in particular 
co­ordinate television 
programme exchanges among its 
active members. In addition, in 
the framework of Eurovision, 
EBU active members participate 
in the joint acquisition and 
sharing of sport rights. The EBU 
has 68 active members in 49 
countries situated in the 
European broadcasting area and 
50 associate members in 30 
countries outside the area. The 
EBU members are the main 
European public broadcasters. 
On 3 April 1989 the European 
Broadcasting Union ("EBU") 
applied for negative clearance or 
for exemption pursuant to 
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty 
for the Eurovision system. 
On 11 June 1993 the 
Commission adopted a decision 
pursuant to Article 81(3) EC 
granting a conditional exemption 
until 25 February 1998 to the 
notified EBU's provisions. The 
exemption was subject to a sub­
licensing scheme of the EBU to 
third parties of the jointly 
acquired television rights to 
sport events. 
On 11 July 1996 the CFI 
annulled the Commission 
decision following an appeal by 
a number of European television 
channels27. 
2 ' Metropole Télévision SA and Reti 
Televisive Italiane SpA and 
The EBU appealed the CFI's 
ruling before the Court of Justice 
but withdrew it in May 2000. 
Therefore, the annulment of the 
Commission decision stands. 
On 1st September 199928 the 
Commission published an 
Article 19(3) Notice showing its 
intention to exempt the 
Eurovision system. 
On 10 May 2000 the 
Commission adopted a decision 
exempting the Eurovision 
system pursuant to Article 81(3) 
from 1993 until 200529. 
Ill THE NOTIFIED 
ARRANGEMENTS 
THE EUROVISION 
SYSTEM 
The notified arrangements are 
the so­called "Eurovision 
system", that is, the rules which 
govern within the EBU and the 
Eurovision/Sports system: (1) 
the joint acquisition of television 
sports rights (2) the sharing of 
jointly acquired television sports 
rights (3) the exchange of the 
signal for sport events (4) the 
access scheme for non EBU 
members to Eurovision sports 
rights (5) The sublicensing rules 
relating to exploitation of 
Eurovision rights on pay­TV 
channels. 
Gestevisión Telecinco SA and 
Antena 3 de Televisión ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities, joint cases T­528/93, 
T­542/93, T­543/93 and T­546/93, 
European Court Reports 1996, p. II­
0649. 
2 8 OJ C 248/4. 1.9.99. 
2 9 Not yet published. 
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The parties made some changes 
to the notified arrangements. 
These changes, which are part of 
the notified Eurovision system, 
are the 1993 and the 1999 access 
schemes for non-members. 
1. The access scheme for non 
EBU members to 
Eurovision sports rights 
(1993) 
Under the scheme submitted to 
the Commission on 26 February 
1993, the EBU and its members 
undertake to grant non-member 
broadcasters extensive access to 
Eurovision sports programmes 
for which the rights have been 
acquired on an exclusive basis 
through collective negotiations. 
The 1993 scheme grants live and 
deferred transmission rights to 
third parties of jointly acquired 
Eurovision sports rights. In 
particular the non-EBU members 
have significant access to the 
unused rights, i.e. for the 
transmission of sport events for 
which an EBU member does not 
transmit any part or only a minor 
part of the sports event. The 
terms and conditions of access 
are freely negotiated between the 
EBU (for trans-national 
channels), or the member(s) in 
the country concerned (for 
national channels), and the non-
member. However, the EBU and 
its members will in no 
circumstances grant less 
favourable access than is 
stipulated in these sublicensing 
rules. 
2. The sublicensing rules 
relating to exploitation of 
Eurovision rights on pay-
TV channels (1999) 
As an addition to the general 
rules on EBU non-members' 
access to Eurovision Sport 
Programmes adopted on 
24.02.1993, the EBU adopted 
and submitted to the 
Commission on 26.03.1999 a set 
of sublicensing rules relating to 
exploitation of Eurovision rights 
on pay-TV channels. 
Pursuant to the 1999 set of rules 
when an EBU member transmits 
part of a sports event on its 
national general programme 
channel and part on its pay-TV 
channel: 
A non-EBU member has all 
rights stemming from the 
1993 rules for the 
broadcasting on its free-to-
air or pay-TV channels, live 
or deferred. In addition; 
A non-EBU member has the 
right to transmit on its pay-
TV channel identical or 
comparable competitions to 
those presented on the EBU 
member's pay-TV channel. 
The introduction of those 1999 
rules on pay TV by the EBU was 
the necessary consequence of the 
evolution of the European 
television market which led the 
EBU members to enter the 
thematic channels' segment. 
Digital technology offers the 
technical potential for more and 
more such channels, and the 
large majority (if not the totality) 
of such further channels will 
certainly be both thematic (in 
terms of programming) and pay 
TV (in terms of financing). 
Therefore, in the late 1990s 
when the possibilities for 
technical delivery were 
exploding and as a consequence, 
a multitude of different channels 
were on offer and audiences 
became more and more 
fragmented, the EBU members 
had to adapt and to diversify 
their programming offer 
accordingly with thematic 
channels. In this context, the 
1999 access scheme became 
necessary in order to ensure that 
the joint acquisition origin of the 
EBU's rights would not unfairly 
place other pay-TV competitors 
in disadvantage. 
The complete text of the 
sublicensing rules have been 
published by the EBU on 
internet: http://www.ebu.ch and 
it is annexed to the Commission 
decision. It is also important to 
note that the EBU and its 
members can grant more 
favourable access than that 
stipulated in the sublicensing 
rules. 
IV THE RELEVANT 
MARKET 
1. Product market 
The EBU considered that the 
market relevant for the 
assessment of the case is the 
market for the acquisition of 
television rights to important 
sporting events in all disciplines 
of sport, irrespective of the 
national or international 
character of the event. The EBU 
is only active in the acquisition 
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of television rights to sports 
events of a ' pan-European 
interest30. 
The Commission decided that 
the market definition proposed 
by the EBU was too wide and 
that there is a strong likelihood 
that there are separate markets 
for the acquisition of some major 
sport events, most of them 
international. The Commission's 
assessment in this market 
definition issue is particularly 
interesting as a precedent for 
future cases in the TV sports 
rights domain. The Commission 
applies the substitutability test as 
set out in its Commission Notice 
on the definition of relevant 
market for the purposes of 
Community competition law3 '. 
The Commission started by 
saying that sports programmes 
have particular characteristics; 
they are able to achieve high 
viewing figures and reach an 
identifiable audience, which is a 
special target for certain 
important advertisers. 
However, the Commission finds 
that the attraction of sports 
programmes and hence the level 
of competition for the television 
rights varies according to the 
type of sport and the type of 
event. Mass sports like football, 
3U Sport events of a pan-European 
interest include for example; The 
Olympic Games, the Football World 
Cup, the European football 
Championships; the World and 
European Athletic Championships; 
Wimbledon, the US and French 
tennis Opens; the NBA basketball. 
3 1 (97/C 372/03) 
tennis or motor-racing generally 
attract large audiences, the 
preferences varying from 
country to country. By contrast, 
minority sports achieve very low 
ratings. International events tend 
to be more attractive for the 
audience in a given country than 
national ones, provided the 
national team or a national 
champion is involved, while 
international events in which no 
national champion or team is 
participating can often be of 
little interest. In the last ten 
years, with increased 
competition in the television 
markets, the prices for television 
rights to sport events have 
increased considerably. This is 
particularly true with regard to 
outstanding international events 
such as the Football World Cup 
or the Olympic Games. 
The preferences of viewers 
determine the value of a program 
to advertisers and pay TV 
broadcasters32. In free to air 
television we cannot directly 
observe viewers' reactions to 
changes in the price of 
broadcasts, and hence we cannot 
directly observe evidence on the 
price elasticities of demand. This 
is also true for pay-TV since 
pay-TV contracts usually 
involve monthly or annual 
3 - The same that the customers 
substitutability determine the 
upstream market of the supply of 
digital interactive television services 
by service providers to content 
providers as the Commission has 
decided in its decision of 15 
September 1999 - case 36.539 -
British Interactive Broadcasting/ 
Open. OJ L 312, 6 December 1999. 
payments for bundles of 
channels, but not individual 
prices for each program. 
However, if we observe that 
sports broadcasts achieve the 
same or similar sized audiences 
whether or not they are 
competing with simultaneously 
broadcast sports events, there is 
strong evidence that these events 
could determine the subscribers 
or advertisers' choice of a certain 
broadcaster. 
Indeed, data on viewer 
behaviour, among major sporting 
events, shows that for at least 
some sporting events which have 
been analysed such as the 
Summer Olympics, the Winter 
Olympics, the Wimbledon Finals 
and the Football World Cup 
viewing behaviour does not 
appear to be influenced by the 
coincidence of other major 
sports events being broadcast 
simultaneously, or nearly 
simultaneously. That is, viewing 
figures for the major sports 
events appear to be largely 
independent of whatever other 
major sports are broadcast near 
in time to them33. Therefore, the 
3 3 When major sport event A is 
broadcast simultaneously with 
another major sport event B, event 
A achieves (on average) the same 
audience as it does when event Β is 
not available. For instance, there is 
evidence that the elasticity of 
demand in the UK for the 
Wimbledon Finals with respect to 
the World Cup Football is very 
small, and probably zero. World 
Cup Football viewers do not appear 
to watch Wimbledon Finals, even 
when the World Cup is not 
available. The same can be said with 
regard to the Premier Leaaue 
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offer of such sport events could 
influence the subscribers or 
advertisers to such an extent that 
the broadcaster would be 
inclined to pay much higher 
prices. 
However, the Commission did 
not find it necessary for the 
purposes of this case to exactly 
define the relevant product 
markets. Taking into account the 
present structure of the market 
and the sublicensing sets of rules 
granting access to non-EBU 
members to the Eurovision 
Sports Programmes, the 
Commission considered that 
these agreements do not raise 
competition concerns , even on 
the basis of markets for the 
acquisition of particular sport 
events such as the Summer 
Olympics. 
2. Geographic market 
The Commission did not find 
necessary for the purposes of 
this case to exactly define the 
relevant geographic market. 
Taking into account the present 
structure of the market and the 
sublicensing sets of rules 
granting access to non-EBU 
Football broadcast by BSkyB in 
relation with the top-30/40 most 
viewed sport programs in free-to-air 
TV in the UK.. The test indicates 
that viewers of Premier League 
matches do not substitute to other 
major sports events when broadcast 
on the same day. Source : "Market 
definition in European Sports 
Broadcasting and Competition for 
Sports Broadcasting Rights" by 
Market Analysis LTD, a study for 
Competition DG of the European 
Commission, October 1999. 
members to the Eurovision Sport 
Programmes the agreements did 
not raise competition concerns 
even on the basis of national 
markets for the acquisition of 
sports rights as well as for the 
downstream markets of free-to-
air and pay-TV broadcasting. 
V MARKET STRUCTURE 
As a result of the new entrants 
and the increased capacity 
devoted to sports broadcasts, 
there are fierce bidding contests 
to obtain valuable sports 
broadcasting rights. The effect of 
that seems to be a transferring of 
profits away from downstream 
broadcasters and towards 
upstream rights owners. The 
prices of sporting events TV 
rights have therefore increased 
sharply. 
In this context, the EBU has 
significantly lost market share in 
the relevant markets for the last 
ten years. This is the most 
relevant fact underlying the 
Commission's exemption 
decision. 
The new market structure 
confirms that digitisation and the 
convergence process can in 
principle be a factor which 
increases competition in the 
absence of "technical or content" 
bottlenecks which could 
foreclose the new emerging 
markets. The new capacity leads 
to the entrance of new 
competitors in the market. New 
competitors should bring more 
competition in the TV sports 
market under normal market 
circumstances. 
VI THE COMMISSION'S 
ASSESSMENT 
The decision concludes that the 
notified arrangements fall within 
the scope of Article 81(1) EC, 
but that subject to the conditions 
and obligations in the decision 
and following the changes made 
as a result of the Commission's 
intervention, the criteria of 
Article 81(3) EC are met. 
1. ARTICLE 81(1) EC 
1.1 Restriction of competition 
between the EBU 
members as a result of the 
notified agreements 
The EBU rules governing the 
joint acquisition and sharing of 
television rights to sport events 
and the use of the Eurovision 
signal have as their object and 
effect the restriction of 
competition between the 
members. 
1.2. The joint acquisition of 
rights 
As a result of the EBU statutes 
(Article 13(4)) and from the 
nature of Eurovision as a 
solidarity system, the EBU 
members bind themselves to 
jointly acquire television rights 
to sport events. Therefore, the 
joint acquisition of rights within 
the framework of Eurovision 
restricts and, in many cases, 
eliminates competition between 
the participants in the Eurovision 
system. Instead of bidding 
against each other, members 
participate in joint negotiations 
and agree among themselves the 
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financial and other conditions for 
the acquisition of the rights. 
1.3 The sharing of the 
Eurovision rights 
The Eurovision rights are shared 
between the EBU members 
participating in the joint 
acquisition of the rights for a 
specific sports event. All 
members participating in the 
agreement are entitled to the full 
benefit of the rights regardless of 
the territorial scope of their 
activity and regardless of their 
technical means of broadcasting. 
However, members who 
compete for the same national 
audience (several members in 
one country or members 
broadcasting from their country 
into the country of another 
member in the same language) 
have to agree among themselves 
on the procedure for attributing a 
priority to one of them. 
1.4 The exchange of the 
Eurovision signal 
For events which take place 
within the Eurovision area the 
coverage (television signal 
consisting of basic video and 
international sound-feed) is 
produced by a member in the 
country concerned and is 
available to all other members 
via the Eurovision programme 
exchange system. The 
Eurovision programme exchange 
system is based on reciprocity : 
whenever one of the 
participating members covers an 
event, in particular a sports 
event, which takes place on its 
own national territory and is of 
potential interest to other 
Eurovision members, it offers its 
coverage free of charge to all the 
other Eurovision members on the 
understanding that in return it 
will receive corresponding offers 
from all the other members in 
respect of events taking place in 
their respective countries. The 
originating member also 
provides the necessary 
infrastructure to other interested 
members such as commentary 
positions, etc. 
2. ARTICLE 81(3) EC 
All conditions pursuant to 
Article 81(3) EC are met in the 
Commission's view. The 
Eurovision systems improves 
distribution and the coverage of 
the relevant sport events in the 
benefit of the European viewers. 
The restrictions are 
indispensable to attain that 
objective. In addition, the EBU 
has modified the notified 
agreements to include a set of 
sublicensing rules which make 
sure that non-EBU members 
have extensive access to the 
Eurovision sport rights. This 
counterbalances the restrictive 
effects of the joint acquisition of 
the sport rights. The schemes 
will provide extensive live and 
deferred transmission access for 
non-members on reasonable 
terms . 
3. CONDITIONS AND 
OBLIGATIONS 
The Commission imposed 
basically the same conditions 
and obligations upon the EBU as 
those in its 1993 decision to 
ensure a proper functioning of 
the access schemes for non EBU 
members of the relevant 
Eurovision sports rights. 
3.1 Conditions 
In order to ensure contractual 
access for third parties to the 
television rights to sports events 
acquired within the framework 
of Eurovision such contractual 
access must be allowed under 
the agreements with the rights 
owners (sport organisers or 
rights agents). It is therefore a 
condition for the exemption that 
the EBU and its members 
finalise only agreements which 
allow the EBU and its members 
to grant access to third parties in 
accordance with the access 
scheme for non EBU members 
to Eurovision sport rights and 
the sublicensing rules relating to 
the exploitation of Eurovision 
rights on pay-TV channels or, 
subject to the approval of the 
EBU, on more favourable 
conditions. 
3.2 Obligations 
In order to assist the 
Commission during the 
exemption period in checking 
whether the rules on contractual 
access for non EBU members to 
Eurovision sport rights and the 
sublicensing rules relating to the 
exploitation of Eurovision rights 
on pay-TV channels are applied 
in an appropriate, reasonable and 
non-discriminatory way, the 
EBU must be under the 
obligation to inform the 
Commission of all amendments 
and additions to the access 
32 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 
^ ARTICLES 
schemes and of all arbitration 
procedures concerning disputes 
under the access schemes. 
VII - CONCLUSION 
Irrespective of the legal debate 
which followed the 1993 
Commission decision and the 
consequent annulment by the 
ruling of the CFI in 1996, the 
new Commission exemption of 
the Eurovision system 
constitutes an important 
precedent in the domain of 
product market definition for TV 
sports rights and clarifies the 
Commission's policy with 
regard to the assessment of joint 
buying arrangements of 
exclusive rights. The 
Commission's exemption of the 
Eurovision system is consistent 
with a market structure in which 
the EBU members have 
significantly lost market share in 
Europe in the last years as a 
result of increased competition 
from other powerful commercial 
broadcasters. 
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Le dégroupage de la boucle locale : un pas 
de plus dans la libéralisation des 
télécommunications. Exemple de 
complémentarité entre la régulation 
sectorielle et les règles de concurrence du 
Traité 
Par Christophe de LA ROCHEFORDIERE, 
DG Comp-C-1 
La Commission a adopté le 26 
avril 2000 une Recommandation 
aux Etats Membres et une 
Communication sur le 
« dégroupage de la boucle 
locale » des réseaux de 
télécommunications des 
opérateurs historiques34. 
Derrière cette terminologie 
absconse (en anglais « local loop 
unbundling ») se cache l'un des 
principaux enjeux de 
concurrence dans le secteur des 
télécommunications, à savoir le 
manque - voire l'absence - de 
concurrence sur les terminaisons 
de réseaux des opérateurs 
historiques, qui permet à ceux-ci, 
malgré la libéralisation de la 
téléphonie vocale35 depuis le 1er 
janvier 1998, de garder des parts 
de marchés hégémoniques, dans 
bien des cas proches de 100%, 
sur les marchés d'appels locaux 
et de services d'accès aux 
abonnés. L'accès à la boucle 
locale est devenu un nouvel 
enjeu avec le développement 
3 4 Non encore publiée. Ces textes sont 
diponibles sur le site internet de la 
DG Concurrence, page 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/ 
index_en.htm. 
3 5 Cf. Directive 98/10/CE. 
d'Internet : les communications 
permettant aux utilisateurs 
d'avoir accès à leur serveur 
Internet sont des 
communications locales et 
doivent donc habituellement être 
acheminées par la boucle locale 
des opérateurs historiques. Pour 
cette raison, afin de favoriser la 
concurrence dans les 
communications et le 
développement d'Internet, la 
Commission, suivant en cela les 
conclusions du Conseil européen 
de Lisbonne36, a recommandé 
aux Etats Membres de mettre en 
oeuvre d'ici la fin de l'an 2000 
le dégroupage de la boucle 
locale. Plusieurs Etats membres 
ont d'ailleurs déjà rendu 
obligatoire le dégroupage ou fixé 
formellement des dates à cette 
fin (Autriche, Danemark, 
Finlande, Allemagne, Italie, 
Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni). 
Les caractéristiques de la 
boucle locale. Situation 
concurrentielle. 
La boucle locale, que la langue 
anglaise désigne aussi bien par 
3° Voir http://vvwvv.ispo.cec.be/ 
eeurope-initiative.htm 
local loop ou last mile, est la 
terminaison de réseau des 
opérateurs télécom reliant leur 
dernier répartiteur aux abonnés 
du réseau. Cette boucle locale 
est, sauf exception, pour chaque 
ligne composée d'une paire fils 
de cuivre. Sur cette paire de 
cuivre transitent des 
communications en mode 
numérique ou analogique, sur 
des fréquences hertziennes 
permettant d'acheminer de la 
voix et des données, mais ayant 
normalement une capacité 
insuffisante pour acheminer 
rapidement des images ou des 
volumes importants 
d'information (la capacité 
disponible avec les technologies 
téléphoniques traditionnelles est 
inférieure à 50 kbits/s). 
Le contrôle de cette 
infrastructure, qui est un réseau 
de distribution de détail de 
services téléphoniques aux 
particuliers, s'avère actuellement 
déterminant dans la concurrence 
que livrent les opérateurs 
existants aux nouveaux entrants 
pour le maintien de leurs parts de 
marché. Certes, depuis le 1er 
janvier 1998, compte tenu des 
obligations des Directives 
« téléphonie vocale » et 
« interconnexion »37, les 
opérateurs historiques doivent 
accorder l'interconnexion et la 
sélection d'appels à leurs 
nouveaux concurrents. L'option 
de présélection d'opérateur est 
3 7 Cf. Directives 98/10/CE et la 
directive 97/33/CE, amendée par la 
directive 98/61/CE. 
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même obligatoire38 depuis le 1er 
janvier 2000. Mais comme les 
nouveaux entrants n'ont en 
temps normal pas de boucle 
locale, l'interconnexion, associée 
à la présélection d'opérateur, ne 
leur permet habituellement que 
d'offrir des services sur les 
communications non locales39, 
que ce soient les communi­
cations inter­régionales ou bien 
internationales. 
Dans la directive sur la 
réalisation de la pleine 
concurrence sur le marché des 
télécommunications40, la Com­
mission distinguait plusieurs 
services de téléphonie fixe de 
détail, à savoir le raccordement 
initial, l'abonnement mensuel, 
les communications locales, 
régionales et internationales. Il 
convient naturellement de 
surveiller attentivement les 
catégories de services établies de 
la sorte, en raison notamment de 
la rapidité des évolutions 
technologiques, et de les 
réexaminer régulièrement, au cas 
par cas ; toutefois, à l'heure 
3 8 Cf. Directive 97/33/CE, amendée 
par la directive 98/61/EC 
3 " Sauf si la sélection / présélection 
d'opérateur inclut les 
communications locales. Cf. 
Directive 98/61/CE du Parlement 
Européen et du Conseil 24 
septembre 1998 amendant la 
Directive 97/33/CE (JO L268, 
3.10.1998). Début 2000 la plupart 
des Etats Membres n'avaient pas 
encore mis en oeuvre les obligations 
de la directive pour la 
sélection/présélection des appels 
locaux. 
4 0 Directive 96/19/CE, 20e 
considérant, JO L 74, du 22.3.1996, 
Ρ 13. 
actuelle, ces services ne sont 
normalement pas substituables 
les uns aux autres et ils peuvent 
donc être considérés comme 
autant de marchés en cause41. 
Un particulier peut grâce à la 
présélection avoir deux 
opérateurs : l'un pour les 
services d'accès (l'opérateur 
historique), et un autre (un 
nouvel entrant) pour les appels 
téléphoniques. Ceci implique 
que les conséquences concurren­
tielles du contrôle de la boucle 
locale par les opérateurs 
historiques ne soient pas 
analysées sur l'ensemble agrégé 
des services de détail, mais sur 
chaque marché spécifique défini 
de la sorte. 
De plus, un nouveau marché est 
en voie d'apparition, celui des 
services de télécommunications 
à haut débit qui peuvent être 
fournis sous forme de services 
DSL (digital subscriber line) par 
la boucle locale. C'est vers ces 
nouveaux services que 
convergent les regards de tous 
les acteurs et leurs stratégies. Les 
nouveaux services de type DSL 
utilisent une autre gamme de 
fréquences que les services 
téléphoniques classiques, de 
sorte que les abonnés, de même 
qu'ils peuvent recevoir sur leurs 
transistors radios des émissions 
en ondes moyennes et en 
modulation de fréquence, vont 
sur les mêmes lignes télépho­
niques pouvoir simultanément 
bénéficier de services à bande 
4 ' Cf Communication de la 
Commission sur la définition du 
marché en cause, JOCE C273 du 
09/12/1997. 
étroite ­ les communications 
téléphoniques traditionnelles ­ et 
de services à large bande, par 
exemple l'ADSL42. La 
différence est saisissante, le 
volume d'information pouvant 
passer par la bande large étant de 
actuellement de l'ordre de 1 à 10 
Mbits pour une ligne desservie 
en ADSL. Nous faisons de la 
sorte un saut de trois chiffres 
dans les capacités de 
transmission disponibles sur la 
paire de cuivre, sans qu'il faille 
changer celle­ci (seuls les 
modems de terminaison aux 
deux bouts de la ligne de cuivre 
doivent être ajoutés, ainsi qu'un 
séparateur entre les 
communications à bande étroite 
et à large bande). L'enjeu est 
considérable, parce que sur le fil 
de cuivre pourront désormais 
circuler non seulement la voix et 
les données, mais aussi la vidéo. 
Quand on sait que les images 
sont beaucoup plus gourmandes 
en capacités de transmission que 
la voix et les données, on a là un 
facteur de véritable explosion du 
volume de trafic de télécom­
munications. Le marché des 
services télécommu­nications, 
loin d'être saturé en raison du 
développement d'Internet, pour­
rait même connaître une 
nouvelle jeunesse. 
4 2 L'ADSL­asymetric digital sub­
scriber line­ une une variante parmi 
la famille des services DSL. 
L'ADSL consiste à faire descendre 
du réseau vers l'abonné des volumes 
supérieurs à ceux qui remontent de 
l'abonné vers le réseau. 
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Le caractère indispensable de 
l'infrastructure 
La Commission note dans sa 
Communication que la boucle 
locale est une infrastructure sans 
l'accès à laquelle, si l'opérateur 
historique est le seul à fournir le 
service, aucune concurrence ne 
pourra apparaître sur les marchés 
en cause tels qu'elle les définit : 
i. les services d'accès aux 
particuliers, que ce soit pour 
les services traditionnels à 
bande étroite (la connexion, 
l'abonnement mensuel) ou les 
nouveaux services à large 
bande ; 
ii. le marché des 
communications locales43. 
Certes, une concurrence partielle 
pourra apparaître sur tel réseau 
câblé existant, telle boucle 
optique ou telle « boucle radio » 
(les fréquences de boucles radios 
- wireless loops en Anglais - sont 
en cours d'attribution dans 
plusieurs Etats membres), mais 
habituellement pas au niveau 
national dans des conditions 
économiques concurrentielles 
avec la paire de cuivre. Il 
apparaît en effet que les réseaux 
câblés sont dans la plupart des 
cas des réseaux ne desservant 
pas la population sur le territoire 
national tout entier ; de plus, 
l'introduction des services à 
large bande sur les réseaux 
43 Sauf dès que la sélection et la 
présélection d'opérateurs incluent 
également, comme le prévoient les 
directives communautaires, les 
appels locaux. 
câblés exige de nouveaux 
investissements importants. Le 
câble, à la différence de la paire 
de cuivre, doit être partagé entre 
de nombreux utilisateurs, et les 
technologies de large bande ne 
sont pas stabilisées à un niveau 
qui les rendent parfaitement 
substituables et compétitives 
avec les technologies DSL sur la 
paire du cuivre. 
La Commission souligne 
également que la boucle locale 
est une infrastructure qui ne peut 
pas être dupliquée à un coût 
raisonnable et dans des 
conditions normales de 
rentabilité. 
L'une des raisons ayant conduit 
la Commission à de telles 
conclusions est la définition du 
marché géographique pertinent 
auquel donne accès cette 
infrastructure de distribution de 
services. En effet, les 
infrastructures des opérateurs 
historiques ont été construites au 
niveau national lorsqu'ils étaient 
en position de monopole. Depuis 
la libéralisation complète de la 
téléphonie vocale ne 1998, la 
concurrence se développe au 
niveau national, les nouveaux 
opérateurs ayant des licences 
nationales leur permettant 
d'offrir des services de détail sur 
l'ensemble du territoire d'un Etat 
membre, comme ils le font par 
exemple pour les 
communications à longue 
distance. De sorte que les 
nouveaux entrants, sauf cas 
particuliers, visent normalement 
le marché national, pourvu qu'ils 
aient accès aux infrastructures de 
distribution de services leur 
permettant de le faire. Il est 
normalement hors de portée d'un 
quelconque intervenant, compte 
tenu du niveau absolu des coûts, 
de dupliquer l'intégralité de la 
boucle locale, soit les millions de 
lignes desservant l'ensemble des 
abonnés du territoire national, 
que ce soit avec la technologie 
existante de la paire de cuivre ou 
avec des technologies de 
substitution telles que le câble ou 
la fibre optique. La 
Communication note également 
que les réseaux de boucle locale 
radio qui font actuellement 
l'objet d'attribution de 
fréquences dans plusieurs Etats 
Membres ne paraissent pas 
actuellement compétitifs sur 
l'ensemble du marché et ne 
permettraient à l'heure actuelle 
que de cibler des clientèles très 
spécifiques telles que les PME 
ou les professionnels. La boucle 
locale est donc indispensable à la 
fourniture de services de détail 
sur les marchés identifiés ci-
dessous. 
L'accès et ses conditions 
Ainsi sont remplies les 
conditions restrictives -
caractère indispensable de 
l'infrastructure pour délivrer le 
produit/service, impossibilité 
technique et/ou économique de 
créer une infrastructure 
équivalente et absence sans 
l'accès à l'infrastructure de 
concurrence sur le(s) marché(s) 
de référence - qu'a posées la 
Cour dans l'Arrêt Bronner44, 
4 4 Cf. l'arrêt de la Cour du 26 
novembre 1998, Oscar Bronner 
GmbH & Co. KG contre Mediaprint 
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pour que 1 acces a une 
infrastructure soit requis en vertu 
de l'article 82 du Traité. Cette 
interprétation de la jurisprudence 
peut apparaître très limitatif, 
restreignant l'application de la 
doctrine des « infrastructures 
essentielles » à un cas 
particulier, celui où il n'existe 
pas d'autre concurrence sur le 
marché tel que défini. En réalité, 
compte tenu des caractéristiques 
de la boucle locale, il permet de 
résoudre la question de l'accès. 
En effet, si ainsi que l'indique la 
Communication il existe déjà 
une forme de concurrence sur la 
boucle locale de l'opérateur 
historique, par exemple parce 
qu'un autre opérateur a déjà 
obtenu l'accès, alors un refus 
d'accès peut être traité comme 
un abus « classique » de position 
dominante sous forme de 
discrimination. 
Il est par ailleurs à noter que la 
Commission a considéré dans la 
Communication une autre forme 
d'abus en tant que telle, la 
limitation de la production, des 
débouchés ou du développement 
technique au préjudice des 
consommateurs, et ce 
indépendamment de la condition 
précédente. Compte tenu du rôle 
stratégique de la boucle locale 
pour le déploiement de nouveaux 
services à large bande, il apparaît 
qu'un refus de débouclage aurait 
inéluctablement cet effet dès lors 
que le nouvel entrant souhaite 
Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag 
GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint 
Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH 
& Co. KG et Mediaprint 
Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. 
KG, Affaire C-7/97 
offrir de nouveaux services à 
haut débit tels que l'ADSL. La 
Commission, se basant sur 
l'Article 82, indique de la sorte 
que doivent être traitées avec une 
rigueur particulière les 
infractions se traduisant par un 
gel du développement de 
nouveaux produits et services. 
Le droit de la concurrence 
permet donc d'accompagner et 
même d'encourager les 
mutations dues au changement 
technologique. 
Un refus d'accès à cette 
infrastructure indispensable est 
alors un abus de position 
dominante et une infraction de 
l'Article 82 du Traité45 qui 
pourra selon les cas être traité 
comme un refus de vente, une 
discrimination (par exemple 
entre une filiale de l'opérateur 
historique et le nouvel entrant) 
ou la limitation de la production, 
des débouchés ou du 
développement technique au 
préjudice des consommateurs. 
La Communication de la 
Commission souligne également 
que des délais excessifs, des 
conditions contractuelles 
discriminatoires pourront être 
constitutives d'abus de position 
dominante. D'autres points 
sensibles devront être réglés par 
voie réglementaire nationale ou 
contractuelle et concernent intel-
aila les conditions de co-
localisation dans les installations 
techniques de l'opérateur 
historique (le nouvel entrant doit 
par exemple pouvoir installer ses 
modems ADSL dans les locaux 
Cf. notamment décision Sealink , JO 
L 15 du 18.1.1994 pp 8-19. 
de l'opérateur dominant), ainsi 
que la répartition et la bonne fin 
des obligations de services de 
maintenance. 
L'un des points sensibles 
qu'aborde également la 
Recommandation est celui du 
prix du dégroupage : il est 
normal que les opérateurs 
historiques fassent payer un droit 
d'accès à cette infrastructure, au 
même titre qu'ils le font 
lorsqu'ils accordent l'intercon-
nexion sur leur réseau. Puisque 
les directives communautaires 
prévoient que les tarifs des 
opérateurs historiques doivent 
être alignés sur leurs coûts, la 
question est de savoir quels sont 
ces coûts et leurs méthodes 
d'évaluation. Un consensus 
émerge dans les pays tels que les 
Etats Unis qui ont initié le 
dégroupage de la boucle locale 
en 1996 sur le fait que ces coûts 
doivent être non pas des coûts 
historiques des ex-monopoles 
(largement amortis et désormais 
sans signification économique) 
mais les coûts incrémentaux à 
long terme46 qu'encourent les 
opérateurs sur leur réseau. Dans 
sa Recommandation la 
Commission n'a pas pris de 
façon tranchée position sur la 
46 En Anglais Long Run Incremental 
Cost (LRIC). Il s'agit des coûts 
aditionnels afférents à la fourniture 
du service, comparés avec les coûts 
de l'opérateur en l'absence de 
fourniture du service. Ces coûts 
incluent l'actualisation de tous les 
investissements d'entretien et de 
mise à jour technologique 
prévisibles à moyen et long terme. Il 
s'agit donc d'un flux de dépenses 
futures actualisées et non pas d'un 
coût historique. 
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méthode à privilégier : de fait, à 
l'article 1 de la 
Recommandation, elle considère 
qu'il s'agit d'une responsabilité 
qui incombe aux autorités 
nationales de régulation. 
Les opérateurs devront être 
cohérents dans leurs méthodes 
de tarification : il ne serait pas 
normal en particulier que l'accès 
à la boucle locale soit facturé sur 
la base de coûts incrémentaux de 
long terme alors que les services 
de détail du même opérateur 
seraient encore tarifés aux coûts 
historiques. De telles pratiques 
de prix sont susceptibles de se 
traduire par des abus de position 
dominante sous l'article 82 du 
traité. La Communication 
souligne notamment à cet effet 
que le risque d'effet de ciseaux 
sur les marges ('margin 
squeeze') est plus élevé lorsque 
les tarifs de l'opérateur historique 
n'ont pas été totalement 
rééquilibrés selon le principe de 
couverture des coûts. 
D'une manière générale, un effet 
de ciseaux sur les marges, qui est 
une pratique de prix constitutive 
d'un abus au sens de l'article 82 
du traité47 lorsqu'elle émane 
d'un opérateur dominant intégré 
verticalement, est susceptible 
d'être mis en évidence quand il 
apparaît que les opérateurs 
historiques facturent l'accès à la 
boucle locale à des prix qui, si ils 
leur étaient imposés, rendraient 
la délivrance de leurs services 
correspondants d'accès aux 
4 7 Cf. Décision British Sugar, Journal 
officiel n° L 284 du 19/10/1988 p. 
0041 ­0059 
particuliers impossible au prix 
où ils la facturent, compte tenu 
des coûts supplémentaires 
afférents à la fourniture de ces 
services de détail. Il en résulte 
que les prix d'accès facturés aux 
nouveaux opérateurs (la 
connexion et la location 
mensuelle) doivent, par ligne, 
être sensiblement inférieurs aux 
tarifs de détail correspondants 
des opérateurs historiques. Cette 
relation est d'ailleurs reconnue 
par les opérateurs : Telia et 
Telenor, en vue de l'approbation 
de leur fusion par la 
Commission48 (approbation 
finalement sans effet puisque la 
fusion a ex­post échoué), 
s'étaient engagés à ce que les 
coûts d'accès à leur boucle 
locale soient en tous cas 
inférieurs d'un facteur 
substantiel à leurs tarifs 
correspondants de détail. 
La Recommandation de la 
Commission 
La Recommandation de la 
Commission porte sur trois 
options : 
(i) Le dégroupage total de la 
boucle locale (dégroupage 
de l'accès à la paire de 
cuivre pour la fourniture 
concurrentielle de services 
avancés par des tiers). 
Cette option se traduit par 
une perte complète par 
l'opérateur historique de 
sa relation commerciale 
avec l'utilisateur, qui 
résilie son abonnement 
48 Cf. décision du 13.10.1999, 
publier. 
auprès de lui et qui 
s'abonne aux services 
proposés par le nouvel 
entrant : ce dernier lui 
apporte aussi bien la 
téléphonie traditionnelle 
que les nouveaux services 
de type ADSL. 
Le dégroupage complet 
suppose que le nouvel 
entrant soit un opérateur 
complet de services de 
télécommunications à 
même de délivrer une 
large gamme de services 
aux utilisateurs. 
(ii) La seconde option qui doit 
selon la recommandation 
être accessible aux 
utilisateurs et aux 
nouveaux entrants est 
Γ utilisation partagée de 
la paire de cuivre. Dans 
cette option, le nouvel 
entrant et l'opérateur 
existant partagent la même 
ligne de cuivre : le nouvel 
entrant offre des services à 
large bande (type ADSL) 
alors que l'opérateur 
historique continue à offrir 
à l'abonné des services à 
bande étroite (technique­
ment, le trafic à bande 
étroite et le trafic à large 
bande sont distingués au 
moyen d'un séparateur 
placé avant le commu­
tateur de l'opérateur en 
place). L'abonné ne résilie 
donc pas son abonnement 
auprès de ce dernier, mais 
souscrit un nouvel abon­
nement auprès du nouvel 
entrant pour les services à 
large bande. 
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Dans la pratique, cette 
option de dégroupage 
partiel convient aux petits 
opérateurs qui n'ont pas 
une offre complète de 
services et qui ne 
souhaitent pas prendre le 
risque de voir l'opérateur 
historique abandonner 
toute relation commerciale 
avec l'utilisateur (ce qui 
pourrait mettre en cause la 
qualité du service de 
maintenance de 
l'infrastructure). Le 
nouvel opérateur aura 
souvent tendance à faire à 
l'utilisateur une offre 
conjointe avec un offreur 
de services internet. Cette 
option a fait l'objet de 
commentaires très 
défavorables de certains 
opérateurs historiques, qui 
craignent manifestement 
qu'elle accélère l'entrée 
de nouveaux opérateurs de 
services à forte valeur 
ajoutée (type ADSL) 
spécialisés sur ce type de 
produits : l'expérience des 
Etats Unis, où l'ouverture 
de la boucle locale a été 
introduite en 1996, montre 
que c'est sans doute là que 
se trouve le potentiel le 
plus important de 
développement du 
dégroupage. 
(iii) Une troisième option est 
prévue par la 
recommandation mais ne 
constitue par un véritable 
dégroupage de la ligne : 
l'opérateur historique 
installe une liaison 
d'accès à haut débit qui 
va jusqu'à l'abonné, puis la 
rend accessible à des tiers 
afin de leur permettre de 
fournir des services à haut 
débit aux clients. Cette 
dernière option place 
plutôt que les opérateurs 
concurrents en position de 
simples revendeurs sur la 
boucle locale, mais peut 
avoir un intérêt 
commercial transitoire 
pour eux en attendant 
qu'ils soient en mesure 
d'installer leurs propres 
équipements et de 
demander le dégroupage, 
partiel ou total, à 
l'opérateur existant. 
La Commission a considéré que 
ces trois types d'accès à la 
boucle locale devraient être 
accessibles simultanément, le 
nouvel entrant et le 
consommateur (et non 
l'opérateur existant) devant avoir 
le choix. 
Conclusions 
Une certaine prudence est 
nécessaire dans l'interprétation 
des droits d'accès à la boucle 
locale des opérateurs historiques 
sous les règles de concurrence, et 
les modalités du dégroupage à 
privilégier. Comme le note la 
Commission dans la 
Communication, compte tenu de 
la rapidité des évolutions 
technologiques, les définitions 
des marchés pertinents et 
l'analyse quant au caractère 
indispensable de la boucle locale 
pour la fourniture de services sur 
ces marchés devront être 
réexaminés chaque fois qu'un 
cas se présentera. 
Le dégroupage de la boucle 
locale est cependant un bon 
exemple de complémentarité 
possible entre la régulation 
sectorielle ex-ante et l'applica-
tion du droit de la concurrence. 
La Recommandation de la 
Commission aux Etats Membres 
adoptée le 26 avril dernier 
n'impose rien à ce stade, c'est de 
la soft law, les Etats Membres ne 
sont pas actuellement contraints 
au dégroupage de la boucle 
locale. Mais la Commission a 
donné un signal clair : si le 
dégroupage n'est pas mis en 
oeuvre par la voie réglementaire 
au niveau national, il pourra dans 
bien des cas l'être en vertu de 
l'Article 82 du Traité. Les 
opérateurs historiques confrontés 
à des demandes d'accès à la 
boucle locale devront com-
prendre que, dans la majorité des 
cas, leur intérêt bien compris est 
de l'accorder, de façon non 
discriminatoire, sans quoi ils 
s'exposent à des actions en 
infraction de l'Article 82 du 
Traité. Ultérieurement, la soft 
law sera durcie : ainsi 
qu'annoncé par M. Liikanen le 
26 avril lors de la présentation à 
la presse des orientations de 
suivi de la « Revue 1999 » 
adoptées par la Commission, le 
dégroupage sera par la suite 
introduit dans le nouveau cadre 
réglementaire communautaire et 
deviendra obligatoire. 
Le chemin qui mène à une 
concurrence équitable sur la 
boucle locale est toutefois semé 
d'embûches, comme le montre 
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l'expérience de l'Allemagne, qui 
a introduit le dégroupage depuis 
1998 : deux ans plus tard, 
Deutsche Telekom contrôle 
encore environ 99% du marché 
des services d'accès et des 
communications locales. Les 
conditions dans lesquelles a été 
organisé ce dégroupage en sont 
responsables : 
- la loi allemande ne prévoit pas 
l'option prometteuse du 
dégroupage partiel proposé par 
la Recommandation de la 
Commission. Il est vrai 
qu'Internet, le commerce 
électronique et les services à 
large bande de type ADSL 
n'avaient pas en 1998 le 
développement et l'actualité 
qu'ils ont aujourd'hui ; 
le régulateur national a 
maintenu les prix de détail des 
abonnements de Deutsche 
Telekom inférieurs aux prix 
d'accès à la boucle locale, 
imposant de la sorte un réel 
désavantage compétitif aux 
nouveaux concurrents. 
L'effet combiné de la 
Recommandation de la 
Commission - ou de toute 
réglementation sectorielle à 
venir - et des règles de 
concurrence applicables sous 
l'Article 82 du traité pourrait 
désormais permettre un impact 
plus rapide du dégroupage sur 
l'ouverture du marché aux 
nouveaux opérateurs. Il faut le 
souhaiter en vue d'une diffusion 
accélérée d'Internet et du 
commerce électronique en 
Europe. 
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Application of Articles 81 & 82 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between Is' February and 31s' May 2000 
HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION 
AGREEMENTS: Ensuring a modern 
policy 
By Joachim LUCKING, DG COMP-A-1 
After the successful reform of 
the EC competition rules on 
vertical restraints, the 
Commission is now focusing on 
updating its policy on 
collaboration agreements 
between competitors (horizontal 
co-operation agreements). These 
agreements are potentially 
restrictive of competition and 
could thus fall under Article 81 
of the Treaty. Guidance for the 
assessment of horizontal co-
operation under the Community 
competition rules is currently 
given by way of two block 
exemption Regulations (on 
research and development 
(R&D) agreements49 and 
specialisation agreements50) and 
49 Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 418/85 of 19 December 1984 
on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of Research and Development 
Agreements as amended by 
Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No. 151/93 of 23 December 
1992, OJ L 53, 22.2.1985 p.5, 
OJL21, 29.1.1993 p. 8. 
50 Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No 417/85 of 19 December 1984 
on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of specialisation agreements as 
amended by Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No 151/93 of 
23 December 1992, OJ L 53, 
two Notices51 (dealing with 
particular problems such as the 
assessment of co-operative joint 
ventures). As the block 
exemption Regulations will 
expire on 31 December 2000, 
and as the existing Notices have 
become largely outdated, the 
Commission is considering how 
the future assessment of 
horizontal co-operation should 
reflect changes in the economic 
and legal environment. 
As a result of these reflections, 
the Commission on 27 April 
2000 published 
• a draft block exemption 
Regulation on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of specialisation 
agreements, 
• a draft block exemption 
Regulation on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
to categories of research and 
22.2.1985 p.l, OJ L 21, 
29.1.1993 p. 8. 
51 Notice on Agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices in the 
field of co-operation between 
enterprises (OJ C 75, 29.7.1968 
p3); Notice concerning the 
assessment of co-operative joint 
ventures under Article 81 (OJ C 
43, 16.2.1993, p.2). 
development (R&D) 
agreements, 
• draft Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 81 to 
horizontal co-operation 
agreements. 
The objective of these documents 
is to clarify the application of 
competition rules in the area of 
horizontal co-operation 
agreements. The drafts have been 
made public both on the 
Internet-site of the Competition 
DG (http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
dg04/entente/other.htm) and in 
the Official Journal (C-118 of 
27.04.2000). The publication 
starts the public consultation 
process on this reform. 
Orientations for Reform 
The starting point for this reform 
is the recognition that horizontal 
co-operation between 
competitors can have both 
negative and positive effects on 
the market. On the one hand, 
horizontal co-operation may lead 
to competition problems. This is 
the case if the parties to a co-
operation agree to fix prices, 
output or share markets, or if the 
co-operation enables the parties 
to maintain, gain or increase 
market power and thereby causes 
negative market effects with 
respect to prices, output, 
innovation or the variety and 
quality of goods. 
On the other hand, horizontal co-
operation may also often be 
useful and pro-competitive. 
Companies need to respond to 
increasing competitive pressure 
and a changing market place 
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driven by globalisation, the 
speed of technological progress 
and the generally more dynamic 
nature of markets. Co-operation 
can be a means to share risk, 
save costs, pool know how and 
launch innovation faster. In 
particular for small and medium 
sized enteiprises co-operation is 
an important means to adapt to 
the changing economic 
environment. Consumers will 
share these gains, provided that 
effective competition is 
maintained in the market. 
European competition policy 
does already take into account 
these dangers and benefits, but 
the existing system of 
notifications and authorisations 
puts an administrative burden 
both on companies without 
market power and the 
Commission. A review of the 
present policy towards 
horizontal co-operation 
agreements based on a wide-
ranging consultation of 
European companies showed 
that industry regards the existing 
block exemption regulations as 
too narrow, inflexible, and too 
focused on legal clauses. 
Industry also expressed a need 
for clearer guidance on the 
assessment of other types of co-
operation, not covered by any 
block exemption. 
A review of cases dealt with by 
the Commission under Article 81 
showed that around 40% of these 
cases concerned horizontal co-
operation agreements. The 
majority of these (58%) involved 
forms of co-operation not 
covered by any block exemption 
regulation. However, the number 
of horizontal co-operation 
agreements creating competition 
problems was limited. 
It is therefore necessary to 
increase the relevance of the 
block exemptions for industry 
and to adopt a more economic 
approach both for the block 
exemptions and for the treatment 
of individual cases, while 
maintaining a strict approach 
towards anti-competitive 
agreements. 
The draft documents thus aim to 
give better guidance to market 
participants. They will replace 
the fragmented and partly 
outdated notices and regulations 
in this area. The review is also 
an essential pillar in our attempts 
to modernise competition policy. 
The approach is very similar to 
that recently adopted for vertical 
agreements. By virtue of the 
clarified rules, the Commission's 
services will be freed from 
examining cases which are of no 
interest for competition policy 
and they will thus be able to 
concentrate on more important 
cases. 
The draft block exemption 
Regulations 
The draft block exemption 
Regulations are supposed to 
replace the existing Regulations 
on Specialisation (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No. 417/85) 
and R&D (Commission 
Regulation (EEC) No. 418/85). 
These Regulations expire on 31 
December 2000. The adoption of 
the new Regulations before the 
end of this year is thus desirable. 
They are based on the existing 
enabling Regulation52. 
In comparison to the existing 
Regulations the drafts have been 
revised so as to make them more 
user-friendly and to increase its 
scope and clarity. The current 
block exemptions on R&D and 
Specialisation not only define 
categories of agreements which 
are covered, but also list the 
exempted clauses. These so-
called "white lists" are deleted 
from both block exemptions. 
Instead they exempt all 
conditions under which 
undertakings pursue R&D and 
specialisation agreements, 
subject to certain conditions and 
the exclusion of hardcore 
restrictions. The idea is to move 
away from a clause-based 
approach and to give greater 
contractual freedom to the 
parties of such agreements. 
In addition to this increase in 
flexibility, several changes in the 
draft block exemption 
Regulation on R&D should 
increase their scope and 
usefulness for industry. For 
example, it is proposed to 
increase the market share 
threshold for exemption from 
20% to 25%. If the agreement 
J - Council Regulation (EEC) No 
2821/71 of 20 December 1971 on 
the application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of 
agreements, decisions, and 
concerted practices modified by 
Regulation (EEC) No 2743/72 of 19 
December 1972. 0.1 L 285. 
29.12.1971. p.46, OJ L 291. 
28.12.1972, p. 144. 
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foresees joint distribution of the 
products which were jointly 
developed, the market share 
threshold could be increased 
from currently 10% to 25%. The 
requirement to draw up a 
framework programme prior to 
entering into R&D agreements 
has been deleted, as experience 
has shown that it is not practical 
for companies to enter into such 
agreements prior to undertaking 
R&D. To protect competition in 
innovation, a provision has been 
added which allows the 
withdrawal of the block 
exemption in those cases where 
an agreement would eliminate 
effective competition in R&D on 
a particular market. 
As regards the draft block 
exemption Regulation on 
Specialisation, it is not proposed 
to increase the market share 
threshold (currently 20%). 
However, the practical scope of 
the Regulation will be increased, 
through the deletion of the 
turnover threshold, and through 
the coverage of unilateral 
specialisation as an increasingly 
important form of outsourcing. 
On the other hand, safeguards 
against potentially harmful 
specialisation agreements have 
been introduced. This applies to 
the obligation of a cross supply 
obligation between two 
companies engaging in 
reciprocal specialisation so that 
no party leaves the market 
downstream of production. 
The draft Guidelines 
The draft Guidelines 
complement the draft block 
exemption Regulations. They 
describe the general approach 
which should be followed when 
assessing horizontal co-operation 
agreements. They are thus 
applicable to R&D and 
production agreements not 
covered by the block exemptions 
as well as to most other types of 
competitor collaboration. The 
following types are covered: 
R&D, production, purchasing, 
commercialisation, standardi-
sation, and environmental 
agreements. 
All types of horizontal co-
operation agreements are 
analysed according to a common 
analytical framework. This 
framework can be summarised 
as follows: a horizontal co-
operation agreement restricts 
competition if it is likely to 
reduce competition in the market 
to such an extent that negative 
market effects as to prices, 
output, innovation or the variety 
or quality of goods and services 
can be expected. To cause a 
restriction of competition the 
parties normally need 
appropriate tools to co-ordinate 
their behaviour and a certain 
degree of market power. 
Consequently, a co-operation has 
to be assessed in its economic 
context taking into account both, 
the nature of the agreement and 
the parties' combined market 
power which determines 
together with other structural 
factors - the capability of the co-
operation to reduce overall 
competition to such a significant 
extent. 
These two categories of criteria 
normally have to be assessed 
together. There are, however, 
some instances where the nature 
of a co-operation indicates from 
the outset the applicability of 
Article 81(1). This concerns 
primarily agreements that have 
the object of restricting 
competition by means of price 
fixing (including pure sales 
agencies), output limitation or 
sharing of markets, customers or 
sources of supply. These 
'hardcore' restrictions are 
presumed to have negative 
market effects and not to result 
in any efficiency gains or 
benefits to consumers. They are 
therefore generally prohibited. 
On the other hand, there are also 
some agreements for which it 
can be said from the outset that 
Article 81(1) does not apply. 
These include agreements 
between non-competitors, 
agreements between competing 
companies that can not cany out 
independently the project or 
activity covered by the co-
operation, or agreements 
concerning an activity far 
removed from the marketing 
level. 
For all other agreements that 
may fall under Article 81(1) a 
market analysis is necessary. 
This assessment will be 
facilitated by the guidelines. The 
discussion by types of 
agreements allows taking 
account of specific competition 
problems related to the different 
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forms of co-operation. It also 
addresses the most common 
types of combinations, e.g. joint 
R&D with subsequent joint 
production. 
Expected Impact of the 
Proposals 
The impact of the proposed 
changes on industry should be 
positive. The increase in legal 
security should stimulate co-
operation between companies 
with little or no market power, in 
particular small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). These 
companies will have greater 
contractual freedom for their co-
operation and will be freed from 
the costs and delays associated 
with unnecessary notifications. 
The consumers will also benefit 
from the proposals which will 
enable the Commission to 
concentrate on those cases which 
harm consumers by increasing 
prices or reducing output, 
innovation or the variety or 
quality of goods and services. 
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MERGERS 
Application of Council Regulation 4064/89 
Case No : COMP/M. 1672 -
Volvo/Scania 
By Dan SJÖBLOM, Merger Task Force 
Introduction 
On 14 March 2000, the 
Commission decided to declare 
the proposed concentration 
between the two Swedish truck 
producers, Volvo and Scania, 
incompatible with the common 
market. The prohibition decision 
was based on what may be 
summarised as a straightforward 
case of classical horizontal 
overlaps and high market shares. 
In particular it was found that the 
proposed concentration would 
have created dominant positions 
on: 
• the markets for heavy trucks 
in Sweden, Norway, Finland 
and Ireland; 
• the markets for touring 
coaches in Finland and the 
United Kingdom; 
• the market for inter-city 
buses in Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway and Finland; and 
• the market for city buses in 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway, 
Finland and Ireland. 
This purpose of this article is to 
summarise the central features of 
the Commission's competition 
analysis. In doing so, it will 
highlight two areas in particular, 
namely the definition of the 
relevant geographic market and 
the presence of unilateral effects. 
While the article focuses on the 
analysis of the heavy trucks 
markets, largely similar reasoning 
was used to analyse the bus and 
coach markets. 
Subsequent to the adoption of the 
decision, some commentators 
have argued that the decision 
demonstrates that companies from 
smaller Member States are at a 
competitive disadvantage in the 
assessment under the Merger 
Regulation. The article will 
briefly respond to these, 
obviously groundless, allegations. 
The proposed concentration 
The proposed concentration 
involved the acquisition by 
Volvo of a controlling stake in 
Scania. On 6 August 1999, 
Volvo reached an agreement to 
acquire all of Investor AB's 
shares in Scania, equivalent to 
just under 50% of the voting 
capital. Concurrently, Volvo 
made a public offer for all other 
shares in Scania. 
The relevant product markets 
Within the industry, trucks are 
often divided into three distinct 
categories based on the weight 
of the vehicle (light, medium and 
heavy trucks). None of the 
parties are active in light trucks 
and Scania has only de minimis 
sales of medium trucks. 
However, both parties are active 
on a European or even 
worldwide basis in the 
production and supply of heavy 
trucks. In the decision, the 
Commission agreed with Volvo's 
proposed definition of the 
relevant product market as that 
for heavy trucks over 16 tonnes. 
Although heavy trucks are 
differentiated products, it was 
found that any further 
breakdown of the large variety 
of possible configurations of 
such vehicles would not be 
meaningful in terms of assessing 
the market power of the merged 
companies. 
The Relevant Geographic 
Markets 
As far as the above-mentioned 
areas are concerned, the 
Commission concluded that the 
geographic reference market for 
heavy trucks is still national in 
scope. This conclusion was 
partly based on observed 
differences in technical 
requirements, purchasing habits 
and market shares in various 
Member States. However, the 
existence of price discrimination 
constituted the strongest 
indication that the effects of the 
merger should not, as proposed 
by Volvo, be assessed at the 
European level. In the course of 
the investigation the 
Commission found clear 
indications that truck producers 
are able to charge significantly 
different prices (often 10% or 
more) for similar products, even 
when they are sold in 
neighbouring countries. It was 
also found that the existence of 
such price differences did not 
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lead to any significant cross-
border, or parallel, trade. The 
explanation for these phenomena 
is that heavy truck sales 
generally include a service 
package, which means that a 
significant proportion of the total 
price relates to a local service 
component. 
Effects of the proposed 
concentration on the markets 
for heavy trucks 
Even before the proposed 
concentration, Volvo and Scania 
were already leading 
manufacturers of heavy trucks in 
the EEA. The merged entity 
would have become the leading 
supplier in the EEA with 31% of 
all sales, followed by 
DaimlerChrysler with 20%. At 
the level of the relevant national 
markets the merged entity would 
have acquired very high market 
shares, ranging from around 
90% (in the Swedish market) to 
around 50% (in the Irish 
market). It was further noted that 
the parties' market positions have 
been both stable and largely 
symmetrical in the past and that 
the merged entity, in all of the 
markets, would have had a 
position several times stronger 
than the closest remaining 
competitor. 
The existing evidence, that 
Scania prior to the proposed 
concentration had been 
competing strongly with Volvo 
and was widely regarded as its 
closest competitor, compounded 
the competition concerns 
resulting from the high 
combined market shares. The 
reason for this is that the merged 
entity in such circumstances 
would have had even better 
possibilities to exploit its 
dominant position than indicated 
by its market shares alone. Given 
that Volvo's intention was to 
maintain the Scania brand and 
organisation as an entirely 
separate business unit, Volvo 
could, for example, have raised 
the prices for Scania trucks by 5-
10%, safe in the knowledge that 
a significant proportion of those 
customers who would not accept 
such an increase would be likely 
to switch to the closest 
competing brand, i.e. Volvo. 
Since Volvo would also have 
controlled the closest brand, 
such a reaction to a price 
increase would have been 
revenue neutral to Volvo. The 
effect of controlling the two 
closest competitors on the 
market is therefore to 
substantially reduce the risk 
associated (even by a dominant 
firm) in imposing a supra-
competitive price53. In this 
context, the Commission had 
found evidence that Volvo and 
Scania had pursued similar 
strategies in the relevant markets 
and that they had similar brand 
images, which were based on, 
inter alia, excellent quality and 
reliable service. 
Furthermore, the investigation 
also showed that the barriers to 
5 3 For further information on the 
Unilateral effects doctrine in 
differentiated product markets, see 
e.g. Federal Trade Commission v. 
Staples, Inc., 97 OF. Supp. 1066 
(D.D.C. 1997). 
entry or expansion in these 
markets were high. Any 
competitor who would have 
wanted to challenge the merged 
entity would have had to make 
large investments over a 
significant period of time to 
build up the necessary critical 
mass of installed vehicles in the 
relevant markets. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Commission 
assessed - and dismissed -
Volvo's claim that the 
transaction would necessarily 
lead to market share losses for 
the new entity, the extent of 
which, according to Volvo, 
would have been sufficient to 
preclude the creation of 
dominance. 
For these reasons, the 
Commission concluded that, if 
approved, the concentration 
would have significantly 
changed the structure of the 
market for heavy trucks in 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and 
Ireland, and created a dominant 
position on each of those 
markets. 
Proposed commitments 
Volvo submitted a package of 
proposed commitments in order 
to ensure the approval of the 
proposed concentration. Even 
though these commitments 
could, if properly implemented, 
have had some beneficial effect 
on the competitive situation in 
the relevant markets, the 
investigation showed that they 
would have been insufficient to 
resolve all the competition 
concerns resulting from the 
proposed acquisition of Scania. 
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The proposed commitments 
included certain measures 
relating to a particular, Swedish 
cab crash test for heavy trucks, 
and a temporary suspension of 
the Scania brand. These 
proposals were found to have 
little or no potential impact on 
the competitive situation. The 
cab crash test follows from 
Swedish law and can therefore 
only be abolished by the 
Swedish Government. It was 
therefore, despite Volvo's 
undertaking to use its best efforts 
to ensure its abolition, not 
possible to conclude that the test 
will be abolished. Equally, the 
proposed suspension of the 
Scania brand was found to be of 
limited significance, as it 
contained a number of 
significant limitations (both in 
terms of time and scope). 
Notably, it would not imply the 
withdrawal of the Scania product 
line, which, according to the 
proposal, would have continued 
to be sold under another brand of 
Volvo's choice. 
Volvo had also proposed to 
divest its 37% stake in Bilia AB 
(a truck, bus and car distributor 
in the Nordic countries). The 
stated purpose would have been 
to remove one of the existing 
vertical links into the distribution 
level. However, on closer 
examination the Commission 
found that this company, even if 
the ownership link were to be 
removed, would remain 
economically dependent on 
Volvo in the same way as all 
other (non-integrated) Volvo 
dealers. 
Volvo also proposed measures to 
open up access to its dealer and 
service networks for competing 
manufacturers. This proposal, 
which would basically have left 
the existing structure of the 
Volvo and Scania organisations 
intact, was however not found to 
provide either the existing 
dealers or the competitors with 
sufficiently strong incentives to 
have a real impact on the market. 
The undertakings proposed by 
Volvo for the coach, city- and 
inter-city bus markets were also 
found to be too limited in scope 
to significantly facilitate access 
to the relevant markets for 
competitors. They were therefore 
considered as insufficient to 
remove the competition concerns 
in each of the relevant markets. 
Conclusion 
Given the negative effects on 
competition on at least 15 
relevant markets, and the failure 
of Volvo to propose any 
undertakings that fully removed 
these concerns, the Commission 
decided, on 14 March 2000, to 
declare the proposed 
concentration incompatible with 
the common market. 
Although there are no "new" 
lessons to be learned from the 
decision, it confirms the 
Commission's commitment not 
to allow the creation of dominant 
positions through concentrations. 
It thereby highlights the need for 
firms that have strong and 
overlapping market positions to 
carefully assess all elements that 
are relevant for the assessment 
of the scope of the geographic 
market. Caution is clearly called 
for if that assessment provides 
indications that the geographic 
may not be sufficiently wide to 
exclude competition concerns. 
This applies in particular if the 
firms are close competitors on 
differentiated product markets. 
The aftermath 
Following the Commission's 
decision in Volvo/Scania, certain 
commentators alleged that the 
Commission's competition 
policy discriminates against 
large firms from "smaller" 
Member States who, it was 
alleged, would be unduly 
hindered from expanding 
through mergers and 
acquisitions. This allegation is of 
course completely without 
foundation. 
First, it must be recalled that the 
purpose of any competition 
based merger control system is 
to ascertain the absence of 
negative effects on any relevant 
market. The only way to avoid 
an arbitrary assessment that 
would reduce merging firms' 
legal certainty is to apply this 
test without having regard to 
whether such markets are small 
or large in absolute or relative 
terms. 
Second, it should be 
remembered that the success of 
companies such as Volvo and 
Scania have largely been due to 
the competition between them. 
This explains, to a large degree, 
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why they have both become 
successful international 
companies with more than 80% 
of their sales outside the Nordic 
region. Even from an industrial 
point of view it is not clear why 
it would be in anyone's interest 
to have competition between 
such companies eliminated 
through a merger. 
Third, the implied suggestion -
to allow mergers that would lead 
to dominant positions on "small 
home markets" - would, in 
addition to being unlawful under 
the Merger Regulation, lead to 
discrimination against customers 
and consumers in smaller 
Member States. These customers 
would then become exposed to 
the dominance and the 
Community would fail to protect 
them in the same way as if they 
had been active in a "large 
market". The suggested approach 
would also lead to discrimination 
against companies from larger 
Member States who would, 
firstly, be barred from entering 
the market(s) of the dominant 
firm, whereas the merged entity 
would be able to enter the larger 
and more open markets. 
Secondly, companies with "large 
home markets" would also be 
discriminated against by not 
being able to claim this peculiar 
"small market defence". 
Finally, it should be stressed 
firms based in smaller countries 
and which have high market 
shares in their home markets, 
such as Volvo and Scania, are 
certainly not precluded from 
expanding through structural 
transactions. In fact, within some 
weeks of the Commission's 
negative decision both Volvo 
and Scania have found 
alternative strategic partners. 
Scania has a new large (although 
not controlling) shareholder, 
Volkswagen AG, which was not 
previously active in the 
production of heavy trucks and 
buses. This transaction did not 
fall under the Merger 
Regulation, as VW's acquisition 
of 34% of the voting rights in 
Scania did not confer control in 
the meaning of the Merger 
Regulation. 
Just a few weeks later, Volvo 
announced its intention to 
acquire Renault's heavy truck 
division (RVI) in exchange for 
15% of the shares in AB Volvo. 
This transaction will fall to be 
assessed under the Merger 
Regulation. Without prejudging 
the assessment that will have to 
be made of the Volvo/Renault 
transaction, it appears clear that 
those who claimed that the 
Volvo/Scania merger was a sine 
qua non have already been 
proven mistaken. 
Main developments between 1st 
January and 30 April 2000 
By Anna PAPAIOANNOU, Walter TRETTON and Neil 
MARSHALL, Merger Task Force 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A substantive number of 
notifications was submitted in 
the first four months of 2000 (95 
compared to 92 in the same 
period in 1999). Important 
workload was derived by the 
record level of cases in phase II, 
involving deeper market 
investigation: no fewer than 9 
phase II investigations were 
carried over from 1999,54 while 
5 4 In six of these cases a final decision 
was taken within in the period 
covered by this review, one was 
withdrawn and two investigations, 
namely in cases M. 1671 - DOW 
six new ones were opened in the 
period covered by this review.55 
Consequently this led to an 
unprecedented number of six 
decisions under Article 8 of the 
CHEMICAL/UNION CARBIDE 
and Ml 693 - ALCOA/ 
REYNOLDS, were still ongoing at 
the end of this period. 
5 5 M.1673 - VEBA/VIAG, M.1741 -
MCI WORLCOM/SPRINT, 
M.1813 - INDUSTRI KAPITAL 
(NORDKEM)/DYNO, M.1806 -
ASTRA ZENECA/NOVARTIS, 
M.1882- PIRELLI/BICC. JV.27-
MICROSOFT/LIBERTY 
MEDIA/TELEWEST. 
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Merger Regulation56, which is 
twice the number taken during 
the same period in 1999 and 
three times that of 1998. The 
deeper phase II investigations 
conducted in the period under 
examination eventually 
concluded in one prohibition 
(VOLVO/SCANIA)57 and five 
approval decisions subject to 
commitments (AIR LIQUIDE/ 
BOC58, LINDE/AGA59, TO-
TALFINA/ELF AQUITAINE60, 
ALCAN/ALUSUISSE61, MMS/ 
DASA/ASTRIUM62). In this 
context it is interesting to 
mention that the parties 
abandoned the deal in the case 
ALCAN/PECHINEY a few 
hours before an imminent 
prohibition. 
Eleven cases were cleared with 
commitments at the end of a 
phase I investigation. Such 
commitments are intended to 
solve competition problems that 
are "readily identifiable and can 
easily be remedied".63 
Commitments at the end of a 
phase II investigation were 
accepted in five cases. The 
experience on remedies gleaned 
by the Commission in these and 
5 6 i.e. decisions following the four 
months' further investigation. 
5 7 M.1672. 
5 8 M.1630. 
5 9 M.1628. 
6 0 M.1628. 
6 1 M.1663. 
6 2 M.1636. 
6 3 Recital 8 of Council Regulation 
(EC) 1310/97 amending Council 
regulation EEC 4064/89 (the Merger 
Regulation). 
previous cases will be reflected 
in a forthcoming Notice on 
Commitments. 
It should be underlined that the 
Commission has continued to 
work very closely with 
competition authorities of third 
countries and of Member States 
concerning remedies and other 
issues on individual cases. For 
the record, GENERALI/INA64 
may be mentioned as an 
exemplary case of co-operation 
with competition authorities of a 
Member State. The parallel 
aluminium cases ALCAN7 
ALUSUISSE and ALCAN/ 
PECHINEY gave the 
opportunity for effective 
collaboration with the US 
competition authorities.65 
A situation of increasing 
workload faced by the Merger 
Task Force, received the 
attention of certain media.66 The 
forthcoming Notice on 
Simplified Treatment of Routine 
Cases could be viewed in this 
context. 
The issue of workers' 
participation in merger 
procedures became topical on 
occasion of the decision 
UNILEVER / AMORA-
MAILLE67. The Merger 
Regulation clearly stipulates in 
6 4 M.1712. 
6 5 For an analysis of these aluminium 
cases, see comprehensive article in 
this issue by Dimitri Giotakos. 
6 6 e.g. FINANCIAL TIMES, 
14.4.2000, or Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
29/30.04.2000. 
6 7 M. 1802. 
Article 18.4 that employees' 
representatives should be 
entitled to be heard, upon 
application, in the context of a 
phase II examination. It should 
be underlined that that up to the 
present, the Commission has 
never refused to hear workers' 
recognised representatives at any 
stage of the procedure. It should 
be borne in mind however that, 
in the context of merger analysis, 
the Commission will only hear 
the aspects being governed by 
competition law. DG Competi-
tion firmly believes, that the 
workers' right to be heard should 
be sufficiently publicised. 
During the period under 
examination, the Court of First 
Instance delivered one 
judgement in the joined cases 
involving action by The Coca 
Cola Company (TCCC) and 
Coca Cola Enterprises (CCE) 
versus the European 
Commission.^ 
In 1997 TCCC and CCE had 
appealed against a Commission 
decision authorising the sale by 
TCCC and by Cadbury 
Schweppes to CCE of their 
interests in Amalgamated 
Beverages. The Commission had 
considered that although Coca 
Cola and Cadbury Schweppes 
had held a dominant position in 
the British cola market prior to 
the operation, the concentration 
6 8 Joined cases T-125/97 and T-127 -
THE COCA COLA COMPANY v. 
COMMISSION and COCA COLA 
ENTERPRISES v. COMMISSION 
of 22.3.2000 . 
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itself did not strengthen this 
dominance. 
In its decision the Commission 
had simply 'taken note of an 
undertaking by CCE to refrain 
from certain commercial 
practices, but had not made the 
decision conditional upon it. The 
CFI, after examining the file and 
evaluating the statements made 
in the course of the procedure, 
held that the inclusion of this 
undertaking did not produce 
legal effects (in the sense that a 
breach of its terms would entail 
the decision's revocation) and 
therefore was not legally 
challengeable.69 
II. RELEVANT CASES 
In the period of time covered by 
this review, the Commission had 
the opportunity to examine 
closer certain markets which are 
of immediate interest to 
consumers (such as domestic and 
motorway fuels, mobile 
telecommunications, pay-TV) 
Furthermore, deeper 
investigation was conducted in 
sectors which are currently 
6 9 The other points of the appeal were 
held to be inadmissible on grounds 
of not producing legal effects. These 
were a control question, the 
definition of the relevant market 
(cola-flavoured carbonated soft 
drinks) and the finding that Coca 
Cola and Schweppes Beverages held 
a dominant position on the British 
cola market. The CFI considered it 
was not the mere finding that a 
company held a dominant position 
at a given time that might give rise 
to the risk of fines but its resorting 
to conduct which constitutes an 
abuse ofthat position. 
undergoing fundamental restruc-
turing leading to a significantly 
higher degree of consolidation 
(industrial gases, aluminium, 
pharmaceuticals) or which are 
already highly consolidated 
(chemicals). 
The definition of the scope of the 
geographic market was the 
central point in the 
Commission's investigation 
which led to the prohibition of 
the take-over of SCANIA by 
VOLVO. In its decision, the 
Commission has made it clear 
that the consistent application of 
the dominance test to any 
relevant geographic market, 
independently of its size, besides 
being within the letter and spirit 
of the Merger Regulation, 
guarantees protection to 
consumers from the effects of 
dominance, in small and large 
markets alike and especially 
where the common market rules 
have not been fully effective.70 
The take-over of ELF-
AQUITAINE by TOTAL-
FINA71 was a case of regrouping 
of first league national players 
leading to the creation of 
"national champions". The 
general competition concern in 
such cases is that dominant 
positions may be created in the 
parties' traditional national 
7 0 For a comprehensive analysis of the 
case, see special article in this issue 
by Dan Sjöblom. 
' ' For an analysis of the issues involved 
in this case, see article by A. 
Schaub, CI. Rakovsky, H. Piffaut,P. 
Deluyek in Competition Policy 
Newsletter, No 1,2000. 
markets which would 
subsequently lead to a 
partitioning of the national 
territory between them with 
further destabilising impact on 
the structure of the common 
market. The Commission's task 
was to identify and eliminate (i) 
activity overlaps and (ii) 
bottlenecks that could enable the 
new entity to lock the market to 
its profit by control of import 
logistics, of transport and 
distribution of refined petroleum 
products. The operation called 
for careful assessment also due 
to its expected significant impact 
upon vital markets for 
consumers. 
In examining the mergers AIR-
LIQUIDE/BOC and LINDE/ 
AGA (all companies rated 
between first and sixth world-
wide in terms of turnover), the 
Commission was faced with the 
first two cases of global 
consolidation in the industrial 
gases industry.72 
In AIR LIQUIDE/BOC, the 
Commission identified distinct 
product markets in the industrial 
gases sector, defined by type of 
gas and by method of 
distribution, namely, (i) the 
tonnage market (large quantities 
of oxygen and nitrogen to 
industrial users, sold through 
dedicated production plants 
installed on the customer's site or 
transported through pipelines), 
7 2 The AIR LIQUIDE/BOC deal was 
eventually abandoned by the parties 
following unsuccessful negotiations 
on remedies with the Federal Trade 
Commission in the US. 
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(ii) the bulk market (lower 
quantities of liquid gases usually 
to be transported by rail or road 
to the customer's site) and (iii) 
the cylinders market (storage in 
cylinders of smaller quantities 
gases still in gaseous form). The 
Commission took account of the 
inter-relation between these 
markets, implying for instance, 
that a strong position on the 
tonnage market will often confer 
competitive advantages on the 
bulk market and vice-versa. 
The tonnage market was 
considered to be EEA-wide. On 
this market the parties would 
have obtained dominant position. 
The parties, however, offered 
commitments which were found 
to remove the Commission's 
competition concerns 
The geographic market for bulk 
and cylinder gases (with the 
exception of certain high purity 
and high value gases) was found 
to be national in scope mainly 
due to different prices, market 
structures and distribution 
systems in Member States. The 
operation would have 
strengthened the dominant 
position in certain bulk and 
cylinder markets of Air-Liquide 
in France and of BOC in the UK 
and Ireland. Furthermore, by 
combining existing dominant 
positions in neighbouring 
countries in these markets, the 
operation raised the concern that 
an extended area would be 
perpetually dominated by one 
single entity. The remedies 
proposed aimed at ensuring the 
effective opening of the former 
home markets to competition, 
through divestment of plants 
mainly in the UK and France. 
The annual sales of the divested 
plants were in the range of about 
half of the market share that Air 
Liquide would have otherwise 
acquired. 
In the helium and electronic 
specialty gases, which were 
found to be wider than national 
in scope, the operation would 
threaten to create a joint 
dominant position between the 
new entity and Air Products (a 
joined bidder with Air Liquide in 
the acquisition of BOC, subject 
to the division between them of 
BOC's assets after completion of 
the deal). In helium, where the 
operation would have reduced 
the vertically integrated 
suppliers from four to three, 
remedies consisted in the 
divestiture of contracts for liquid 
helium supply from Russia and 
Poland, access (via back-to-back 
agreements) to Air Liquide/ 
BOC's purchasing agreements in 
the USA, plus a freezing of Air 
Liquide's joint control (together 
with Air Products and ultimately 
with the Algerian Government) 
on the important Algerian 
supply. Remedies vis-à-vis the 
joint dominant position that the 
operation would create in 
electronic specialty gases, 
consisted in the divestment of 
the transfill facility owned by 
Air Liquide in France (together 
with the necessary technology 
licences, customer information 
and purchase orders to keep it a 
viable business), as well as of a 
commitment to grant third party 
access to licences to BOC's 
patented technology, a process to 
be managed by an independent 
patent attorney. 
The Commission's findings in 
the Air-LIQUIDE/BOC case, as 
regards the product and 
geographic market definition of 
tonnage, bulk and cylinder gases 
were confirmed in the parallel 
case LINDE/AGA. Commit-
ments in that case covered 
divestments in the bulk and 
cylinder gas markets in the 
Netherlands and Austria. 
The Commission's investigation 
in the VODAFONE AIR-
TOUCH / MANNESMANN 73 
case showed that there is an 
emerging demand for advanced 
seamless pan-European services 
from internationally mobile 
customers. In particular large 
corporations with substantial 
amounts of European cross-
border businesses have a greater 
demand for such advanced 
services than other types of 
subscribers. These new services 
essentially include pan-European 
offerings of Internet mobile 
services and wireless location 
services and will, to a substantial 
degree, be accessed through 
Internet mobile portals. 
The advanced pan-European 
services are heavily dependent 
on the ability of operators to 
precisely locate their customers 
when the latter are outside the 
reach of their own network. With 
existing GSM networks this is 
not possible, but through new 
73 M.1795. 
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technologies such as GPRS,74 
EDGE75 and CAMEL, 76 
operators will be able to 
integrate each others networks to 
provide these services seamless-
ly. These technologies also allow 
a significant improvement with 
regard to the speed information 
and data (including content) can 
be transferred through the 
different networks. However, in 
order to provide seamless 
services, operators have to agree 
on the modifications on the 
existing network configurations, 
centralised management solu-
tions and cost and profit 
allocation. 
Following the merger, the new 
entity has a unique footprint in 
the common market, with sole 
control of mobile operators in 
eight Member States and joint 
control in three. In addition, it 
has an unrivalled customer base 
(almost double the amount of its 
nearest competitor only in 
Europe). Through the large 
footprint, it appeared that the 
merged entity would be in a 
unique position to build an 
integrated network which would 
'"* General Packet Radio Service, a 
technology developed for GSM 
networks to allow enhanced rates of 
data transfer. 
7 3 Enhanced Data GSM Environment or 
Enhanced Data Rates for Global 
Evolution, represents the final 
evolution of data communications 
within the GSM standard (second 
generation+). 
Customised Application of Mobile 
Enhanced Logic, a GSM feature 
name for including Intelligent 
Network functions into the GSM 
system. The technology will be 
become available after 2002. 
enable a quick implementation 
of the provision of advanced 
seamless pan-European services, 
at least in those Member States 
where it has sole control. On the 
other hand, the merged entity's 
competitors, because of their 
segmented footprints and the 
difficulties in integrating their 
networks into a seamless one, 
would not be able to duplicate 
this in the short to medium term 
(on average 3-5 years). This 
raised serious doubts as to the 
compatibility of the merger with 
the common market. 
The remedies accepted consisted 
in, (i) the de-merger of Orange 
Pic, as a stand-alone business 
including all its subsidiaries, in 
order to face competition 
concerns in the UK and Belgian 
mobile telephony market, (ii) the 
granting to other mobile 
operators of the possibility to 
provide pan-European advanced 
seamless services to their 
customers by using the 
integrated network of the merged 
entity. Due to fast developments 
in the sector, to the award of 3 rd 
generation UMTS licences and 
to the fact that competitors will 
in all likelihood try to build up 
alternative infrastructure, the 
undertakings have been limited 
to a period of three years. 
In the course of the investigation 
in the BT/ESAT77 case, the 
Commission found evidence of 
the existence of a market for the 
distribution in Ireland of pan-
European or global end-to-end 
77 M.1838. 
network services, which 
encompass managed data 
networks, frame relay services, 
voice virtual private networks 
including call centre services. 
While the production of global 
services has a global dimension, 
their distribution may have a 
narrower/national dimension. 
Indeed, global service providers 
require a national presence and 
often appoint independent local 
distributors with their own 
network for handling traffic in 
that market. Due to the already 
established position of ESAT in 
the distribution of such services 
in Ireland, the merged entity 
would have controlled between 
50% and 60% of the Irish 
market. As a remedy BT 
undertook to grant the global 
services provider Global One, 
the right to terminate the 
distribution agreement with 
ESAT or, alternatively, to 
disclaim any exclusivity 
distribution rights. Moreover the 
parties undertook not to renew 
another provider's (Infonet) 
distribution agreement. All these 
remedies were aimed at opening 
up the Irish market for the 
distribution of global telecom-
munications services. 
In the ASTRIUM case (jo¡nt 
venture between MMS and 
DASA), the Commission 
analysed the satellite production 
market both as regards prime 
contracting and equipment 
producing activities. As it 
emerged from the Commission's 
enquiry, each of the sub-systems 
and equipment products which 
constitute the platform and 
payload of a satellite might 
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constitute a distinct product 
market. In particular, there 
appeared to be a distinct market 
for mechanical wheels (used for 
the stabilisation of the satellite 
attitude). The geographic market 
for such equipment for 
observation and scientific 
satellites appears to be 
European-wide. This is due to 
the fact that such satellites are 
commissioned by space 
agencies, such as the European 
Space Agency (ESA). ESA in 
specific, takes care that contract 
allocation at certain production 
levels within a project takes 
place on the basis of the 
geographic "juste retour" (fair 
return) principle which requires 
it to (i ) grant preference to the 
fullest extent possible to industry 
in all ESA Member States (ii) to 
ensure that all ESA Member 
States participate in projects in 
an equitable manner, having 
regard to their financial 
contribution to ESA. 
The Commission also identified 
a distinct market for military 
communication satellites in 
France. In that market, where 
procurement is based on open 
competition between MMS and 
just one another competitor 
(Alcatel Space), there was risk 
that the operation would create a 
dominant position. Since DASA 
were the only supplier to Alcatel 
Space for a series of sub-systems 
and equipment, the operation 
would result in Astrium 
becoming both a competitor and 
key supplier to Alcatel Space. It 
would therefore be in a position 
to foreclose the market to 
Alcatel Space. 
MMS undertook to divest its 
business in mechanical wheels, 
as a remedy to the fact that 
following the operation the only 
other supplier of this product in 
Europe would have depended on 
sales to Astrium. A second 
undertaking concerned the 
granting of DASA's licences for 
the manufacturing and sale of 
other equipment products 
(chemical propulsion systems, 
chemical thrusters and on-board 
management systems) to prevent 
foreclosure of the market to 
Alcatel Space. 
The acquisition by GENERALI, 
a company active in the 
insurance sector both in Italy and 
abroad, of INA, one of the 
largest Italian insurers was 
cleared by the Commission 
subject to a number of 
commitments. Accordingly, 
Generali undertook to divest its 
controlling stakes in three 
subsidiaries active in the life 
insurance sector and its 
shareholding in the insurance 
company Fondiaria. INA 
undertook to divest its 
controlling interests in the bank 
insurance company Bnl Vita and 
in Banco di Napoli. The 
competition concerns raised by 
the transaction were aggravated 
by the existence of significant 
interlocking directorships, 
whereby directors of Generali 
and INA were also member of 
the boards and/or Executive 
committees of some oftheir 
competitors in the life insurance 
sector. Both Generali and INA 
undertook to eliminate such 
interlocking directorships in 
order to prevent co-ordination of 
the competitive behaviour of the 
interlocked companies. 
The case SHELL/BASF7« 
(project Nicole) concerned a 
joint venture in which the parties 
proposed to combine all of their 
worldwide polypropylene ("PP") 
and polyethylene interests held 
by Montell, Targor and Elenac. 
The joint venture was cleared 
after a Phase 1 investigation 
subject to a package of 
commitments offered by the 
parties. 
The combination of the two 
companies' businesses raised 
horizontal competition issues in 
the markets for PP technology 
licensing, PP resins and PP 
compounds that were remedied 
by commitments to divest 
significant amounts of resins and 
compounds production capacity 
as well as BASF's PP 
technology licensing business 
(Novolen). 
In addition, BASF holds a suite 
of patents for the next generation 
of PP catalysts (metallocenes) 
that would have been strong 
enough to block others bringing 
any metallocene catalysts to the 
market. The Commission 
considered that the combination 
of this strong patent position 
with the position that the joint 
venture would have held in the 
traditional (Ziegler-Natta) 
catalysts and technology would 
have further strengthened the 
parties' dominance. To remedy 
these concerns, the parties 
78 M.1751. 
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committed to a package of 
measures involving licensing 
and non-assertion of these patent 
rights, as a result of which the 
joint venture's ability to prevent 
the development of metallocene 
catalysts will be removed. 
The parties proposed a form of 
"pendulum" arbitration that had 
not previously been seen by the 
Merger Task Force. In the 
negotiations for the 
consideration for the patent 
licenses can be reached then 
both negotiating parties would 
submit a single proposal to the 
arbitration panel. This panel can 
only decide in favour of one of 
the two submitted proposals - in 
its entirety. The Commission 
believes that this process 
therefore creates incentives for 
the parties to submit fair and 
reasonable offers and provides a 
route to solving complex 
negotiation issues fairly and 
without burdening the 
Commission's resources. 
III. REFERRALS 
MEMBER STATES 
TO 
In the first four months of 2000, 
the Commission referred all or 
part of the deal to Member 
States' competition authorities in 
three cases. Of these, two were 
referred in full to the UK 
(ANGLO AMERICAN/ 
TARMAC79 and HANSON/ 
PIONEER80). The other 
(CARREFOUR/PROMODES8 ' ) 
79 
80 
81 
1779 
1827 
M. 1684 
was the subject of two partial 
referral decisions, one to France 
and one to Spain, as well as a 
conditional clearance decision 
by the Commission. 
While neither of the two cases 
that were referred in full raised 
new issues, they were closely 
related and the analysis applied 
in the ANGLO AMERICAN/ 
TARMAC case was directly 
applicable in the subsequent 
analysis of the acquisition of 
Pioneer by Hanson. Both 
concentrations involved the 
supply of aggregates - sand, 
gravel, etc - and related 
downstream products such as 
ready-mixed concrete and 
asphalt in the UK. Due to the 
costs involved in transport of 
these products, the 
Commission's investigations 
reaffirmed its conclusions in 
previous decisions that the 
geographic markets for these 
products are local and distinct, 
thereby fulfilling the conditions 
for referral. Neither case raised 
competition issues in other 
Member States, and so it was 
possible to refer the cases in full. 
The jurisdictional fallout of the 
concentration between Carrefour 
and Promodès was rather more 
complex. In relation to the 
downstream, retailing activities, 
the deal would have created 
competitive problems on 
localised retail markets in France 
and Spain. The relevant 
authorities in these two countries 
requested the referral of all these 
markets on the basis that these 
were not a substantial part of the 
common market and they were 
subsequently referred. However, 
the Commission retained 
jurisdiction over the remaining 
parts of the deal, where the 
geographic dimensions of 
competition were considerably 
wider. 
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Application of Article 90 EC 
Main developments between 1s' February and 31s' May 2000 
Long-term supply agreements in the 
context of gas market liberalisation: 
Commission closes investigation of 
Gas Natural 
By Mariano FERNÁNDEZ SALAS, DG COMP-E-3 
Introduction 
On 27 March 2000 the 
Commission announced its 
decision to close its investigation 
concerning the long-term gas 
supply agreement entered into by 
the Spanish gas company GAS 
NATURAL, belonging to the 
REPSOL-YPF group of 
companies, and the Spanish 
electricity generator ENDESA 
after both parties modified the 
terms of their agreement in line 
with the competition concerns 
expressed by the Commission in 
a warning letter82. 
The original transaction, the first 
of this kind in Spain, provided 
GAS NATURAL with an 
important gas contract in tenns 
of quantities sold and of long 
duration in the fastest growing 
segment of the Spanish gas 
market: gas for electricity 
generation. 
The context of the agreement: 
the liberalisation of the gas 
market. 
The transaction between GAS 
NATURAL, the dominant 
supplier in the Spanish gas 
8 2 See IP/00/297 of 27.03.2000 
market, and ENDESA, the 
market leader in the electricity 
business in Spain, took place at a 
particularly crucial moment in 
the liberalisation of the Spanish 
and European gas markets. 
The interest of the Commission 
in this case was to ensure that 
the gas supply contract did not 
allow the dominant gas supplier 
to prolong its de facto monopoly 
for many years and thus impede 
new entry in the Spanish gas 
market which had started to be 
liberalised. 
GAS NATURAL used to hold a 
monopoly on all Spanish gas 
markets (except for some 
distribution licences in a few 
areas). Liberalisation started in 
1996 in Spain when the 
monopoly rights of GAS 
NATURAL were partly lifted for 
large industrial consumers as 
well as for power generators. 
The latter are of particular 
interest to new entrants in the 
market because of their 
requirement to purchase large 
quantities over longer periods of 
time. Power generators are also 
potential entrants into the 
wholesale gas market themselves 
(ENDESA is, for example, 
already present in the gas 
distribution market). Gas is a key 
fuel for power generators not 
only as a substitute for coal but 
also as a product to be offered to 
final consumers ("multi utility"). 
Ensuring the openness of the 
Spanish market (and of other 
national markets) was (and still 
is) of paramount importance at 
the time given that the EU Gas 
Directive enters into force in 
August 2000, providing for the 
initial stages of the liberalisation 
of the European market. 
The issues at stake 
The more important 
infringements of competition 
arising as a result of the 
agreement between ENDESA 
and GAS NATURAL were: 
- the creation of barriers to 
entry into the liberalised 
Spanish gas market as a result 
of a long-term supply 
agreement having a de facto 
exclusive character and 
leading to a foreclosure effect 
in the market; and 
- the own use requirement 
established in the contract 
amounting to a restriction on 
the resale of gas which led to 
an artificial segmentation of 
Spanish gas markets. 
However, before analysing the 
existence of the infringements to 
competition, the first step was to 
establish the relevant market 
affected, both in terms of 
product and geographical 
market, as well as the question 
of the existence of a dominant 
position in that market. 
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1. The product market 
affected. 
The approach of the Commission 
in previous decisions, notably in 
the context of the merger 
regulation83, can also be 
followed in this case. Firstly, gas 
is considered to be a separate 
product from other sources of 
energy like electricity or petrol. 
Secondly, different customer 
groups can constitute separate 
relevant gas markets. Thus the 
bulk supply of gas to eligible 
industrial customers or to 
wholesalers can be a different 
market (free market) from the 
regulated market of distribution 
in which customers are captive. 
It was the first of these two 
markets which was affected by 
the transaction. In this context, 
one could argue that electricity 
generators constitute a special 
group of customers within the 
free market as a result of their 
own special demand conditions. 
However the reply to this 
question can also be left open 
since the conclusions drawn as 
to the geographical dimension of 
the market and as to the position 
of GAS NATURAL on the 
relevant market would remain 
unchanged. 
83 See in particular Decision of 
01.09.1994, case n° M.493, 
Tractebel/Distrigaz; Decision of 
02.06.1998, case n° M.931. 
Neste/Ivo and Decision of 
29.09.1999, case n° M.1383, 
Exxon/Mobil. 
2. The geographical market 
affected. 
In previous cases, such as the 
Exxon/Mobil merger, the 
Commission found that 
wholesale markets were still 
national at this stage. The market 
conditions are determined by the 
past monopolistic structure with 
one company holding a de facto 
monopoly on import, transport 
(pipelines and LNG terminals), 
storage and resale of gas. While 
the Spanish legislation allows 
eligible customers to import gas 
directly, some services can only 
be provided almost exclusively 
by wholesale companies 
established at national level 
(balancing, back-up, security 
storage, diversification etc.). 
This makes it difficult for 
eligible customers (and gas 
producers) to by-pass the 
services of wholesale 
transmission companies. It is 
true that the geographical 
relevant market may acquire a 
wider dimension with the entry 
into force of the Gas Directive 
and the general introduction of 
TPA on the gas networks in all 
Member States. However, these 
regulatory changes will bring 
about merging markets in the 
longer run only and markets 
remain essentially national at 
present. These conclusions can 
also be applied to this case. 
3. The dominant position. 
The market position of GN is 
still very strong even after 3 
years of the liberalisation 
process. GN supplies around 
90% of the requirements of 
industrial customers and 
electricity generators in the free 
market. This militates in favour 
of a presumption of dominance, 
in accordance with past case-law 
(Hoffmann-La Roche and Akzo). 
This presumption is also 
supported by the strong position 
of GN in the regulated market 
where it supplies (and will 
legally continue to supply until 
2008) around 90% of the 
customers. 
One could argue that the supply 
of gas for electricity generation 
was an emerging market in 
Spain since this contract was the 
first of its kind to supply new 
generation (CCGT) plants 
(though gas was already supplied 
for electricity generation to 
existing thermal plants also able 
to burn fuel). In emerging 
markets high market shares do 
not necessarily indicate 
dominance. However, this view 
cannot be followed: the 
electricity generation market is 
certainly a growing market but 
not an emerging market. It is not 
an ex-novo market created, for 
instance, by new technological 
developments, but rather a 
segment of a wider market that 
could become a separate market 
as a result of a different demand 
structure, assuming that 
electricity generators have 
special characteristics that 
distinguish them from other 
large industrial consumers. 
However, from the point of view 
of supply, the difference 
between supplying an electricity 
generator and an interruptible 
industrial consumer that uses gas 
to produce electricity in a co-
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generation unit is small, except 
perhaps with regard to the 
volumes supplied. 
If the argument of the existence 
of an emerging market was, 
nevertheless, accepted, one has 
to consider whether high market 
shares indeed indicate a 
dominant position. Such 
assumption presupposes that the 
emerging market in question 
remains open to new entrants 
and that the quasi-monopoly 
market position is consequently 
only temporary^. During the 
investigation, however, there 
were some indications that GAS 
NATURAL, even under a 
dynamic perspective, does enjoy 
a dominant position in the 
growing market segment of gas 
sales to electricity generators and 
will maintain its dominant 
position on a lasting basis. The 
strong position of GAS 
NATURAL as an importer into 
Spain (only true importer) and 
its gate-keeper function for 
access to the infrastructure 
militated in favour of 
considering GAS NATURAL a 
dominant company. 
Thus, the dominant position 
resulted from the considerable 
market shares held by GAS 
NATURAL in the relevant and 
neighbouring markets, its control 
of the gas infrastructure in Spain 
as well as from the commercial 
advantages it enjoys vis-à-vis its 
potential competitors. 
8 4 See Decision of 09.11.1994, case n° 
M.469, MSG Media Service. 
4. The alleged abuses of Gas 
Natural dominant posi-
tion. 
The Commission's claims were 
basically the following: 
• Creation of barriers to entry 
into the liberalised Spanish 
gas market: de facto 
exclusivity and long duration 
of supply contract. ENDESA, 
through the contract in 
question, was basically 
covering all its gas 
requirements for the 
foreseeable future and a large 
proportion thereafter in 
accordance with its perceived 
share of Spanish power 
production. At the same time, 
potential entrants were losing 
an attractive client in terms of 
volumes, as electricity 
generators are among the 
larger customers of gas. Entry 
of new competitors was 
rendered more difficult and 
thus less likely. The 
subsequent foreclosure effect 
in the Spanish market 
substantially hindered the on-
going liberalisation of the 
European gas market. 
Consequently, the dominant 
position of GAS NATURAL 
was reinforced. 
• Own use requirement: 
restriction on the resale of 
gas and segmentation of 
Spanish gas markets. The 
original agreement also had 
the effect of limiting the 
competitive position of 
ENDESA in the gas market, 
where at present it is a small 
player, since it was not 
allowed to resell the 
competitive gas purchased 
from GAS NATURAL for 
electricity generation, while 
GAS NATURAL undertook, 
in a separate agreement, to 
supply gas for resale at a 
different price. Price 
differentiation according to 
final use and resale 
prohibition is the classic 
behaviour of dominant firms. 
Lowering the prices to 
customers that are likely to 
attract new entrants, while 
maintaining a higher level of 
price in other segments of the 
market (market segmen-
tation), certainly helps to 
maintain the market position 
of dominant firms (such as 
GAS NATURAL). 
• Discrimination of other 
Spanish gas purchasers. 
Other clauses of the original 
agreement had the effect of 
providing ENDESA better 
treatment than other future 
buyers from GAS 
NATURAL without any valid 
justification. 
THE AMENDMENTS PROPOSED 
BY THE PARTIES. 
Following its investigation, 
during which the Spanish 
Competition Authorities were 
duly informed in application of 
the Commission's cooperation 
notice of 199785, the 
Commission informed the 
85 The Spanish authorities dealt with 
other parts of the agreements 
between ENDESA and GAS 
NATURAL. In particular, they 
prohibited the merger of part of the 
gas distribution network of both 
companies in hvo Spanish regions. 
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companies concerned that the 
original supply agreement could 
constitute an infringement of 
Article 82 of the Treaty as it had 
the effect of reinforcing the 
already existing dominant 
position of GAS NATURAL in 
the Spanish gas market. 
GAS NATURAL and ENDESA, 
replying to the concerns of the 
Commission, proposed some 
amendments to the gas supply 
contract. Their proposals were 
basically the following: 
• Substantial reduction (around 
25%) of gas volumes covered 
by the contract in order to 
free part of ENDESA's 
purchasing capacity ensuring 
its continued existence as a 
customer in the gas market 
which could attract new 
market entry. Thus, the 
exclusivity ratio diminished 
and reached a point where it 
was no longer possible to 
claim the existence of de 
facto exclusivity in the 
contract. 
• Reduction of the long-term 
duration of the supply 
contract by one third in order 
to avoid the excessive long-
term dependence of the 
customer on the supplier. 
Thus, the contract will not 
exceed 12 years in the plateau 
period. 
• GAS NATURAL will not 
require ENDESA (or any 
other electricity generator in 
future contracts) to use the 
gas for electricity generation 
purposes only once supplies 
reach the plateau level. Thus 
ENDESA becomes free to 
resell the gas86. 
• Modification of other clauses 
of the agreement that could 
have the effect of 
discriminating in favour of 
ENDESA compared to other 
gas customers. 
CLOSING OF THE PROCEDURE 
AND EFFECTS ON THE 
LIBERALISATION OF THE GAS 
MARKET. 
In view of the commitments 
made by the parties, the 
Commission decided not to 
pursue its ex-officio case against 
GAS NATURAL: 
• As a result of the reduction of 
the volumes to be supplied 
and of the duration of the 
contract, not all of 
ENDESA's requirements are 
°" Except for the build-up period. 
During this period, GAS 
NATURAL increases the gas 
deliveries to ENDESA 
progressively. Because of the 
flexibility conditions, it was 
accepted that, during the build-up 
period, GAS NATURAL could 
require an own use requirement 
from ENDESA. However, the 
flexibility argument cannot play a 
role anymore once deliveries in the 
agreement reach the plateau level. 
Asking GAS NATURAL for a 
complete removal of the resale 
prohibition would not have a 
practical impact, since during the 
build-up period, it would be difficult 
for ENDESA to resale any gas in 
Spain. In the past, the Commission 
also accepted that a (limited in time) 
resale prohibition could be imposed 
on an electricity generator ( See case 
TRANSGAS-TURBOGAS, 1996 
Commission Report on Competition 
Policy, p. 48 and p. 135.). 
satisfied. Accordingly, 
ENDESA will need to 
purchase more gas in the 
future, thus attracting new 
suppliers and bringing more 
competition to the Spanish 
market. In this case, the 
Commission considered that 
the volumes concerned are 
large enough to attract new 
entrants. Indeed, it appears 
that quite substantial 
minimum quantities need to 
be involved before entry into 
discussions with gas 
producers/traders, not yet 
selling in the geographical 
market concerned, can be 
envisaged, in particular when 
the purchases relate to 
Liquefied Natural Gas. 
Allowing ENDESA (or other 
gas buyers) to resell the gas 
will completely change the 
pattern of trade in the market. 
GAS NATURAL will no 
longer be in a position to 
segment the market, and may 
face sales from ENDESA (or 
other large gas buyers) in the 
gas market. 
Access by power generators 
to competitive natural gas as 
a substitute for coal is crucial 
for the development of a 
competitive electricity 
market. In addition, natural 
gas is also a product that 
electricity producers can offer 
to final consumers ("multi 
energy"). Under the terms of 
the agreement as amended, 
ENDESA will be able to 
offer gas at spot market 
conditions in the gas market, 
while developing at the same 
time its new power 
generation park. 
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Main developments between 
1st January and 31st May 2000 
Eight Survey on State Aid in 
the EU 
In April 2000 the Commission 
approved the Eighth Survey on 
State Aid in the EU, COM 
(2000)205. As with previous 
editions, the coverage of the 
Survey was extended further 
and, for the first time, data on 
employment and training aid 
were included. Moreover 
separate analyses were carried 
out on C02 emission tax 
schemes that contain elements of 
State aid and certain categories 
of horizontal aid. 
Results of the Survey 
Overall results presented in 
Table l show that during the 
three year period 1996 to 1998, 
the Member States of the EU 
spent an average of € 93 billion a 
year in aid in the manufacturing, 
agriculture, fisheries, coal 
mining, transport, financial and 
other service sectors. This is an 
l l% decrease on the previous 
reporting period 1994 to 1996. 
The manufacturing sector 
received an average of € 33 
billion a year during the current 
period, a decrease of some 15% 
when compared with the 
previous reporting period. The 
gradually decreasing EU-wide 
trend in the award of aid 
observed in the Sixth and 
Seventh Surveys has therefore 
been maintained. 
However, as can be seen from 
Table 2, these overall figures 
conceal wide variations in aid 
levels and trends between 
countries. 
When considering aid levels in 
relation to value added, they are 
currently highest in Greece and 
Italy and lowest in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden. The 
spread is remarkable: in Greece, 
aid is seven times higher than in 
the UK. In regard to cohesion, a 
comparison between three of the 
four largest economies and the 
four Cohesion countries -
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain - also illustrates important 
differences. Manufacturing aid 
in Germany, France and Italy, 
although having dropped slightly 
from the 80 percent share during 
the previous period, still 
accounts for 76 per cent of all 
manufacturing aid. At the same 
time the share of aid that is 
granted in the Cohesion 
countries increased, albeit 
marginally from 8 to 9 percent of 
manufacturing aid. 
Remarkable differences between 
Member States are also to be 
seen when the different 
objectives and forms of aid are 
considered. At the EU level 
regional aid represents almost 
60% of total aid to 
manufacturing. However its 
share at Member State level 
varies from one to 96% 
depending upon the country. 
Overall, the amount of aid 
granted to manufacturing for 
one-off ad-hoc measures to assist 
individual firms has continued to 
decrease and now amounts to 
4% of all manufacturing aid in 
the Union. At the same time 
accompanying changes in the 
distribution of manufacturing aid 
between horizontal and regional 
objectives have been observed. It 
appears that with the exception 
of Germany, Italy and Greece, 
all Member States are gradually 
shifting resources away from 
sectorial, ad-hoc aid, towards 
horizontal objectives. There is 
also a perceptible shift of 
resources towards regional aid 
with absolute increases being 
seen in ten Member States. 
Conclusions drawn by the 
Commission 
Clearly in view of the still very 
high levels of State aid, the strict 
and rigorous control of State aid 
will be maintained. However 
given the very different patterns 
in the award of aid that are found 
across the EU, the Commission's 
response will be suitably 
nuanced. 
- Increasing transparency 
User-friendly access to 
information on the 
Commission's state aid policy 
will be reinforced by a state 
aid register. It is also being 
considered whether a 
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scoreboard could further 
improve transparency; 
Modernising the state aid 
control rules 
The frameworks for 
environmental aid and 
employment aid are under 
revision. Legislation is being 
prepared to exempt certain 
categories of State aid - like 
aid for small and medium 
enterprises or training aid 
from notification 
requirements. Such group 
exemptions should ensure a 
reduced level of 
administrative effort on the 
part of Member States and 
the Commission, thereby 
allowing a greater focus on 
more complex areas of state 
aid control; 
Enforcing state aid control 
effectively outside the 
European Union Enforcement 
of the strict state aid control 
provisions contained in the 
Europe Agreements signed 
with the candidate countries 
will be increased through the 
finalising of implementing 
rules for these provisions. 
- Faster recovery of illegal aid 
Particular importance will be 
attached to a more speedy 
recovery of aid which the 
Commission has declared 
incompatible with the EC 
Treaty. 
The Survey may be consulted on 
DG COMP's homepage at: 
http ://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg 
4/lawaid/en/rap8.htm. 
Table 1 
Overall national aid in the European Union 1994-1996 and 1996-1998 
in billion euro 
Overall national aid 
Of which: 
Manufacturing sector 
Agriculture 
Fisheries 
Coal mining 
Transport 
Financial Services 
Tourism 
Media and Culture 
Employment* 
Training* 
Other Services 
1994-1996 
104,2 
38,5 
14,5 
0,3 
9,1 
36,7 
2,0 
0,3 
0,6 
1,1 
0,8 
0,3 
1996-1998 
93.0 
32.6 
13.3 
0.3 
7.2 
32.1 
3.3 
0.2 
0.7 
1.4 
0.9 
0.9 
"Data incomplete for 1994-1996 
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Table 2 
State aid to the manufacturing sector 
Annual averages 1994-1996 and 1996-1998 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
-Old Lander 
-New Lander 
Greece 
Spain 
Finland 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
EUR 15 
In per cent of value 
added 
1994-1996 
1,3 
2,5 
2,6 
3,8 
4,8 
2,3 
1,6 
1,7 
1,3 
5,5 
2,2 
1,1 
1,4 
0,8 
0,6 
2,8 
1996-1998 
1,4 
1,9 
2,9 
2,6 
4,9 
2,1 
1,6 
2,0 
1,9 
4,4 
2,3 
1,2 
1,0 
0,8 
0,7 
2,3 
In euro per person 
employed 
1994-1996 
654 
1376 
1252 
1941 
451 
8783 
925 
769 
928 
895 
909 
2419 
1400 
702 
263 
421 
317 
1292 
1996-1998 
719 
1093 
1433 
1434 
435 
6021 
997 
691 
959 
1131 
1458 
1955 
1476 
735 
188 
441 
334 
1113 
In million euro 
1994-1996 
455 
931 
607 
16201 
3080 
13121 
592 
1883 
366 
3607 
240 
11040 
46 
602 
272 
330 
1358 
38531 
1996-1998 
495 
732 
712 
11463 
2856 
8607 
616 
1800 
391 
4481 
416 
8864 
48 
629 
195 
344 
1454 
32639 
Averages in 1997 prices 
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Germany - The Commission 
authorizes the special tax 
treatment of certain sectors of 
the economy in connection 
with the continuation of the 
ecological tax reform 
On 15 February 2000, the 
Commission decided to 
authorise the continued 
ecological tax reform in 
Germany under state aid rules. 
The Commission has concluded 
that the special tax treatment of 
certain sectors of the economy, 
notified by the German 
Government under the state aid 
rules in connection with the 
continuation of the ecological 
tax reform, is compatible with 
the EC Treaty. It has decided to 
authorise the special rules up to 
the year 2002 under the 
Community guidelines on state 
aid for environmental protection 
and on the basis of its existing 
practice and the Community's 
environmental policy. 
The Commission approved the 
introduction of the ecotax in 
Germany in April 1999, in so far 
as it was covered by the state aid 
rules. It should be borne in mind 
that a general increase in, or the 
introduction of, energy taxes is 
not in itself an aid measure 
requiring authorisation. 
However, exemptions from any 
such general tax in the form of 
reduced tax rates or refunds may 
have to be regarded as aid if they 
favour certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods. The 
Commission took the view in 
April 1999 that this was in 
principle the case as regards the 
reductions of up to 20% in tax 
rates provided for under the 
ecotax law for firms in 
manufacturing industry, 
agriculture and forestry and for 
rail transport services. 
This decision covers the second 
stage of the ecological tax reform. 
The main features of the 
extension are the gradual annual 
increase in electricity tax and in 
fuel tax. The reduced tax rates are 
being maintained under the 
increased electricity tax. This 
means that the relevant firms will 
receive a higher tax exemption; 
however, they will also pay 
higher taxes than before. 
Furthermore, as part of the 
increase in electricity tax, a 
growing number of firms will pay 
the reduced rates and thus be 
covered by the partial tax 
exemption. For this reason, the 
increase in electricity tax also 
requires authorisation under the 
state aid rules. The same applies 
to the tax refund proposal for 
manufacturing industry. 
The increase in fuel tax will in 
principle have to be borne by all 
finns; however, public transport 
will be subject to only half of the 
additional levy. This too, in the 
Commission's view, amounts to 
aid. 
The reduction in mineral oil tax 
for low-sulphur fuels and the 
exemption granted on electricity 
generated for their own 
consumption by plants of up to 2 
MW are, in the Commission's 
view, not aid. 
As in April 1999, the 
Commission has, however, 
decided not to raise any 
objections to the aid provisions, 
because they are in line with the 
Community guidelines on state 
aid for environmental protection, 
its previous practice on similar 
schemes in other Member States 
and the Community's environ-
mental policy. 
The Commission is thus 
essentially maintaining the 
position it took in its April 1999 
decision: the 1994 Community 
guidelines on state aid for 
environmental protection (OJ C 
72/03 of 10 March 1994) 
recognise that the introduction of 
environmental taxes and charges 
can involve state aid because 
some firms may not be able to 
stand the extra financial burden 
immediately and require 
temporaiy relief. Such aid in the 
form of relief from environmental 
taxes may under certain 
conditions, and taking each case 
on its merits, be approved in 
exceptional cases. Having 
considered all the circumstances 
of the case, and taking into 
account its previous practice and 
the Community's environmental 
policy, the Commission has 
decided that the conditions for 
approval are met. In so deciding, 
it has taken account of the fact 
that at present not all Member 
States of the Community or 
non-Community countries 
impose such energy taxes and 
that the introduction of 
environmental taxes therefore 
affects the competitive position of 
the relevant firms. 
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The Commission has also based 
its decision on the fact that the 
authorisation period remains 
unchanged as compared with the 
original authorisation period. 
The Federal Government has 
renewed its commitment to 
re-notify the measures for 
approval no later than three years 
after the entry into force of the 
ecotax, i.e. before 1 April 2002, 
and, in the Electricity Tax Law, 
has set a similar limit to the 
period of applicability of the aid 
measures. 
The Commission has also noted 
that the Federal Government 
assumes that German industry 
will stick to the voluntary 
agreements entered into 
previously and will in the years 
ahead continue its efforts to 
reduce energy consumption and 
increase energy efficiency. 
Lastly, the Commission has taken 
account of the fact that the 
German scheme is in line with 
the Commission's 1997 proposal 
for a Council Directive 
restructuring the Community 
framework for the taxation of 
energy products. 
This decision does not cover the 
proposed exemption of certain gas 
and steam turbine power stations 
from mineral oil tax. This 
measure will be dealt with later in 
a separate Commission decision 
Denmark - Commission 
approves tradable C02 
emission permits for the 
electricity sector in Denmark 
for the period 2001-2003 
On 29 March the Commission 
decided not to object to a scheme 
concerning tradable C02 
emission permits for the 
electricity sector in Denmark. 
The Commission welcomes the 
Danish emissions trading scheme, 
since it is important for the EU to 
gather experience ahead of the 
International Emissions Trading 
to be introduced under the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2008. However, the 
Commission considers that giving 
producers emission pennits 
without compensation constitutes 
State aid under Article 87(1) of 
the EC Treaty. It can approve the 
State aid on the basis of Article 
87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty, since 
the scheme will contribute to the 
development of environmental 
protection. The Commission 
makes clear that this decision is 
without prejudice to future 
decisions on methods for 
allocating tradable emission 
pennits. This applies for a 
possible revised version of the 
Danish scheme allowing trade in 
pennits between different 
countries, for a new scheme to 
apply after 2003 and for schemes 
subsequently developed in other 
Member States. 
The system is based on an annual, 
national ceiling for the allowable 
emissions from electricity 
production. It is limited to the 
electricity sector, since it alone is 
responsible for about 40% of the 
total emissions of COi in 
Denmark. The ceiling is reduced 
each year, going from 22 million 
tonnes in 2001 to 21 million 
tonnes in 2002 and 20 million 
tonnes in 2003, when the scheme 
ends. The national quota is 
allocated to existing electricity 
producers for free, based on their 
historical emissions in the period 
1994-1998 (grandfathering). The 
basic quotas allocated will only 
cover about 70% of the historical 
emissions of each electricity 
producer. 
The idea behind a system with 
tradable emission permits is that 
the incentive to reduce emissions 
should be strongest where the 
cost of doing so is the lowest. In 
theory, a producer able to reduce 
emissions at a cost per tonne 
which is lower than the amount 
of the fine due for exceeding the 
quota, i.e. DKK 40/tonne (about 
€ 5.40), will do so. The excess 
permits can then be sold to 
another producer, for whom it is 
cheaper to buy pennits than to 
pay the fine. A producer can also 
save permits that are not used in 
one year for use the next year 
(banking). Each year, the quota of 
each producer is adjusted taking 
account of the national quota for 
the particular year, the 
transactions made and whether 
emission permits have been 
saved. 
In its assessment, the 
Commission has emphasised the 
importance of safeguarding the 
freedom of establishment. Thus, 
the Danish authorities will ensure 
that if there are new entrants on 
the Danish electricity market 
during the operation of the 
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scheme, these will receive quotas 
based on criteria that are 
objective and non­discriminatory 
in relation to those applied to 
incumbent producers. The criteria 
are subject to approval by the 
Commission. 
The Danish scheme should be 
seen against the background of 
the Kyoto Protocol to the UN 
Framework Convention on 
Climate Change from December 
1997. Under the Kyoto Protocol, 
the European Community 
committed itself to reducing its 
emissions of greenhouse gases 
by 8% during the period 2008­
2012 in comparison with their 
levels in 1990. A burden­sharing 
has been agreed internally in the 
EU, which for Denmark implies 
a reduction by 21% in the period 
2008­2012 compared with 1990. 
France et Pays­Bas ­ La 
Commission autorise des aides 
en faveur du programme de 
recherche ΙΤΕΑ. 
Le 11 avril, la Commission a 
autorisé les aides notifiées par la 
France et les Pays­Bas en faveur 
du programme de recherche 
ΙΤΕΑ (« Information Technology 
for European Advancement »). 
ΙΤΕΑ est un programme Eureka 
de recherche et développement 
dans le domaine des 
technologies logicielles. Il vise à 
acquérir des connaissances dans 
différents domaines (composants 
logiciels, architectures, 
spécifications de standards, 
spécifications des interfaces, 
etc.) et concerne tout 
particulièrement le dévelop­
pement de technologies pour les 
« briques logicielles » 
(« middleware »). 
Douze pays, dont onze de 
l'Union Européenne, ont 
manifesté leur intérêt pour ce 
programme. Conformément aux 
règles Eureka, ΙΤΕΑ sera mené 
en collaboration transfrontalière 
au niveau européen, et 
impliquera une collaboration 
effective entre industriels et 
centres publics de recherche. 
Les autorités françaises et 
néerlandaises soutiendront les 
projets de R&D menés dans le 
cadre d'ITEA en apportant des 
aides dont l'intensité maximale 
sera de 50%. Le programme 
ΙΤΕΑ durera jusqu'en juin 2007 
et aura un budget total d'environ 
3200 millions d'Euros. Les aides 
apportées par les autorités 
françaises et néerlandaises au 
titre des régimes approuvés par 
la Commission s'élèveront au 
maximum à 274 millions 
d'Euros et 95 millions d'Euros 
respectivement. 
La Commission a analysé les 
régimes d'aides notifiés par la 
France et les Pays­Bas dans le 
cadre du programme ΙΤΕΑ 
conformément à l'Encadrement 
communautaire des aides d'Etat 
à la Recherche et au 
développement87. 
Les travaux financés dans le 
cadre d'ITEA sont de la 
recherche industrielle ou des 
développements pré­concurren­
tiels au sens de l'Encadrement. 
ΙΤΕΑ s'inscrit dans les objectifs 
du Cinquième Programme Cadre 
de Recherche et Développement, 
et plus particulièrement dans les 
objectifs du programme 
spécifique «Société de 
l'information conviviale88». Les 
régimes notifiés par la France et 
les Pays­Bas pouvaient par 
conséquent bénéficier du bonus 
d'intensité de 25% prévu au 
point 5.10.3 de l'Encadrement 
pour les projets s'inscrivant dans 
le Programme­cadre communau­
taire avec collaboration 
transfrontalière et diffusion des 
résultats : une intensité d'aide de 
50% pouvait donc être autorisée. 
La Commission, qui a souligné à 
de nombreuses reprises que 
l'industrie des technologies de 
l'information et des 
communications jouerait un rôle 
crucial pour la société de 
l'information au 21ème siècle, 
considère qu'un programme de 
recherche comme ΙΤΕΑ 
contribue à l'intérêt commun. 
Elle a conclu que les dispositifs 
d'aide français et néerlandais 
étaient en tout point conformes à 
l'Encadrement communautaire 
des aides d'Etat à la Recherche 
et au Développement et 
pouvaient par conséquent être 
autorisés. 
87 JOC45, 17.2.1996, p.5 JOL64du 12 mars 1999. p.20 
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Germany - The Commission 
decides that the aid granted 
from 1993 to 1997 in favour of 
System Microelectronic 
Innovation GmbH (SMI) is 
incompatible with the Treaty 
and has to be recovered. In 
order to ensure its effective 
recovery, it decides that the aid 
will have to be recovered not 
only from the present owner of 
the assets of SMI 
(Microelectronic Design & 
Development GmbH - MD&D) 
but also from any other 
companies to which SMI's 
assets have been or will be 
transferred. 
The European Commission has 
decided to close the formal 
investigation procedure in 
respect of State aid measures 
amounting to DEM 140,100,000 
awarded to System 
Microelectronic Innovation 
GmbH (SMI), Frankfurt/Oder/ 
Brandenburg (Germany) with a 
final negative decision. As these 
measures are incompatible with 
the Treaty, the aid has to be 
recovered. 
On 5 August 1997, the 
Commission initiated a formal 
investigation procedure against 
unnotified aid measures in 
favour of SMI. The company 
filed for bankruptcy already in 
April 1997. The main activity of 
SMI was the production of 
customer specific microchips. 
The bankruptcy administrator 
decided to continue the 
company's operation. A new 
company, named Silicium 
Microelektronik Integration 
GmbH Frankfurt/Oder (SIMI), 
was founded on 30 June 1997 to 
secure the going-concern of 
SMI. All shares of SIMI were 
owned by the company in 
bankruptcy SMI. On 1 July" 1997 
the administrator also founded a 
100 % subsidiary of SIMI, 
named Microelectronic Design 
& Development GmbH 
(MD&D), whose intended 
activities were in the field of 
consulting, marketing, 
development and design of 
microelectronic products and 
services. After several fruitless 
attempts of the Land 
Brandenburg to sell MD&D to a 
private investor, the negotiations 
with MEGAXESS Inc from the 
USA, were finally successful. In 
July 1999 MD&D bought the 
shares of SIMI and the assets of 
SMI. 
Grants of a total DEM 
64,800,000 for investment 
purposes by the Treuhandanstalt 
and a loan of DEM 70,300,000 
of the Land Brandenburg for loss 
coverage from 1993 until 1997 
were awarded in favour of SMI. 
A further DEM 4,000,000 of the 
Land and DEM 1,000,000 of the 
THA was awarded in favour of 
SIMI, the subsidiary of SMI. 
As the aid measures were neither 
covered by approved regimes 
nor exemptable on the basis of 
the provisions of the Treaty, the 
aid measures had to be 
considered as being 
incompatible and therefore have 
to be recovered from the 
beneficiaries. 
The Commission further decided 
that the aid measures in favour 
of SMI and SIMI have to be 
recovered from MD&D. This 
company still benefits from the 
aid because it still uses the assets 
of the bankrupt company, SMI, 
thus taking advantage from the 
aid formally granted to SMI and 
SIMI. 
Furthermore, Germany should be 
prevented from evading the 
consequences of the recovery 
decision by setting up a system 
of successive subsidiaries like it 
did in this case. Therefore, the 
Commission decided also to 
extend its decision to aid 
measures in favour of any other 
undertaking to which SMI's, 
SIMl's or MD&D's assets have 
been or will be transferred. 
Nouvelles Décisions sur les 
cartes des aides d'Etat à finalité 
régionale pour la période 2000-
2006 
The mapping exercise that the 
Commission started some 2 
years ago is now more than half 
way. At the end of May the 
Commission approved the full 
map of areas where national 
regional aid may be granted for 
nine Member States. These are 
Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Finland, 
Sweden, Spain and Austria. The 
Commission also approved the 
Article 87(3)(a) areas of Italy 
and Portugal. 
Although good progress was 
made during the last months, the 
proposals submitted by some 
Member States have not allowed 
the Commission to approve all 
maps. Procedures according to 
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Article 88(2) of the Treaty are 
pending on the Belgium and on 
the Dutch map, and on the 
Italian and Portuguese Article 
87(3)(c) areas. The assessment 
for Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom is not yet finalised. 
Germany 
On 14 March the Commission 
approved the remaining part of 
the German regional aid map for 
the period 1 January 2000 until 
31 December 2003. The decision 
declares the City of Berlin and 
several regions in West-
Germany eligible under Article 
87(3)(c) EC-Treaty and lays 
down the respective maximum 
aid intensities relevant for 
regional aid. Thus, the city of 
Berlin may receive 20% (in net 
grant equivalent), the region of 
Hameln-Pyrmont, the city of 
Passau and the city of Hof 10% 
(in net grant equivalent) and the 
remaining proposed labour 
market regions in West-
Germany 18% (in net grant 
equivalent). However, Germany 
declared not to exceed 20 % 
gross in the city of Berlin and 
18 % gross for the relevant 
labour market regions in West 
Germany. 
In July last year, the 
Commission had already decided 
that the five new Länder are 
eligible under Article 87(3)(a) 
EC-Treaty and their respective 
aid intensities were laid down 
for the period 1 January 2000 
until 31 December 2003. 
Austria 
On 30 May, the Commission 
approved the Austrian regional 
aid map for the period 1 January 
2000 until 31 December 2006. 
Burgenland is the only region to 
qualify under Article 87(3)(a) 
EC-Treaty. Therefore, in same 
parts of this region a maximum 
aid intensity of 35% (in net grant 
equivalent) is permitted. Regions 
falling under Article 87(3)(c) 
EC-Treaty have either been 
selected on a NUTS III basis or 
correspond to areas eligible 
under the Structural Funds. Their 
respective maximum aid 
intensities have been chosen in 
order to reflect the seriousness 
and intensity of the regional 
problem and vary between 
12,5% and 20% (in net grant 
equivalent). 
Sweden 
On 29 March, the Commission 
approved the Swedish regional 
aid map for the period 2000 to 
2006. The Swedish Article 
87(3)(c) EC region is one single, 
compact zone located in the 
North of the country. It has a 
population of 1.4 million (15.9% 
of the total population of 
Sweden). In the most remote part 
of the (c)-area, the maximum aid 
intensity ceiling is set at 30% 
nge. This area has a population 
density of 1.9 inhabitants per 
square kilometre and qualifies as 
a low population density area 
under paragraph 3.10.4 of the 
Guidelines on national regional 
aid 89 . In the rest of the (c)-
8') OJC74, 10.3.1998, p. 9 
region, the aid ceiling is set at 
17.5% nge for large enterprises 
and 17.5% nge + 10% gge for 
SMEs. 
On 3 May, the Commission also 
approved the Swedish regional 
development aid scheme. This 
scheme establishes a 
comprehensive package of aid 
measures to support the 
development of enterprises 
located in the Swedish Article 
87(3)(c) regions. Under the 
scheme, the Swedish authorities 
will provide aid for general 
business investment as well as 
for advisory services for SMEs, 
research and development 
projects and training actions. 
France 
The Commission approved the 
French regional aid map on 1 
March. 36.7% of the French 
population live in assisted areas. 
2.7% live in the French 
"Département d'Outre-mer", the 
only French Article 87(3)(a) 
regions, where regional aid can 
amount to 65% net for large 
companies and 75% net for 
SMEs. 
The Article 87(3)(c) areas were 
selected according to a method 
which was based on the French 
Travel-to-Work-Areas but also 
took account of the designated 
Objective 2 areas. Regional aid 
to large companies in the 
assisted areas may not exceed 
20% net and 15% in those areas 
which were limited to 15% in 
1999. In the Doubs and Upper-
Rhin, the aid intensity is limited 
to 10% net. Aid for SMEs can 
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benetit from a majoration of 10 
gross percentage points. 
Spain 
La Commission européenne a 
approuvé la carte espagnole des 
aides à finalité régionale dont le 
taux de population couverte qui 
ne dépasse pas les 79,2% du 
total de la population espagnole. 
Parmi la population couverte, 
58,4% se situe dans les régions 
relevant de l'article 87.3.a) car le 
PIB/habitant y est inférieur à 
75 % de celui con-espondant à la 
moyenne communautaire et 
20,8% se situe dans des régions 
en meilleure situation relative 
qui tombent sous le coup de 
l'article 87.3.c). 
Les plafonds régionaux des 
intensités des aides régionales 
seront (en termes d'équivalent 
subvention net) de 50% dans les 
régions de l'Andalucia, les 
Canarias et l'Extremadura; de 
40% dans les régions de Galicia, 
Asturias, Castilla y León (sauf 
les provinces de Palencia et 
Segovia où le plafond sera de 
37% et les provinces de Burgos 
et de Valladolid où il sera de 
35%), Castilla - La Mancha (sauf 
la province de Guadalajara où il 
sera de 30%), Comunidad 
Valenciana (sauf les provinces 
de Valencia où il sera de 37% et 
de où il sera de 35%), Murcia, 
Ceuta et Melilla. Aux plafonds 
indiqués, s'ajoutera, dans le cas 
des PME un supplément de 15 
points bruts de pourcentage. 
Quant aux régions en meilleure 
situation relative et relevant donc 
de l'article 87.3.c), les intensités 
seront de 20% sauf dans les 
communes proposées de la 
province de Lleida où elle 
s'élèvera à 10%, dans la 
province de Teruel où elle 
s'élèvera à 30% ESN en raison 
de la faible densité de population 
et dans la région de Cantabria où 
elle commencera à 40% pour 
diminuer jusqu'à 20% sur une 
période de quatre ans en raison 
du fait qu'il s'agit d'une région en 
transition du statut de région 
87.3.a) au statut de région 
87.3.c). Aux plafonds indiqués, 
s'ajoutera, dans le cas des PME 
un supplément de 10 point bruts 
de pourcentage. 
Finland 
By letter dated March 16, the 
Commission informed Finland 
of its approval of the increase 
(compared to the ones approved 
in October 1999) of the intensity 
rates for large firms in the 
Article 87(3)(c) regions outside 
the Aland islands (now 20% 
NGE and 16% NGE). 
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COMPETITION DG staff list 
Directeur général 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions G et H 
Conseiller pour les réformes 
Conseiller auditeur 
Conseiller auditeur 
Assistants du Directeur général 
directement rattachés au Directeur général : 
1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information 
2. Questions informatiques 
DIRECTION A 
Politique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires 
Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions 
Conseiller 
Conseiller 
1. Politique générale de la concurrence, 
aspects économiques et juridiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Projets législatifs et réglementaires ; 
relations avec les Etats membres 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Affaires internationales 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
DIRECTION Β 
Task Force "Contrôle des opérations 
de concentration entre entreprises" 
Télécopieur central : 295 01 28 
Alexander SCHAU Β 
Jean-François PONS 
Gianfranco ROCCA 
Helmut SCHRÖTER 
Roger DAOÜT 
John TEMPLE LANG 
Henrik MØRCH 
Bernhard FRIESS 
Irène SOUKA 
Guido VER VA Ε T 
Kirtlkumar MEHTA 
Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 
Georgios ROUNIS 
Bernd LANGEHEINE 
Emil PAULIS 
Paolo CESARMI 
Yves DEVELENNES 
Götz DRA UZ 
Conseiller 
1. Unité opérationnelle I 
2. Unité opérationnelle II 
3. Unité opérationnelle III 
4. Unité opérationnelle IV 
2952387/2958819 
2994423/2962284 
2951152/2967819 
2951196/2955894 
2965383/2960090 
2955571/2994036 
2950766/2992132 
2956038/2950006 
2957206/2950210 
1959224/2951305 
2957389/2952871 
2951146/2960699 
2953404 
2991855/2965019 
2965033/2995470 
2951286 
2951590/2995406 
2958681/2996728 
Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/2967244 
Giacomo GIÀ COMELLO 2951268 
Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/2962368 
Francisco Enrique GONZALEZ DIAZ a. i. 2965044 
Wolfgang MEDERER 2953584 
Paid MALRICSMITH 2959765 
DIRECTION C 
Information, communication, multimédias 
Conseiller 
1. Télécommunications et Postes, 
Coordination Société d'information 
­ Cas relevant de l'Article 81/82 
­ Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 
2. Médias, éditions musicales 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER ff 
Herbert UNGERER 
Pierre BUIGUES 
Suzanna SCHIFF 
Christian HOCEPIED 
Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 
Georg Klaus DE BRONETT 
Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 
2953895/2963904 
2966623 
2994387 
2957657/2995365 
2960427/2958316 
2953895/2963904 
2959268 
2960949/2965303 
68 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 
INFORMATION SECTION 
DIRECTION D 
Services 
1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) 
2. Transports et infrastructures des transports 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Commerce et autres services 
Enzo MOA VERO MILANESI 
Serge DURANDE 
Jürgen MENSCHING 
Jóos STRAGIER 
Loivri EVANS 
2953427/2969481 
2957243/2951802 
2952224/2995894 
2952482/2995894 
2965029/2965036 
DIRECTION E 
Cartels, industries de base et énergie 
1. Cartels 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Industries de base. 
3. Enercie, eau et acier 
Angel TRADACETE COCERÁ 
Maurice GUERRIN 
Julian JOSHUA 
Nicola ANNECCHINO 
Michael ALBERS 
2952462/2950900 
2951817/2951816 
2955519/2951816 
2961870/2956422 
2961874/2960614 
DIRECTION F 
Industries des biens d'équipement 
et de consommation Sven NORBERG 
1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Fin LOMHOLT 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
Automobiles, autres moyens de transport 
et construction mécanique connexe 
Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques, 
textiles et autres biens de consommation 
Carmelo MORELLO 
Eric VAN GINDERACHTER 
Luc GYSELEN 
2952178/2965550 
2955619/2957439 
2955132 
2954427/2950479 
2961523/2963781 
DIRECTION G 
Aides d'Etat I 
Conseiller 
1. Politique des aides d'Etat 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Aides horizontales 
3. Aides à finalité régionale 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
4. Analyses, inventaires et rapports 
Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 
Robert HANKIN 
Jean-Louis COLSON 
Wouter PIEKE 
Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 
Reinhard WALTHER 
2958603/2992627 
2959773/2956689 
2960995/2962526 
2959824/2967267 
2960376/2965071 
2958434/2956661 
DIRECTION H 
Aides d'Etat II 
1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, construction 
navale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, 
électronique, construction mécanique et autres 
secteurs manufacturiers 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Entreprises publiques et services 
Task Force 'Aides dans les nouveaux Lander' 
Humbert D RABBE 
Maria REHBINDER 
Jorma PIHLATIE 
Ronald FELTKAMP 
Conrado TROMP 
2950060/2952701 
2990007/2963603 
2953607/2955900 
2954283/2960009 
2960286 
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Documentation... 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given 
by Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of these 
are available from Competition DG's home page on the World 
Wide Web. Future issues of the newsletter will contain details ol 
conferences on competition policy which have been brought to our 
attention. Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this 
facility should refer to page 1 for the address of Competition DG's 
Information Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
"Who will be in the driver's seat?" ­
Mario MONTI ­ Forum Europe 
Conference ­ Brussels ­ 11.05.2000 
Presentation of the XXIXth report 
on competition policy ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ European Parliament ­
Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs ­ 08.05.2000 
The Role of EC Competition Policy 
in the Liberalisation of EU Energy 
Markets ­ Angel TRADACETE 
COCERÁ ­ European Energy 
Millenium Forum ­ Brussels ­
27.04.2000 
Sport and Competition ­ Mario 
MONTI ­ Excerpts of a speech 
given at a Commission­organised 
conference on sports ­ Brussels ­
17.04.2000 The Community's State 
Aid Policy ­ Mario MONTI ­
Conference of the 16 Ministers of 
Economic Affairs of the German 
Länder ­ Brussels ­ 30.03.2000 
Liberalizzazioni e Concorrenza ­
Mario MONTI ­ Commissioni 
Congiunte Bilancio, Industria e 
Affari Costituzionali del Senato ­
Roma ­ 28.03.2000 La politique 
européenne de concurrence et la 
société de l'information : Bilan et 
perspectives après le Sommet de 
Lisbonne ­ Jean­François PONS ­
Conférence Euro CPR 2000 ­
Venise ­ 27.03.2000 ­ Shipping: 
Examining the development and 
impact of European legislation ­
Jürgen MENSCHING 
Containerisation International ­ 3rd 
Annual Conference "Global 2000" ­
London ­ 22.03.2000 
I servizi pubblici locali nel quadro 
della politica di concorrenza 
comunitaria ­ Mario MONTI ­
Convegno organizzato dalla 
Fondazione Montedison su « Le 
liberalizzazioni e le privatizzazioni 
dei servizi pubblici locali » ­ Milano 
­20.03.2000 
Modernisation of EU Competition 
Rules ­ Launch of the Competition 
Act 1998 ­ Mario MONTI ­ London 
­ 02.03.2000 
Speech given at the formal 
introduction ceremony of the new 
President of the Bundeskartellamt ­
Mario MONTI ­ Festveranstaltung 
Präsidentenwechsel Bundes­
kartellamt Bonn ­ Bonn 
13.01.2000 
Modernising Community 
Competition policy : State Aids and 
Antitrust ­ Mario MONTI ­ Meeting 
of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs of the European 
Parliament ­ Brussels ­11.01.2000 
COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ON 
COMPETITION 
Except if otherwise indicated, these 
publications are available through 
the Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities or its 
sales offices (see last page). 
Use Catalogue number to order. 
Publications marked with as asterisk 
(*) are also available on DG 
Competition web site: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/dg4 
home.htm 
LEGISLATION 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IA­Rules 
applicable to undertakings 
Situation at 30 june 1994; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
85, 86 and 90. 
Catalogue No: CM­29­93­A01­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Addendum to 
Volume ΙΑ­Rules applicable to 
undertakings 
Situational 1 March 1995. 
Catalogue No: CM­88­95­436­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIA­Rules 
applicable to State aid 
Situation at 30 June 1998; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. 
Catalogue No: PD­15­98­875­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE; 
EL, EN,"FR, IT, NL, PT. SV, FI) 
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Competition law in the EC­
Volume II B­Explanation of rules 
applicable to state aid 
Situation at December 1996 
Catalogue No: CM­03­97­296­xx­C 
(xx=language code= ES. DA, DE, 
EL. E N ^ R " IT. NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Competition law in the European 
Communities­Volume IIIA­Rules 
in the international field­
Situation at 31 December 1996 
(Edition 1997) 
Catalogue No: CM­89­95­858­xx­C 
(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN. FR. IT, NL, PT. FI, SV) 
Merger control law in the 
European Union­Situation in 
March 1998 
Catalogue No: CV­15­98­899­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL. EN, FR, IT, NL. PT, FI, SV) 
Brochure concerning the 
competition rules applicable to 
undertakings as contained in the 
EEA agreement and their 
implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority. 
Catalogue No: CV­77­92­118­EN­C 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
Competition policy in Europe and 
the citizen 
Catalogue No: KD­28­00­397­xx­C 
(xx=language code: FR et PT; the 
other versions will be available 
later). 
Application of EC State aid law 
by the member state courts 
Cataloeue No: CM­20­99­365­EN­C 
Dealing with the Commission 
(Edition 1997)­Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact­
finding, powers under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Catalogue No: CV­95­96­552­xx­C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EN. FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI,SV) 
Green paper on vertical restraints 
in EC competition policy ­COM 
(96) 721­(Ed. 1997) 
Catalogue No: CB­CO­96­742­xx­C 
(xx= ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NL 
PTSVFI) 
Final report of the multimodal 
group ­ Presented to 
Commissioner Van Miert by Sir 
Bryan Carsberg, Chairman of the 
Group (Ed. 1997). 
Catalogue No: CV­11­98­803­EN­C 
The institutional framework for 
the regulation of 
telecommunications and the 
application of EC competition 
rules ­ Final Report (Forrester 
Norall & Sutton). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­590­EN­C 
Competition aspects of access 
pricing­Report to the European 
Commission 
December 1995 (M. Cave, P. 
Crowther, L. Handier). 
Catalogue No: CM­94­96­582­EN­C 
Community Competition Policy in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March 
1997)­volume II Β a compedium 
prepared by DG IV­C­1; it 
contains Directives under art 90, 
Decisions under Regulation 17 
and under the Merger Regulation 
as well as relevant Judgements of 
the Court of Justice. 
­ Copies available through DG 
COMP­C­1 (tel. +322­2968623, 
2968622, fax +322­2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les 
modalités d'application du 
Règlement (CE) No 1475/95 de la 
Commission concernant certaines 
catégories d'accords de 
distribution et de service de vente 
et d'après vente de véhicules 
automobiles ­ Copies available 
through DG COMP­F­2 (tel. +322­
2951880, 2950479. fax. +322­
2969800) EN, FR, DE 
COMPETITION DECISIONS 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matière d'aides 
d'Etat ­Article 93, paragraphe 2 
(Décisions Finales négatives)­
1964­1995 
Catalogue No: CM­96­96­465­xx­C 
[xx=FR, NL, DE et IT (1964­1995); 
EN et DA (73­95); EL (81­95); (ES 
et PT (86­95): FI et SV (95)] 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
94/98 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=language code= ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, FI, SV) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
93/94 
Catalogue No: CV­90­95­946­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition ­Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.­
90/92 
Catalogue No: CV­84­94­387­xx­C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
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Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
89/90 
Catalogue No: CV-73-92-772-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
86/88 
Catalogue No: CM-80-93-290-XX-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
81/85 
Catalogue No: CM-79-93-792-xx-C 
(xx=DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL.) 
Reports of Commission Decisions 
relating to competition -Articles 
85, 86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.-
73/80 
Catalogue No: CM-76-92-988-xx-C 
(xx=DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL.) 
European Community on 
Competition Policy 1998 
Catalogue No: CV-20-99-301-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI SV 
XXVII Report on Competition 
Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C 
European Community on 
Competition Policy 1997 
Catalogue No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C 
(xx= FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, 
SV, DA, Fl) 
XXVI Report on Competition 
Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C 
European Community 
Competition Policy 1996 
Catalogue No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C 
(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*, 
FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*,FI*, SV*) 
XXV Report on Competition 
Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C 
XXIe Report on competition 
policy 1991 
Catalogue No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Fifth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors 
Catalogue No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV ) 
Sixt survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors 
Catalogue No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C 
Septième rapport sur les aides 
d'Etat dans le secteur des 
produits manufacturés et certains 
autres secteurs de l'Union 
européenne |COM (1999) 148 
final] 
Catalogue No: CB-CO-99-153-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, SV, FI ) 
Recueil des décisions de la 
Commission en matièrre de 
concurrence - Articles 85, 86 et 90 
du traité CEE-64/72 
Catalogue No: CM-76-92-996-xx-C 
(xx=DE, FR, IT, NL.) 
COMPETITION REPORTS 
European Community 
competition policy 1999 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV ) . Copies available 
through Cellule Information DG 
COMP. 
XXVIII Report on Competition 
Policy 1998 
Catalogue No: CV-20-99-785-xx-C 
(xx= ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, FI, SV) 
European Community 
Competition Policy 1995 
Catalogue No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C 
(xx= ES*, DA*, DE*, EL*, EN*, 
FR*, IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*) 
XXIV Report on competition 
policy 1994 
Catalogue No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C 
(xx= language code: ES, DA, DE, 
EL, EN, FR, IT,NL, PT, FI, SV) 
XXIIIe Report on competition 
policy 1993 
Catalogue No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
XXIIe Report on competition 
policy 1992 
Catalogue No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT 
OTHER DOCUMENTS and 
STUDIES 
Buyer power and its impact on 
competition in the food retail 
distribution sector of the 
European Union 
Cat. No: CV-25-99-649-EN-C 
The application of articles 85 & 
86 of the EC Treaty by national 
courts in the Member States 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx= 
FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT) 
Examination of current and 
future excess capacity in the 
European automobyle industry -
Ed. 1997 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C 
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Video: Fair Competition in 
Europe-Examination of current 
Cat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx= 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI, SV) 
Communication de la 
Commission: Les services 
d'intérêt général en Europe (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx= 
DE.NL. GR, SV 
Study of exchange of confidential 
information agreements and 
treaties between the US and 
Member States of EU in areas of 
securities, criminal, tax and 
customs (Ed. 1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C 
Survey of the Member State 
National Laws governing vertical 
distribution agreements (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C 
Services de télécomunication en 
Europe: statistiques en bref, 
Commerce, services et transports, 
1/1996 
Cat. No: CA-NP-96-OOl-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Report by the group of experts on 
competition policy in the new 
trade order [COM(96)284 fin.] 
Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European 
merger control: New lessons 
about collective dominance ? (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C 
Proceedings of the European 
Competition Forum (coédition 
with J. Wiley)-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C. 
Bierlieferungsverträge in den 
neuen EU-Mitgliedstaaten 
Österreich, Schweden und 
Finnland-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C 
Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport 
1995 
Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C 
Information exchanges among 
firms and their impact on 
competition (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C 
Impact of EC funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long term 
competitiveness (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C 
Competition policy in the new 
trade order: strengthening 
international cooperation and 
rules (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C 
Forum consultatif de la 
comptabilité: subventions 
publiques (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: C 184 94 735 FR C 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C 
Study on the impact of 
liberalization of inward cross 
border mail on the provision of 
the universal postal service and 
the options for progressive 
liberalization (Ed. 1995) Final 
report. 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-01S-EN-C 
Meeting universal service 
obligations in a competitive 
telecommunications sector (Ed. 
1994) 
Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy 
(Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: 
White paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2 
PartC 
Cat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European 
single market (Ed. 1993) 
Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C 
International transport by air, 
1993 
Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Enquête 1992 
(Ed. 1993)-9 languages 
Cat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C 
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EG Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie (Ed. 1992) 
Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C 
Green Paper on the development 
of the single market for postal 
services, 9 languages 
Cat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C 
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 
JOURNAL 
1st February 2000 to 
31st May 2000 
ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONS 
AND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIO 
Β Y UNDERTAKINGS) 
27.05.2000 
C 149 2000/C 149-0029 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 30 March 2000 in 
Case T-65/96: Kish Glass & Co. 
Ltd ν Commission of the 
European Communities 
[Competition - Float glass -
Rights of defence and 
procedural rights of the 
complainant - Product market 
and geographical market 
Article 86 of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 82 EC)] 
C 149 2000/C 149-0003 
Judgment of the Court (Fifth 
Chamber) of 16 March 2000 in 
Joined Cases C-395/96 Ρ and C-
396/96 P: Compagnie Maritime 
Beige Transports SA (C-395/96 
P), Compagnie Maritime Beige 
SA (C-395/96 P) and Dafra-
Lines A/S (C-396/96 Ρ) ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition 
International maritime transport 
- Liner conferences - Regulation 
(EEC) No 4056/86 - Article 86 
of the EC Treaty (now Article 
82 EC) - Collective dominant 
position - Exclusivity agreement 
between national authorities and 
liner conferences - Liner 
conference insisting on 
application of the agreement -
Fighting ships - Loyalty rebates 
- Rights of defence - Fines -
Assessment criteria) 
C 149 2000/C 149-0043 Case T-
78/00: Action brought on 3 April 
2000 by Sumitomo Metal 
Industries Limited against the 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0029 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 30 March 2000 in 
Case T-513/93: Consiglio 
Nazionale degli Spedizionieri 
Doganali ν Commission of the 
European Communities 
[(Competition - Customs agents 
- Meaning of "undertaking" and 
"an association of undertakings" 
Decisions adopted by 
associations of undertakings -
Setting of tariffs - Governed by 
public law - Applicability of 
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 81 EC)] 
C 149 2000/C 149-0033 Case T-
5/00: Action brought on 17 
January 2000 by Nederlandse 
Federatieve Vereniging voor de 
Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch 
Gebied against the Commission 
of the European Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0034 Case T-
6/00: Action brought on 17 
January 2000 by Technische 
Unie BV against the 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0035 Case T-
50/00: Action brought on 8 
March 2000 by Dalmine SpA 
against the Commission of the 
European Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0037 Case T-
58/00: Action brought on 12 
March 2000 by Bond van de 
Fegarbel-Beroepsverenigingen 
against the Commission of the 
European Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0038 Case T-
59/00: Action brought on 17 
March 2000 by Compagnia 
Portuale Pietro Chiesa ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0041 Case T-
71/00: Action brought on 24 
March 2000 by Kawasaki Steel 
Corporation against the 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0043 Case T-
77/00: Action brought on 3 April 
2000 by Esat 
Telecommunications Ltd., 
against the Commission of the 
European Communities 
C 149 2000/C 149-0024 Case C-
94/00: Reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Cour 
de Cassation (French Court of 
Appeal) by judgment of that 
court of 7 March 2000 in the 
case of Roquette Frères SA ν 
Directeur-Général de la 
Concurrence, de la 
Consommation et de la 
Répression des Fraudes 
(Director-General for 
Competition, Consumer Affairs 
and the Elimination of Fraud) 
23.05.2000 
C 143 2000/C 143-0003 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/37.866) 
13.05.2000 
C 135 2000/C 135-0020 Case T-
45/00: Action brought on 29 
February 2000 by the Conseil 
National des Professions de 
l'Automobile (C.N.P.A.) and 
Others against the Commission 
of the European Communities 
29.04.2000 
C 122 2000/C 122-0018 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 15 March 2000 in 
Joined Cases T-25/95, T-26/95. 
T-30/95, T-31/95, T-32/95, T-
34/95, T-35/95, T-36/95. T-
37/95, T-38/95, T-39/95, T-
42/95, T-43/95, T-44/95, T-
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45/95. T-46/95. T-48/95. Τ-
50/95, Τ-51/95. Τ-52/95. Τ-
53/95. Τ-54/95, Τ-55/95, Τ-
56/95, Τ-57/95, Τ-58/95, Τ-
59/95. Τ-60/95, Τ-61/95, Τ-
62/95, Τ-63/95, Τ-64/95, Τ-
65/95. Τ-68/95, Τ-69/95, Τ-
70/95, Τ-71/95. Τ-87/95, Τ-
88/95, Τ-103/95 and Τ-104/95: 
Cimenteries CBR and Others ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition 
Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 81(1) EC) Cement 
market - Rights of the defence -
Access to the file - Single and 
continuous infringement 
General agreement and measures 
of implementation - Liability for 
an infringement - Evidence of 
participation in the general 
agreement and measures of 
implementation - Links between 
the general agreement and the 
measures of implementation as 
regards objects and participants -
Fine - Determination of the 
amount) 
C 121 2000/C 121-0014 Notice 
published pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Council Regulation No 
17 concerning case COMP/C.2 -
37.576 - UEFA's broadcasting 
rules [Text with EEA relevance] 
27.04.2000 
C 118 2000/C 118-0003 
Competition rules relating to 
horizontal cooperation 
agreements - Communication 
pursuant to Article 5 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2821/71 
of 20 December 1971 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty to categories of 
agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices modified by 
Regulation (EEC) No 2743/72 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
26.04.2000 
C 117 2000/C 117-0019 
Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee on the 
Commission preliminary draft 
Regulation on the application of 
Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted 
practices between liner shipping 
companies (consortia) pursuant 
to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
479/92 
20.04.2000 
L 100 2000/L 100-0024 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 823/2000 of 19 April 2000 
on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted 
practices between liner shipping 
companies (consortia) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 114 2000/C 114-0003 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/F-1/37.846 -
Neles/VIB) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
19.04.2000 
C 112 2000/C 112-0007 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/37.854/E-2) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 112 2000/C 112-0007 
Notification of agreements to set 
up a joint venture (Case 
COMP/E-2/37.841) [Text with 
EEA relevance] 
08.04.2000 
C 102 2000/C 102-0018 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 13 December 1999 
in Joined Cases T-190/95 and T-
45/96, Société de Distribution de 
Mécaniques et d'Automobiles 
(Sodirna) ν Commission of the 
European Communities 
(Competition - Distribution of 
motor-vehicles - Examination of 
complaints - Action for 
declaration for failure to act, for 
annulment and for compensation 
- Inadmissibility) 
C 102 2000/C 102-0026 Order 
of the President of the Court of 
First Instance of 15 December 
1999 in Case T-191/98 R II, Cho 
Yang Shipping Co. Ltd ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition 
Payment of a fine - Bank 
guarantee - Proceedings for 
interim relief - Urgency -
Interim measures) 
C 102 2000/C 102-0024 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 16 December 1999 
in Case T-198/98: Micro Leader 
Business ν Commission of the 
European Communities 
(Competition - Complaint -
Rejection - Articles 85 and 86 of 
the EC Treaty (now Articles 81 
and 82 EC)- Prohibition on 
importing software marketed in 
a third country - Exhaustion of 
copyright - Directive 
91/250/EEC) 
C 102 2000/C 102-0020 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 17 February 2000 in 
Case T-241/97: Stork 
Amsterdam BV ν Commission 
of the European Communities 
(Competition - Administrative 
procedure - Examination of 
complaints - Infringement of 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 81 EC)- Comfort 
letters - Reopening the 
procedure - Statement of reasons 
- Duty to provide - Extent -
Cooperation agreement 
Exclusive mutual supply clause -
No-compete clause) 
C 102 2000/C 102-0018 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 13 December 1999 
in Joined Cases T-9/96 and T-
211/96, Européenne Automobile 
SARL ν Commission of the 
European Communities 
(Competition - Distribution of 
motor-vehicles - Examination of 
complaints - Action for a 
declaration of failure to act, for 
annulment and for 
compensation) 
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15.03.2000 
C 74 2000/C 074­0005 
Notification of Cooperation 
Agreements (Case COMP/F1­
37.775 ­ CEMEPVText with 
EEA relevance 
14.03.2000 
C 73 2000/C 073­0006 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/F­1/37.802 ­
Dynamit Nobel ­ Orica)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 73 2000/C 073­0006 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/37.741)Text with 
EEA relevance 
03.03.2000 
L 58 2000/L 058­0016 
Commission Decision of 14 
September 1999 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 
81 of the EC Treaty (Case 
IV/36.213/F2 ­ GEAE/P & 
WYText with EEA relevance 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 2901) 
22.02.2000 
L 49 2000/L 049­0037 
Commission Decision of 14 
December 1999 relating to a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 
15(1 )(b) of Council Regulation 
No 17 (Case No IV/34.237/F3 ­
Anheuser­Busch Incorporated ­
Scottish & Newcastle) (notified 
under document number 
C(1999) 4499) 
19.02.2000 
C 47 2000/C 047­0027 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 13 December 1999 
in Joined Cases T­189/95, T­
39/96 and T­l 23/96: Service 
pour le Groupement 
d'Acquisitions (SGA) ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition 
Distribution of motor vehicles ­
Examination of complaints ­
Action for a declaration of 
failure to act, for annulment and 
for compensation) 
17.02.2000 
C 44 2000/C 044­0004 
Notification of an agreement 
(Case COMP/37.752 ­ Day­
certain Cross­border 
Parcels)Text with EEA 
relevance 
14.02.2000 
L 39 2000/L 039­0001 
Commission Decision of 26 
October 1999 concerning a 
proceeding pursuant to Article 
81 of the EC Treaty Case 
IV/33.884 ­ Nederlandse 
Federative Vereniging voor de 
Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch 
Gebied and Technische Unie 
(FEG and TU) (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
3439) 
04.02.2000 
L 30 2000/L 030­0001 
Commission Decision of 14 July 
1999 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty (IV/D­2/34.780 
Virgin/British Airways)Text 
with EEA relevance, (notified 
under document number 
C(1999) 1973) 
03.02.2000 
C 31 2000/C 031­0003 
Notification of a joint venture 
(Case COMP/E­2/37.779 ­
BASF­Sonatrach)Text with EEA 
relevance 
CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS / 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
30.05.2000 
C 150 2000/C 150­0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1966 
Phillips/Chevron/JV) 
27.05.2000 
C 149 2000/C 149­0030 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 22 March 2000 in 
Joined Cases T­l25/97 and Τ­
Ι 27/97: The Coca­Cola 
Company and Coca­Cola 
Enterprises Inc. ν Commission 
of the European Communities 
(Competition ­ Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89 ­ Decision 
declaring a concentration 
compatible with the common 
market ­ Action for annulment ­
Statement of reasons 
Admissibility) 
C 148 2000/C 148­0020 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1910 
Meritanordbanken/Unidanmark) 
C 148 2000/C 148­0021 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.2004 
Investcorp/Chase Capital 
Investments/Gerresheimer 
Group) 
26.05.2000 
C 147 2000/C 147­0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1974 
Compagnie de Saint­
Gobain/Raab Karcher) 
C 147 2000/C 147­0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1963 ­ Industri 
Kapital/Perstorp) 
C 147 2000/C 147­0007 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1687 
Adecco/Olsten) 
25.05.2000 
C 145 2000/C 145­0004 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1842 
Vattenfall/Hew) 
C 145 2000/C 145­0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.40 
Lagardère/Canal+ and 
COMP/JV.47 
Lagardère/Canal+/Liberty 
Media) 
24.05.2000 
C 144 2000/C 144­0008 Non­
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
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COMP/M. 1800 - Marconi/Bosch 
Public Network) 
C 144 2000/C 144-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1938 
BT/Telfort) 
C 144 2000/C 144-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1932 
BASF/American Cyanamid) 
23.05.2000 
C 143 2000/C 143-0005 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1882 - Pirelli/BICC) 
C 143 2000/C 143-0004 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1741 - MCI 
Worldcom/Sprint) 
C 143 2000/C 143-0005 
Initiation of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M.1806 - Astra 
Zeneca/Novartis) 
C 143 2000/C 143-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1835 
Monsanto/Pharmacia & Upjohn) 
20.05.2000 
C 142 2000/C 142-0040 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1916 - RTL 
NEWMEDIA/Primus-Online) 
C 142 2000/C 142-0039 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1950 - Toyoda 
Automatic Loom Works/BT 
Industries) 
C 142 2000/C 142-0038 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.46 - Callahan 
Invest/Kabel Nordrhein-
Westfalen) 
C 142 2000/C 142-0037 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1947 - ABN 
AMRO Lease Holding/Dial 
Group) 
C 142 2000/C 142-0036 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1796 
Bayer/Lyondell) 
C 142 2000/C 142-0036 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1866 - Preussag/ 
Hebel) 
C 142 2000/C 142-0035 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1751 - Shell/BASF/ 
JV - Project Nicole) 
19.05.2000 
C 141 2000/C 141-0019 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1795 - Vodafone Air-
touch/Mannesmann) 
C 141 2000/C 141-0018 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1933 
Citigroup/Flender) 
C 141 2000/C 141-0017 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1858 
Thomson-CSF/Racal (II)) 
18.05.2000 
C 139 2000/C 139-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1989 
Winterthur/Colonial) 
C 139 2000/C 139-0015 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1760 
Mannesmann/Orange) 
17.05.2000 
C 138 2000/C 138-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1975 
Deutsche 
Bank/Eurobank/Lamda 
Deve)opment/JV) 
C 138 2000/C 138-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1876 - Kohlberg 
Kravis & 
Roberts/Wassall/Zumtobel) 
C 138 2000/C 138-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1911 -Dow/BSL) 
16.05.2000 
C 136 2000/C 136-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1646 
CGD/Partest/BCP/SAirGroup/P 
GA) 
C 136 2000/C 136-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1970 - Johnson 
& Johnson/Mercury Asset 
Management/Agora Healthcare 
Services JV) 
C 136 2000/C 136-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1852 - Time 
Warner/EMI) 
13.05.2000 
C 134 2000/C 134-0015 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1886 - CGU/Norwich 
Union) 
C 134 2000/C 134-0015 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1904 
Carrefour/Gruppo GS) 
C 134 2000/C 134-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1957 - Telenor 
Media/VIAG Interkom) 
C 134 2000/C 134-0013 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1793 
Voith/Siemens/JV) 
C 134 2000/C 134-0013 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1889 - CLT-
UFA/Canal+/VOX) 
11.05.2000 
C 130 2000/C 130-0011 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1871 - Arrow 
Electronics/Tekelec) 
C 130 2000/C 130-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1845 
AOL/Time Warner) 
C 130 2000/C 130-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 77 
INFORMATION SECTION 
(Case COMP/M-1898 - TUI 
Group/GTT Holding) 
C 130 2000/C 130-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1968 
Solectron/Nortel) 
C 130 2000/C ¡30-0011 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1571 - New 
Holland/Case) 
C 130 2000/C 130-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1959 
Meritor/Arvin) 
04.05.2000 
C 125 2000/C 125-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.39 
Bertelsmann/Planeta/NEB) 
C 125 2000/C 125-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1944 
HSBC/CCF) 
C 125 2000/C 125-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1946 
Bellsouth/SBC) 
C 125 2000/C 125-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1929 - Magneti 
Marelli/Seima) 
C 125 2000/C 125-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1780 
LVMH/Prada/Fendi) 
03.05.2000 
C 123 2000/C 123-0043 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1819 and 
COMP/ECSC.1320 
Rheinbraun/OMV/Cokowi) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 123 2000/C 123-0042 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1960 
Carrefour/Marinopoulos) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 123 2000/C 123-0044 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1930 
Ahlström/Andritz) [Text with 
EEA relevance] 
C 123 2000/C 123-0045 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1948 
Techpack International/Valois) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 123 2000/C 123-0041 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1879 
Boeing/Hughes) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
29.04.2000 
C 121 2000/C 121-0013 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1961 
NHS/MWCR) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
26.04.2000 
C 116 2000/C 116-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.25 - Sony/Time 
Warner/CDNow) - Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 116 2000/C 116-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1956 
Ford/Autonova) - Text with 
EEA relevance 
20.04.2000 
C 114 2000/C 114-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.46 - Callahan 
Invest/Kabel Nordrhein-
Westfalen) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
19.04.2000 
C 112 2000/C 112*0,008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1891 - BP 
Amoco/Castrol) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 112 2000/C 112-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1919 
Alcoa/Cordant) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 112 2000/C 112-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1822 - Mobil/JV 
Dissolution) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 112 2000/C 112-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1901 - Cap 
Gemini/Ernst & Young) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 112 2000/C 112-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1908 
Alcatel/Newbridge Networks) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C , 112 2000/C 112-0005 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1895 - Ocean 
Group/Exel (NFC)) [Text with 
EEA relevance] 
C 112 2000/C 112-0012 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1887 - Crédit 
Suisse First Boston/Gala Group) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
15.04.2000 
L 95 2000/L 095-0034 
Commission Decision of 28 July 
1999 imposing fines for having 
supplied incorrect information in 
a notification submitted pursuant 
to Article 4 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
(Case No IV/M.1543 
Sanofi/Synthelabo) [Text with 
EEA relevance] (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
2290) 
C 110 2000/C 110-0045 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.37 
BSkyB/KirchPayTV) [Text with 
EEA relevance] 
14.04.2000 
C 108 2000/C 108-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1909 
Alstom/ABB Alstom Power) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 108 2000/C 108-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1831 - Deutsche 
Bank/Ciba) 
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C 108 2000/C 108-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1747 - Telekom 
Austria/Libro) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 108 2000/C 108-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1937 - Skandia 
Life/Diligentia) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 108 2000/C 108-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.45 
Bertelsmann AG/Kooperativa 
Forbundet (KF)/Bokus AB 
(BOL Nordic)) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
13.04.2000 
L 93 2000/L 093-0001 
Commission Decision of 22 
September 1999 declaring a 
concentration to be incompatible 
with the common market and the 
EEA Agreement (Case 
IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First 
Choice) [Text with EEA 
relevance] . (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
3022) 
C 105 2000/C 105-0003 
Opinion of the Advisory 
Committee on Concentrations 
given at the 67th meeting on 9 
September 1999 concerning a 
preliminary draft decision 
relating to Case IV/M.1524 -
Airtours/First Choice 
12.04.2000 
C 104 2000/C 104-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1878 
Pfizer/Warner-Lambert) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
08.04.2000 
C 101 2000/C 101-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1935 
Rabobank/Gilde/Norit) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 101 2000/C 101-0013 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1803 
Electrabel/Epon) [Text with 
EEA relevance] 
06.04.2000 
C 98 2000/C 098-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1820 - BP/JV 
Dissolution) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
05.04.2000 
C 96 2000/C 096-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1911 
Dow/BSL) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 96 2000/C 096-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.42 - Asahi 
Glass/Mitsubishi/F2 Chemicals) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 96 2000/C 096-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.19 - KLM/Alitalia) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 96 2000/C 096-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.44 
Hitachi/NEC - DRAM/JV) [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 96 2000/C 096-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/ECSC.1328 -
HSP/Salzgitter) [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
04.04.2000 
C 95 2000/C 095-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1907 
Woco/Michelin)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 95 2000/C 095-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.30 - BVI Television 
(Europe)/SPE Euromovies 
Investments/Europe Movieco 
Partners-)Text with EEA 
relevance ' 
01.04.2000 
C 94 2000/C 094-0006 Initiation 
of proceedings (Case 
COMP/JV.27 
Microsoft/Liberty 
Media/Telewest)Text with EEA 
relevance 
31.03.2000 
C 93 2000/C 093-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1816 - Churchill 
Insurance Group/NIG 
Holdings)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 93 2000/C 093-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1902 
Telia/Commerzbank/FNH)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 93 2000/C 093-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1772 - Continental 
Teves/ADC Automotive 
Distance Control)Text with EEA 
relevance 
30.03.2000 
C 91 2000/C 091-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1836 
Siemens/Bosch/GSM 
Acquisition)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 91 2000/C 091-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1739 
IVECO/Fraikin)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 91 2000/C 091-0004 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1745 - EADS)Text 
with EEA relevance 
29.03.2000 
C 90 2000/C 090-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1846 - Glaxo 
Wellcome/SmithKline 
Beecham)Text with EEA 
relevance 
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C 90 2000/C Û90-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1920 
Nabisco/United Biscuits)Text 
with EEA relevance 
28.03.2000 
C 89 2000/C 089-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1801 
Neusiedler/American Israeli 
Paper Mills/JV) - Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 89 2000/C 089-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1814 
Bayer/Röhm/Makroform) - Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 89 2000/C 089-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1892 - Sara 
Lee/Courtaulds) - Text with 
EEA relevance 
25.03.2000 
C 88 2000/C 088-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1914 
TXU/Hidroeléctrica)Text with 
EEA relevance 
24.03.2000 
C 86 2000/C 086-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1887 - Crédit 
Suisse First Boston/Gala Group) 
- Text with EEA relevance 
23.03.2000 
C 84 2000/C 084-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1882 
Pirelli/BICC GeneralYText with 
EEA relevance 
C 84 2000/C 084-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1875 
Reuters/Equant - Project 
ProtonYText with EEA relevance 
C 84 2000/C 084-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1886 
CGU/Norwich Union)Text with 
EEA relevance 
22.03.2000 
C 82 2000/C 082-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1650 
ACEA/Telefónica)Text with 
EEA relevance 
21.03.2000 
C 80 2000/C 080-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1895 - Ocean 
Group/Exel)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 80 2000/C 080-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1904 
Carrefour/Gruppo GS)Text with 
EEA relevance 
18.03.2000 
C 78 2000/C 078-0018 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/ECSC.1325 -
EMR/MPRH)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 78 2000/C 078-0017 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1871 - Arrow 
Electronics/Tekelec)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 78 2000/C 078-0016 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1876 
Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts/Wassall/Zurntobel)Text 
with EEA relevance 
17.03.2000 
C 77 2000/C 077-0011 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1716 
Gehe/Herba)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 77 2000/C 077-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1910 
MeritaNordbanken/UniDanmark 
)Text with EEA relevance 
16.03.2000 
C 76 2000/C 076-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1660 - Bank of New 
York/Royal Bank of 
Scotland/RBSI Security 
Services)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 76 2000/C 076-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1774 - Deutsche 
BP/DaimlerChrysler AG/Union-
Tank Eckstein)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 76 2000/C 076-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1618 - Bank of New 
York/Royal Bank of Scotland 
Trust Bank)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 76 2000/C 076-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1812 
Telefónica/Terra/Amadeus)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 76 2000/C 076-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1893 - Butler 
Capital/CDC/AXA/Finauto/Aut 
odistribution/Finelist)Text with 
EEA relevance 
15.03.2000 
C 74 2000/C 074-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1659 - Preussen 
Elektra/EZH)Text with EEA 
relevance 
14.03.2000 
C 73 2000/C 073-0005 
Withdrawal of notification of a 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1862 
Lafarge/Titan/Amereyah)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 73 2000/C 073-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1849 
Solectron/Ericsson 
Switches)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 73 2000/C 073-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1825 - Suzuki 
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Motor/Suzuki KG/Fafin)Text 
with EEA relevance 
10.03.2000 
C 69 2000/C 069-0008 
Withdrawal of notification of a 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1829)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 69 2000/C 069-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1865 - France 
Télécom/Global One)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 69 2000/C 069-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1826 
KBC/KBC Petercam Derivatives 
NV)Text with EEA relevance 
09.03.2000 
C 67 2000/C 067-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.24 
Bertelsmann/Planeta/bol 
Spain)Text with EEA relevance 
C 67 2000/C 067-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1759 
RMC/Rugby)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 67 2000/C 067-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1793 
Voith/Siemens/JV)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 67 2000/C 067-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1885 - Babcock 
Borsig/VA Technologie/Pipe-
Tec)Text with EEA relevance 
C 67 2000/C 067-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1832 
Ahold/ICA-
förbundet/Canica)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 67 2000/C 067-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1883 
NEC/Mitsubishi)Text with EEA 
relevance 
08.03.2000 
C 66 2000/C 066-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1795 
Vodafone 
Airtouch/Mannesmann)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 66 2000/C 066-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1745 
EADSJText with EEA relevance 
C 66 2000/C 066-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1874 
Lafarge/Blue Circle)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 66 2000/C 066-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1856 
Citigroup/Schroders)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 66 2000/C 066-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1880 
Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing/Quante)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 66 2000/C 066-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1867 
Volvo/Telia/Ericsson/WirelessC 
ar)Text with EEA relevance 
C 66 2000/C 066-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1855 
Singapore Airlines/Virgin 
Atlantic)Text with EEA 
relevance 
07.03.2000 
C 65 2000/C 0065-0022 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1777 
CGU/Hibernian)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 65 2000/C 0065-0022 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1754 - Morgan 
Grenfell/Piaggio)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 65 2000/C 0065-0021 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1866 
Preussag/Hebel)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 65 2000/C 0065-0020 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1842 
Vattenfall/HEW)Text with EEA 
relevance 
03.03.2000 
C 61 2000/C 061-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1786 - General 
Electric/Thomson CSF/JV)Text 
with EEA relevance 
01.03.2000 
C 58 2000/C 058-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1873 
Compagnie de Saint-
Gobain/Meyer 
IntemationaI)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 58 2000/C 058-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1712 
GeneraIi/INA)Text with EEA 
relevance 
29.02.2000 
C 56 2000/C 056-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1720 
Fortum/Elektrizitätswerk 
Wesertal)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 56 2000/C 056-0008 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1889 - CLT-
UFA/Canal+/VOX)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 56 2000/C 056-0007 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1829 
HMTF/Nabisco Group 
Holdings/Burlington 
Biscuits/United Biscuits)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 56 2000/C 056-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.42 - Asahi 
Glass/Mitsubishi/F2 
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Chemicals)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 56 2000/C 056-0009 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.35 - Beiselen/Bay 
Wa/MG ChemagYText with EEA 
relevance 
25.02.2000 
C 53 2000/C 053-0015 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1675 - Ducros/Hero 
France)Text with EEA relevance 
C 53 2000/C 053-0014 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1806 - Astra 
Zeneca/Novartis)Text with EEA 
relevance 
24.02.2000 
C 52 2000/C 052-0026 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1835 
Monsanto/Pharmacia & 
Upjohn)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 52 2000/C 052-0027 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1590 
HSBC/RNYC/Safra)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 52 2000/C 052-0025 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1751 
Shell/BASF/JV - Project 
Nicole)Text with EEA relevance 
23.02.2000 
C 50 2000/C 050-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1789 - INA/LUK) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
22.02.2000 
C 49 2000/C 049-0003 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.36 - TXU 
Europe/EDF-London 
Investments)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 49 2000/C 049-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1807 - FNAC7 
COIN/JV)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 49 2000/C 049-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.36 - TXU 
Europe/EDF-London 
Investments)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 49 2000/C 049-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1838 
BT/Esat)Text with EEA 
relevance 
19.02.2000 
C 46 2000/C 046-0025 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1794 - Deutsche 
Post/Air Express 
International)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 46 2000/C 046-0026 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1854 - Emerson 
Electric/Ericsson Energy 
Systems)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 46 2000/C 046-0025 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1797 
SAAB/Celsius)Text with EEA 
relevance 
18.02.2000 
C 45 2000/C 045-0006 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1827 
Hanson/Pioneer)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 45 2000/C 045-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1862 
Lafarge/Titan/Amereyah)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 45 2000/C 045-0008 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1674 
Maersk/Ect)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 45 2000/C 045-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1698 
RWA/Nordsee/Cerny)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 45 2000/C 045-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1763 - Solutia/Viking 
Resins)Text with EEA relevance 
C 45 2000/C 045-0004 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.37 
BSkyB/KirchPayTV)Text with 
EEA relevance 
17.02.2000 
C 44 2000/C 044-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1700 
AVNET/Eurotronics)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 44 2000/C 044-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1778 
Freudenberg/Phoenix/JV)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 44 2000/C 044-0005 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1709 
Preussag/Babcock/Celsius)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 44 2000/C 044-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1742 - Sun 
Chemical/Totalfina/ Coates)Text 
with EEA relevance 
16.02.2000 
C 43 2000/C 043-0029 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.27 
Microsoft/Liberty 
Media/TeIewest)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 43 2000/C 043-0030 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1870 
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ZF/Brembo/DFI)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 43 2000/C 043-0031 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1848 
Schröders Ventures European 
Fund/Takko ModeMarktVText 
with EEA relevance 
15.02.2000 
C 42 2000/C 042-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1831 
Deutsche Bank/CIBA)Text with 
EEA relevance 
12.02.2000 
C 40 2000/C 040-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1869 
CVC/BTR-Siebe Automotive 
Sealing Systems)Text with EEA 
relevance 
11.02.2000 
C 39 2000/C 039-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1775 - Ingersoll-
Rand/Dresser-Rand/Ingersoll-
Dresser Pump)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 39 2000/C 039-0002 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1784 - Delphi 
Automotive Systems/Lucas 
Diesel)Text with EEA relevance 
10.02.2000 
C 38 2000/C 038-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1723 - Illinois Tool 
Works/Premark)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 38 2000/C 038-0009 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1861 
MAN/ERF)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 38 2000/C 038-0010 Initiation 
of proceedings (Case 
COMP/M. 1673 
VEBA/VIAG)Text with EEA 
relevance 
09.02.2000 
C 37 2000/C 037-0010 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1781 
ElectroIux/Ericsson)Text with 
EEA relevance 
08.02.2000 
C 35 2000/C035-0011 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1849 
Solectron/Ericsson)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 35 2000/C035-0010 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/JV.39 
Bertelsmann AG/Planeta 
Corporación SRL/Nuevas 
Ediciones de Bolsillo 
(NEB))Text with EEA relevance 
05.02.2000 
C 33 2000/C033-0005 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1841 
Celestica/IBMYText with EEA 
relevance 
C 33 2000/C033-0004 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1802 
Unilever/Amora-Maille)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 33 2000/C033-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M.1840 
KKR/Bosch Telecom Private 
Networks)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 33 2000/C033-0002 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1813 - Industri 
Kapital (Nordkem)/Dyno 
ASA)Text with EEA relevance 
04.02.2000 
C 32 2000/C 032-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1735 
Seita/TabacaleraVText with EEA 
relevance ( 
C 32 2000/C 032-0002 
Renotification of a previously 
notified concentration (Case 
COMP/JV.32 
Granaria/ÜItje/Intersnack/May 
HoldingYText with EEA 
relevance 
C 32 2000/C 032-0004 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1773 - Nordic 
Capital/Trelleborg)Text with 
EEA relevance 
C 32 2000/C 032-0003 Prior 
notification of a concentration 
(Case COMP/M. 1847 
GM/SAAB)Text with EEA 
relevance 
02.02.2000 
C 30 2000/C 030-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1686 
DaimlerChrysler Services/M B-
Automobil Vertriebsgesellschaft) 
Text with EEA relevance 
C 30 2000/C 030-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M.1755 
CVC/Acordis)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 30 2000/C 030-0006 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1453 
AXA/GRE)Text with EEA 
relevance 
C 30 2000/C 030-0007 Non-
opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case 
COMP/M. 1764 - Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken/BFG 
Bank)Text with EEA relevance 
STATE AID 
30.05.2000 
L 129 2000/L 129-0026 
Commission Decision of 15 
February 2000 on the State aid 
which Belgium is planning to grant 
to NV Sidmar (notified under 
document number C(2000) 517) 
27.05.2000 
Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 83 
> INFORMATION SECTION 
C 149 2000/C 149­0031 
Judgment of lhe Court of First 
Instance of 16 March 2000 in 
Case T­72/98: Astilleros 
Zamacona SA ν Commission of 
the European Communities 
(State aid ­ Shipbuilding ­
Article 4(3) of Council Directive 
90/684/EEC ­ Determination of 
the ceiling for production aid) 
C 148 2000/C 148­0002 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the aid C 7/2000 (ex 
NN 155/99 and ex Ν 490/98) ­
Italy ­ Law No 290 of 17 August 
1999: "Extension of time limits 
in the agricultural sector" 
C 148 2000/C 148­0014 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C. 12/2000 (ex Ν 
532/99) ­ Netherlands: 
development aid for China 
(shipbuilding) 
C 148 2000/C 148­0016 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 148 2000/C 148­0019 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 148 2000/C 148­0010 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
6(5) of the Commission 
Decision No 2496/96/ECSC of 
18 December 1996 establishing 
Community rules for State aid to 
the steel industry (hereinafter 
referred to as the Steel Aid 
Code), concerning aid C 
13/2000 (ex Ν 585­589/99) ­
environmental aid to ECSC steel 
companies 
20.05.2000 
L 120 2000/L 120­0001 
Commission Decision of 25 
November 1998 on State aid 
granted by Italy to Enirisorse 
SpA (notified under document 
number C( 1998) 3866) 
L 120 2000/L 120­0012 
Commission Decision of 15 
February 2000 on State aid 
implemented by Germany in 
favour of Kvaerner Warnow 
Werft GmbH (notified under 
document number C(2000) 516) 
C 142 2000/C 142­0020 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 11/2000 (ex N 
166/99) ­ Italy: investment aid to 
Rivit SpA, non­ECSC steel 
C 142 2000/C 142­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 142 2000/C 142­0011 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid/measure C 
17/2000 (ex N 736/99) ­ Aid to 
Solar Tech srl ­ Italy 
C 142 2000/C 142­0023 State 
Aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 8/2000 (ex N 
548/98) ­ Aid for education of 
farmers in Allgäu, Germany 
C 142 2000/C 142­0026 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 9/2000 (ex NN 
5/99) ­ Second privatisation of 
KataLeuna GmbH Catalysts 
C 142 2000/C 142­0003 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 73/99 (ex NN 
90/97) ­ Germany 
Restructuring measures 
concerning a milk processing 
undertaking; Rhöngold Molkerei 
18.05.2000 
L 117 2000/L 117­0026 
Commission Decision of 15 
February 2000 on the State aid 
which Italy plans to grant to Fiat 
Auto SpA for its plant in Rivalta 
(Turin) (notified under 
document number C(2000) 487) 
13.05.2000 
C 134 2000/C 134­0005 State 
aid ­ Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 6/2000 (ex NN 
93/99) ­ Kvaerner Warnow 
Werft ­ Excess payment of 
restructuring aid 
C 134 2000/C 134­0004 State 
aid­C 59/99 (ex N 352/99)­
France 
C 134 2000/C 134­0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 134 2000/C 134­0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 134 2000/C 134­0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty ­ Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
11.05.2000 
L 112 2000/L 112­0075 EFTA 
Surveillance Authority Decision 
No 112/99/COL of 4 June 1999 
introducing new guidelines on 
State aid to the motor vehicle 
industry and amending for the 
seventeenth time the Procedural 
and Substantive Rules in the 
Field of State Aid 
C 130 2000/C 130­0013 
Authorisation of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the 
EEA Agreement and Article 
1(3) of Protocol 3 to the 
Surveillance and Court 
Agreement ­ EFTA Surveillance 
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Authority decision not to raise 
objections 
06.05.2000 
L 110 2000/L 110-0017 
Commission Decision of 22 
December 1999 on the State aid 
scheme implemented by Italy for 
the production, processing and 
marketing of products listed in 
Annex I to the EC Treaty 
(Sicilian Regional Law No 68 of 
27 September 1995) (Notified 
under document number 
C(1999)5202) 
L 110 2000/L 110-0001 
Commission Decision of 8 July 
1999 on State aid which Italy 
plans to grant to Fiat Auto SpA 
for its plant at Piedimonte San 
Germano, Cassino (Notified 
under document number 
C( 1999)2267) 
L 110 2000/L 110-0009 
Commission Decision of 28 July 
1999 on State aid which Italy 
plans to grant to Fiat Auto SpA 
for its plant at Pomigliano 
d'Arco (Naples) (Notified under 
document number C( 1999) 
2916) 
05.05.2000 
C 127 2000/C 127-0011 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
03.05.2000 
L 105 2000/L 105-0015 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 908/2000 of 2 May 2000 
laying down detailed rules for 
calculating aid granted by 
Member States to producer 
organisations in the fisheries and 
aquaculture sector 
29.04.2000 
C 121 2000/C 121-0029 
Corrigendum to the Community 
guidelines on State aid for 
rescuing and restructuring firms 
in difficulty (Notice to Member 
States including proposals for 
appropriate measures) (OJ C 
288. 9 October 1999) 
C 121 2000/C 121-0019 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 121 2000/C 121-0018 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 of 
the EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 121 2000/C 121-0016 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
19.04.2000 
L 98 2000/L 098-0001 
Commission Decision of 10 
November 1999 concerning aid 
which the Region of Tuscany 
(Italy) intends to grant in the 
livestock sector in favour of the 
Chianina cattle breed (notified 
under document number 
C(1999)3866) 
15.04.2000 
C 110 2000/C 110-0040 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning measures C 1/2000 
(ex N 769/99) - Restructuring 
aid in favour of Philipp 
Holzmann AG [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0009 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning measure C 2/2000 
(ex N 718/99) - Sweden -
Measures to improve the indoor 
environment in buildings [Text 
with EEA relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0012 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, and 
Article 6(5) of Commission 
Decision 2496/96/ECSC 
concerning aid C 9/95 (formerly 
NN 121/94) - Spain - Tubacex 
(ECSC and non-ECSC steel) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0017 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid measure C 10/00 
(ex NN 112/99-N 141/99)-Aid 
in favour of Stamag Stahl- und 
Maschinenbau AG - Germany 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0033 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid C 5/2000 (ex C 
68/97 (ex NN 1 18/97)) - Sniace 
SA - Spain [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0041 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 110 2000/C 110-0044 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 110 2000/C 110-0027 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning aid C 75/99 (ex N 
167/99) - Regional aid to be 
granted to Fiat - SATA for an 
investment project in Melfi 
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08.04.2000 
C 102 2000/C 102-0028 Case T-
354/99: Action brought on 10 
December 1999 by Kuwait 
Petroleum (Nederland) B.V. 
against the Commission of the 
European Communities 
C 102 2000/C 102-0019 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 16 December 1999 
in Case T-l58/96: Acciaierie di 
Bolzano SpA ν Commission of 
the European Communities 
(ECSC Treaty - Action for 
annulment - State aid - Decision 
finding aid incompatible and 
ordering its repayment 
Unnotified aid - Steel Aid Code 
applicable - Rights of the 
defence - Protection of 
legitimate expectations - Interest 
rate applicable - Statement of 
reasons) 
C 101 2000/C 101-0011 State 
aids - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning the aid C 3/2000 (ex 
N 233/99 and N 234/99) -
Netherlands - Development aid 
to Indonesia (Shipbuilding) 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
C 101 2000/C 101-0003 State 
aid - Germany [Text with EEA 
relevance] 
C 101 2000/C 101-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
06.04.2000 
L 85 2000/L 085-0027 
Commission Decision of 30 
September 1998 on aid granted 
by Germany to SKET 
Verseilmaschinenbau GmbH 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
(notified under document 
number C( 1998) 3022) 
04.04.2000 
L 83 2000/L 083-0021 
Commission Decision of 20 July 
1999 on State aid granted by 
Italy to the Inma shipyard 
through the public holding 
company Itainvest (formerly 
GEPI) [Text with EEA 
relevance] (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
2532) 
C 95 2000/C 095-0023 
Corrigendum to the 
authorisation for State aid 
pusuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
(OJ C 88, 25 March 20000) 
01.04.2000 
C 94 2000/C 094-0009 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 94 2000/C 094-0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance e 
30.03.2000 
C 91 2000/C 091-0006 
Authorisation of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the 
EEA Agreement and Article 
1(3) of Protocol 3 to the 
Surveillance and Court 
Agreement - EFTA Surveillance 
Authority decision not to raise 
objections 
29.03.2000 
L 78 2000/L 078-0023 
Commission Decision of 16 
November 1999 on the State aid 
which Italy plans to grant for the 
creation of new shipyards at 
Oristano (Sardinia) and 
Belvedere Marittimo 
(Calabria)Text with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
4839) 
28.03.2000 
C 89 2000/C 089-0008 Draft 
Commission Regulation on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to training aid 
C 89 2000/C 089-0015"Draft 
Commission Regulation on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to State aid to 
small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
C 89 2000/C 089-0006 Draft 
Commission Regulation on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to de minimis 
aid 
25.03.2000 
C 88 2000/C 088-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 88 2000/C 088-0008 State aid 
- Invitation to submit comments 
pursuant to Article 6(5) of 
Commission Decision No 
2496/96/ECSC of 18 December 
1996 establishing Community 
rules for State aid to the steel 
industry concerning aid C 76/99 
(ex NN 153/98) - Employment 
aid for Cockerill Sambre SA, 
ECSC steelText with EEA 
relevance 
C 88 2000/C 088-0005 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 88 2000/C 088-0003 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
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18.03.2000 
C 79 2000/C 079-0022 
Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 15 December 1999 
in Joined Cases T-l 32/96 and Τ­
Ι 43/96: Freistaat Sachsen and 
Others ν Commission of the 
European Communities (State 
aids - Compensation for 
economic disadvantages caused 
by the division of Germany -
Serious disturbance in the 
economy of a Member State -
Regional economic development 
- Community Framework on 
State Aid to the Motor Vehicle 
Industry) 
C 79 2000/C 079-0025 Order of 
the Court of First Instance of 27 
January 2000 in Case T-49/97: 
TAT European Airlines SA ν 
Commission of the European 
Communities (State aid - Air 
transport - Authorisation of aid 
payable in three tranches -
Action brought against the 
decision authorising payment of 
the third tranche - Adoption of a 
fresh decision authorising the 
aid in implementation of an 
annulling judgment - No need to 
adjudicate - Conditions) 
C 78 2000/C 078-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 78 2000/C 078-0008 State aid 
- Invitation to submit comments 
pursuant to Article 88(2) of the 
EC Treaty concerning aid C 
77/99 (ex NN 97/99) - Regional 
aid to VW-AMD for an 
investment project in 
SaxonyText with EEA relevance 
C 78 2000/C 078-0006 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
14.03.2000 
L 66 2000/L 066-0001 
Commission Decision of 17 
March 1999 on State aid given 
by Greece to Heracles General 
Cement CompanyText with 
EEA relevance, (notified under 
document number C( 1999) 716) 
L 62 2000/L 062-0026 
Commission Decision of 28 July 
1999 on State aid granted by the 
Federal Republic of Germany to 
Pittler/Tornos 
Werkzeugmaschinen GmbHText 
with EEA relevance (notified 
under document number 
C( 1999)3025) 
11.03.2000 
C 71 2000/C 071-0014 
Commission Notice on the 
application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to State aid in 
the form of guarantees 
C 71 2000/C 071-0008 State aid 
- Invitation to submit comments 
pursuant to Article 88(2) of the 
EC Treaty, concerning aid C 
48/99 (ex NN 129/98) - Spain 
(Province of Alava) - Tax aid in 
form of a 45 % tax creditText 
with EEA relevance 
C 71 2000/C 071-0007 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 71 2000/C 071-0006 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
08.03.2000 
L 61 2000/L 061-0004 
Commission Decision of 14 July 
1999 on aid granted by Germany 
to Weida Leder GmbH (Weida). 
ThuringiaText with EEA 
relevance (notified under 
document number C(1999) 
3441) 
04.03.2000 
C 62 2000/C 0062-00018 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 62 2000/C 0062-00016 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 62 2000/C 0062-0007 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty, 
concerning aid insert C 79/99 
(ex Ν "" 481/99) - Rover 
LongbridgeText with EEA 
relevance 
C 62 2000/C 0062-0002 State 
aid - Invitation to submit 
comments pursuant to Article 
88(2) of the EC Treaty 
concerning measure C 78/99 (ex 
NN 305/99) - Portuguese 
regional aid map for the period 
from 2000 to 2006Tcxt with 
EEA relevance 
26.02.2000 
C 55 2000/C 055-0008 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 55 2000/C 055-0002 State aid 
- Invitation to submit comments 
pursuant to Article 88(2) of the 
EC Treaty concerning three tax 
aid schemes: C 49/99 (ex NN 
29/99) - Tax aid in the form of a 
reduction in the tax base for 
newly established firms in the 
province of Alava (Spain); C 
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50/99 (ex NN 30/99) - Tax aid in 
the form of a reduction in the tax 
base for newly established firms 
in the province of Guipúzcoa 
(Spain); C 52/99 (ex NN 32/99) 
- Tax aid in the form of a 
reduction in the tax base for 
newly established firms in the 
province of Vizcaya (Spain)Text 
with EEA relevance 
C 55 2000/C 055-0011 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 55 2000/C 055-0010 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
24.02.2000 
C 52 2000/C 052-0030 
Authorisation of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the 
EEA Agreement and Articles 
3(5) and 3(1) of the Act referred 
to in point lb of Annex XV to 
the EEA Agreement - EFTA 
Surveillance Authority decision 
not to raise objections 
23.02.2000 
L 50 2000/L 050-0019 
Commission Decision of 11 
February 2000 on Finnish State 
aid for seeds (notified under 
document number C(2000) 358) 
19.02.2000 
C 46 2000/C 046-0006 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 46 2000/C 046-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 46 2000/C 046-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
15.02.2000 
L 42 2000/L 042-0019 
Commission Decision of 20 July 
1999 on State aid implemented 
by the Federal Republic of 
Germany for Lautex GmbH 
Weberei und VeredlungText 
with EEA relevance, (notified 
under document number 
C( 1999) 3026) 
L 42 2000/L 042-0001 
Commission Decision of 11 
May 1999 concerning aid 
granted by Italy to promote 
employmentText with EEA 
relevance. (Notified under 
document number C(1999) 
1364) 
12.02.2000 
L 37 2000/L 037-0022 
Commission Decision of 26 
October 1999 on the State aid 
implemented by Spain in favour 
of the publicly owned shipyards 
[Text with EEA relevance] 
(notified under document 
number C( 1999) 3864) 
C 40 2000/C 040-0004 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 40 2000/C 040-0002 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
10.02.2000 
L 35 2000/L 035-0043 Decision 
of the EEA Joint Committee No 
12/1999 of 29 January 1999 
amending Annex XV (State aid) 
to the EEA Agreement 
05.02.2000 
C 33 2000/C033-0009 
Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 87 and 88 
(ex Articles 92 and 93) of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no 
objectionsText with EEA 
relevance 
C 33 2000/C033-0006 State aids 
- Invitation to submit comments 
pursuant to Article 88(2) of the 
EC Treaty, concerning aid C 
74/99 (ex NN 65/99) - France -
Development aid to Saint-Pierre-
et-Miquelon (Shipbuilding)Text 
with EEA relevance 
04.02.2000 
L 30 2000/L 030-0025 
Commission Decision of 20 July 
1999 on State Aid granted by 
Germany to SKET Maschinen-
und Anlagenbau GmbHText 
with EEA relevance, (notified 
under document number 
C( 1999)2538) 
PRESS RELEASES 
1.2.2000-31.5.2000 
All texts are available from the 
Commission's press release 
database RAPID at: 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start. 
Enter reference (e.g.: IP/00/544) 
in the "Reference" input box on 
the research form to retrieve text 
of a press release. Press releases 
on competition matters can be 
consulted daily from DG 
Competition's website at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/pres 
sre.htm 
Note: languages available vary for 
different press releases. 
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ANTITRUST 
Reference: IP/00/544 Date: 2000-
05-29 : European Commission 
appoints new Hearing Officer 
Reference: IP/00/520 Date: 2000-
05-24 : Commission finalises new 
competition rules for distribution 
Reference: IP/00/508 Date: 2000-
05-23 : Commission clears 
European manufacturers' agreement 
to improve energy efficiency of 
electric motors 
Reference: IP/00/495 Date: 2000-
05-19 : Commission seeks a 
mandate for negotiations with Japan 
on a co-operation agreement in the 
competition field 
Reference: IP/00/297 Date: 2000-
03-27 : Commission closes 
investigation on Spanish company 
GAS NATURAL 
Reference: IP/00/296 Date: 2000-
03-27 : Financial services: 
Commission closes infringement 
cases against Portugal concerning 
BSCH/Champalimaud 
Reference: IP/00/183 Date: 2000-
02-23 : Reaction by Commissioner 
Mario Monti to the Agreement On 
The Fixed Book Price (Germany 
and Austria) 
Reference: IP/00/154 Date: 2000-
02-15 : Commission assesses the 
updated Stability Programme of 
Italy 
Reference: IP/00/568 Date: 2000-
05-31 : Commission authorises 
takeover of tour operator GTT by 
TUI 
Reference: IP/00/561 Date: 2000-
05-31 : Commission approves 
establishment of packaging joint 
venture by Techpack International 
and Aptar/Valois 
Reference: IP/00/560 Date: 2000-
05-31 : Commission clears 
acquisition of French bank CCF by 
HSBC Holdings 
Reference: IP/00/559 Date: 2000-
05-31 : Commission approves joint 
venture between Ahlström 
Machinery and Andritz in the field 
of pulp and paper equipment 
Reference: IP/00/472 Date: 2000-
05-12 : Commission approves the 
EBU-Eurovision system 
Reference: IP/00/419 Date: 2000-
04-28 : Commission opens 
proceedings against Nintendo 
distribution practices 
Reference: IP/00/411 Date: 2000-
04-27 : Commission starts public 
consultation on the proposed reform 
of competition rules applicable to 
horizontal co-operation agreements 
Reference: IP/00/409 Date: 2000-
04-27 : Telecommunications: 
Commission takes France to court 
over universal service 
Reference: IP/00/404 Date: 2000-
04-25 : Commission renews block 
exemption for consortium 
agreements in shipping 
Reference: IP/00/372 Date: 2000-
04-12 : Commission ready to lift 
immunity from fines to Telefonica 
Media and Sogecable in Spanish 
football rights case 
Reference: IP/00/148 Date: 2000-
02-11 : Commission approves an 
agreement to improve energy 
efficiency of washing machines. 
Reference: IP/00/141 Date: 2000-
02-10 : Commission examines the 
impact of Windows 2000 on 
competition 
Reference: IP/00/121 Date: 2000-
02-07 : Car prices in the European 
Union: differentials between 
Member states of the euro zone 
narrow slightly 
Reference: IP/00/111 Date: 2000-
02-04 : Commission launches 
second phase of telecommunications 
sector inquiry under the competition 
rules: mobile roaming 
MERGERS 
Reference: IP/00/570 Date: 2000-
05-31 : Commission clears spin-off 
of Nortel Networks manufacturing 
assets to Solectron. 
Reference: IP/00/548 Date: 2000-
05-30 : Commission clears 
acquisition of Seima by Magneti 
Marelli 
Reference: IP/00/543 Date: 2000-
05-29 : Commission authorises 
Carrefour and Marinopoulos to set 
up a joint venture in Greece 
Reference: IP/00/542 Date: 2000-
05-29 : Commission gives green 
light to a US joint venture between 
BellSouth and SBC 
Communications 
Reference: IP/00/539 Date: 2000-
05-29 : Commission opens full 
probe into Boeing's acquisition of 
the satellite business of Hughes 
Electronics 
Reference: IP/00/535 Date: 2000-
05-26 : Commission approves joint 
acquisition of Fendi by LVMH and 
PRADA 
Reference: IP/00/528 Date: 2000-
05-25 : Commission clears Ford's 
acquisition of full control of 
Autonova 
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Reference: IP/00/509 Date: 2000-
05-23 : Commission approves 
merger between Pfizer and Warner-
Lambert subject to commitments 
Reference: IP/00/500 Date: 2000-
05-22 : Commission clears Alcatel 
acquisition of Newbridge Networks 
Reference: IP/00/499 Date: 2000-
05-22 : Commission approves 
acquisition of MWCR by SanPaolo 
IMI and Schröders Groups 
Reference: IP/00/496 Date: 2000-
05-19 : European Commission 
clears purchase of Cordant 
Technologies by Alcoa 
Reference: IP/00/494 Date: 2000-
05-19 : Commission clears 
acquisition of Burmah Castrol by 
BP Amoco. 
Reference: IP/00/492 Date: 2000-
05-18 : Commission approves 
purchase by Cap Gemini of Ernst & 
Young's global consulting and IT 
activities 
Reference: IP/00/478 Date: 2000-
05-15 : Commission authorises 
Bertelsmann to acquire stake in 
Nordic Internet bookshop Bokus 
Reference: IP/00/473 Date: 2000-
05-12 : Commission clears 
acquisition of Diligentia by Skandia 
Life Insurance 
Reference: IP/00/453 Date: 2000-
05-10 : Commission clears purchase 
of Courtaulds Textiles by Sara Lee 
subject to the sale of the Well brand 
Reference: IP/00/452 Date: 2000-
05-10 : Commission grants 
conditional clearance to merger 
between Glaxo Wellcome and 
SmithKline Beecham 
Reference: IP/00/447 Date: 2000-
05-08 : Commission approves joint 
venture between Dynamit Nobel 
GmbH Explosivstoff- und 
Systemtechnik and Orica Europe 
Ltd. 
Reference: IP/00/446 Date: 2000-
05-08 : Commission clears Nabisco 
acquisition of United Biscuits 
Reference: IP/00/439 Date: 2000-
05-04 : Commission authorises 
creation of joint venture between 
Hitachi and NEC to produce 
DRAMs 
Reference: IP/00/438 Date: 2000-
05-04 : Commission clears merger 
between Ocean and Exel in the 
sector for logistics services 
Reference: IP/00/425 Date: 2000-
05-04 : Commission clears Dow 
Chemical's acquisition of Union 
Carbide subject to commitments 
Reference: IP/00/424 Date: 2000-
05-04 : Commission clears merger 
between Alcoa and Reynolds 
Metals, under conditions 
Reference: IP/00/421 Date: 2000-
05-02 : Commission authorises 
acquisition of Hoesch Spundwand 
und Profil GmbH (Germany) by 
Salzgitter AG (Germany) 
Reference: IP/00/420 Date: 2000-
05-02 : Commission approves 
takeover of Robert Bosch GmbH's 
mobile telephony operations by 
Siemens AG 
Reference: IP/00/417 Date: 2000-
04-28 : Commission clears Dow 
Chemical's acquisition of full 
control in Germany's BSL 
Reference: IP/00/416 Date: 2000-
04-28 : Commission clears joint 
control by Telia and Commerzbank 
of investment companies FNH and 
TCI 
Reference: IP/00/415 Date: 2000-
04-28 : Commission clears Internet 
travel agency joint venture between 
Telefonica's TERRA and Amadeus 
Reference: IP/00/396 Date: 2000-
04-18 : Commission gives go-ahead 
to joint venture between Reuters and 
Equant 
Reference: IP/00/395 Date: 2000-
04-18 : Commission approves 
Polycarbonate plates joint venture 
of Bayer and Röhin 
Reference: IP/00/394 Date: 2000-
04-18 : Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into proposed take-
over of BICC by Pirelli 
Reference: IP/00/390 Date: 2000-
04-14 : Commission notifies VEBA 
and VIAG of its objections against 
proposed merger 
Reference: IP/00/386 Date: 2000-
04-14 : Commission clears 
acquisition of sole control by Arrow 
Electronics, Inc. over Tekelec 
Europe, S.A. 
Reference: IP/00/385 Date: 2000-
04-14 : Commission clears merger 
between CGU and Norwich Union 
Reference: IP/00/373 Date: 2000-
04-12 : Commission clears merger 
between Vodafone Airtouch and 
Mannesmann AG with conditions 
Reference: IP/00/354 Date: 2000-
04-1 I : Commission clears the 
proposed acquisition by European 
Metal Recycling Limited of Mayer 
Parry 
Reference: IP/00/352 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission clears merger 
between MeritaNordbanken and 
UniDanmark 
Reference: IP/00/346 Date: 2000-
04-10 : Commission clears 
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acquisition of Blue Circle by 
La farge 
Reference: IP/00/343 Date: 2000-
04-07 : Commission approves joint 
venture between Ahold, ICA 
Förbundet and Canica 
Reference: IP/00/342 Date: 2000-
04-07 : The Commission authorises 
the acquisition of sole control by 
Carrefour over the Italian retailer 
Gruppo GS. 
Reference: IP/00/328 Date: 2000-
04-04 : Commission approves 
hydraulic power joint venture 
between Voith and Siemens 
Reference: IP/00/327 Date: 2000-
04-04 : Commission authorises 
NEC and Mitsubishi to set up a JV 
company in the field of PC 
monitors. 
Reference: IP/00/325 Date: 2000-
04-03 : Commission approves joint 
venture between Preussag and VA 
Technologie 
Reference: IP/00/324 Date: 2000-
04-03 : Commission clears the 
acquisition by 3M of Quante's 
telecom components business. 
Reference: IP/00/323 Date: 2000-
04-03 : Commission approves 
merger in the financial services 
sector 
Reference: IP/00/315 Date: 2000-
03-30 : Commission clears merger 
between Monsanto (USA) and 
Pharmacia & Upjohn (USA) subject 
to conditions 
Reference: IP/00/313 Date: 2000-
03-30 : Commission clears joint 
venture between Shell and BASF 
subject to commitments 
Reference: IP/00/308 Date: 2000-
03-30 : Commission clears the 
acquisition by Citigroup (US) of 
part of Schröders (UK) 
Reference: IP/00/302 Date: 2000-
03-28 : Commission clears the 
acquisition by BT of Esat 
Reference: IP/00/293 Date: 2000-
03-24 : Commission approves take-
over of Meyer International pic by 
Compagnie de Saint-Gobain 
Reference: IP/00/283 Date: 2000-
03-21 : Commission gives go-ahead 
to joint venture between Asahi 
Glass and Mitsubishi 
Reference: IP/00/282 Date: 2000-
03-21 : Commission clears the 
acquisition by CLT-UFA of News' 
stake in the German TV channel 
VOX. 
Reference: IP/00/281 Date: 2000-
03-21 : Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into the merger of the 
crop protection businesses of 
Novartis and AstraZeneca. 
Reference: IP/00/280 Date: 2000-
03-21 : Commission clears the 
creation of ASTRIUM, subject to 
conditions 
Reference: IP/00/279 Date: 2000-
03-21 : Commission authorises the 
participation of BSkyB in 
KirchPayTV 
Reference: IP/00/275 Date: 2000-
03-21 : Commission approves 
acquisition of joint control of HEW 
by Vattenfall and the Freie und 
Hansestadt Hamburg 
Reference: IP/00/267 Date: 2000-
03-16 : Commission clears 
acquisition of Ericsson Energy 
Systems by Emerson Electric 
Reference: IP/00/259 Date: 2000-
03-14 : Commission authorises 
under conditions the merger 
between aluminium producers 
Alean and Alusuisse 
Reference: IP/00/258 Date: 2000-
03-14 : Alean abandons its plans to 
acquire Pechiney to avoid the 
prospect of a decision by the 
European Commission to block the 
merger 
Reference: IP/00/257 Date: 2000-
03-14 : The Commission prohibits 
Volvo's acquisition of its main 
competitor Scania 
Reference: IP/00/241 Date: 2000-
03-09 : Commission clears the 
acquisition by Unilever France of 
Amora-Maille subject to conditions 
Reference: IP/00/214 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission approves the 
acquisition of ERF (Holdings) pic 
(UK) by MAN Nutzfahrzeuge AG 
(Germany) 
Reference: IP/00/212 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission clears 
acquisition by KKR Group of Bosch 
Telekom Private Networks 
Reference: IP/00/205 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission clears the 
acquisition by Solectron of the 
telecom switching hardware 
activities of Ericsson in Sweden 
and France. 
Reference: IP/00/200 Date: 2000-
02-29 : Commission approves 
establishment of Nuevas Ediciones 
de Bolsillo (NEB) joint venture by 
Bertelsmann and Planeta. 
Reference: IP/00/199 Date: 2000-
02-29 : Commission clears joint 
venture between Granaria, Ültje and 
Felix Snack in the nut snack sector 
Reference: IP/00/197 Date: 2000-
02-28 : Commission approves the 
participation of Telekom Austria in 
Libro 
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Reference: IP/00/194 Date: 2000-
02-28 : Commission clears 
Celestica's acquisition of IBM's 
electronic manufacturing services 
(EMS) businesses in Italy and the 
US. 
Reference: IP/00/188 Date: 2000-
02-25 : Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into the acquisition of 
Dyno ASA by Industri Kapital in 
the chemicals market 
Reference: IP/00/177 Date: 2000-
02-22 : Commission clears 
acquisition by Bayer AG of the 
polyether polyols activities of 
Lyondell Chemical Company 
Reference: IP/00/174 Date: 2000-
02-21 : Commission opens full 
investigation into the MCI 
WorldCom / Sprint merger 
Reference: IP/00/173 Date: 2000-
02-21 : Commission approves 
acquisition of joint control of E-PIus 
by KPN and BellSouth 
Reference: IP/00/172 Date: 2000-
02-21 : Commission approves 
takeover of Europcar International 
S.A. by Volkswagen AG 
Reference: IP/00/150 Date: 2000-
02-14 : Commission approves joint 
venture in paper sector 
Reference: IP/00/135 Date: 2000-
02-09 : Commission authorises 
TotalFina to take control of Elf 
Aquitaine subject to substantial 
changes to the plan originally 
notified 
Reference: IP/00/134 Date: 2000-
02-09 : Commission approves the 
acquisition of AGA (Sweden) by 
Linde (Germany) subject to 
conditions 
Reference: IP/00/129 Date: 2000-
02-08 : Commission clears Merger 
between Hellenic Bottling Company 
and Coca-Cola Beverages pic, 
subject to undertakings 
Reference: IP/00/128 Date: 2000-
02-08 : Commission approves the 
acquisition of Air Express 
International by Deutsche Post AG 
Reference: IP/00/126 Date: 2000-
02-08 : Commission authorises the 
acquisition by Electrabel (Belgium) 
of the Dutch electricity producer 
EPON 
Reference: IP/00/125 Date: 2000-
02-08 : Commission authorises joint 
venture between Eastern Electricity 
and London Electricity 
Reference: IP/00/118 Date: 2000-
02-07 : Commission clears the 
merger between Swedish defence 
companies Saab and Celsius 
Reference: IP/00/114 Date: 2000-
02-05 : Commission opens in-depth 
investigation into merger between 
VEBA and VIAG 
Reference: IP/00/110 Date: 2000-
02-04 : Commission clears 
acquisitions by Suzuki Motor 
Corporation 
Reference: IP/00/109 Date: 2000-
02-04 : Commission clears 
Finalrealm's acquisition of United 
Biscuits 
Reference: IP/00/106 Date: 2000-
02-03 : Commission agrees to 
dissolution of BP/Mobil Joint 
Venture, a European fuel and 
lubricants producer and retailer; the 
dissolution was a condition of the 
ExxonMobil merger clearance 
decision 
Reference: IP/00/105 Date: 2000-
02-03 : Commission approves joint 
venture between General Electric 
Company (USA) and Thomson-CSF 
(France) in the field of flight 
simulator training. 
Reference: IP/00/104 Date: 2000-
02-02 : Commission gives go-ahead 
to planned joint venture between 
Chemag, Beiselen and BayWa 
Reference: IP/00/92 Date: 2000-
02-01 : Commission concludes that 
BellSouth acquisition of VR 
Telecommunications' stake in E-
Plus falls outside Eu rules 
STATE AID 
Reference: IP/00/550 Date: 2000-
05-30 : Commission approves 
Austria regional aid map for 2000-
2006 
Reference: IP/00/549 Date: 2000-
05-30 : Commission closes 
investigation procedure against of 
original Dutch proposal for regional 
aid map 
Reference: IP/00/483 Date: 2000-
05-16 : Commission decides that 
Italian law on the extraordinary 
administration of large enterprises 
in difficulty contained incompatible 
State aid 
Reference: IP/00/430 Date: 2000-
05-03 : Commission questions 
Belgian plan to grant aid to Ford's 
factory in Genk 
Reference: IP/00/429 Date: 2000-
05-03 : Commission says Swedish 
income tax relief for foreign experts 
does not constitute State aid 
Reference: IP/00/428 Date: 2000-
05-03 : Commission says Danish 
low income tax rate for experts 
recruited abroad is not State aid 
Reference: IP/00/427 Date: 2000-
05-03 : European Commission 
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approves regional aid package for 
Sweden 
Reference: IP/00/426 Date: 2000-
05-03 : Commission adopts 13th 
Monitoring Report on the Article 95 
ECSC steel aid cases 
Reference: IP/00/370 Date: 2000-
04-1 1 : Commission declares that 
EDF rebates to firms in the paper 
industry do not constitute State aid 
Reference: IP/00/367 Date: 2000-
04-11 : State aid still too high 
despite decrease, says annual survey 
Reference: IP/00/363 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission turns to the 
Court because of Germany's failure 
to recover WestLB state aid 
Reference: IP/00/362 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission approves 
Spain's regional aid map for 2000-
2006 
Reference: IP/00/361 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission gives green 
light to French and Dutch aid for 
ΙΤΕΑ research programme 
Reference: IP/00/360 Date: 2000-
04-11 : European Commission 
approves regional aid package for 
Denmark 
Reference: IP/00/359 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission approves 
increase in emergency aid for two 
earthquake-hit regions in Italy 
Marche and Umbria 
Reference: IP/00/358 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission approves a 
loan and equity fund in Ireland -
Western Investment Fund. 
Reference: IP/00/357 Date: 2000-
04-11 : Commission approves 
shipbuilding aid schemes in 
Netherlands. 
Reference: IP/00/356 Date: 2000-
04-1 1 : Commission closes formal 
investigation procedure into 
unnotified state aid to System 
Microelectronic Innovation GmbH 
Reference: SPEECH/00/113 Date: 
2000-03-30 : Mario Monti European 
Commissioner for Competition 
Policy The Community's State Aid 
Policy Conference of the 16 
Ministers of Economic Affairs of 
the German Lander Brussels, 30 
March 2000 
Reference: IP/00/305 Date: 2000-
03-29 : Commission approves 
regional aid map for Sweden 
Reference: IP/00/304 Date: 2000-
03-29 : Commission approves C02 
quotas for the electricity sector in 
Denmark for the period 20012003 
Reference: IP/00/303 Date: 2000-
03-29 : Commission finds that 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH has 
respected its capacity limitation in 
1999. 
Reference: IP/00/254 Date: 2000-
03-14 : Commission approves tax 
breaks for investment in Madeira 
(Portugal) 
Reference: IP/00/253 Date: 2000-
03-14 : Commission to scrutinise 
plan to aid Solar Tech srl (Italy) 
Reference: IP/00/252 Date: 2000-
03-14 : Commission approves 
regional aid map for West German 
regions and Berlin for 1 January 
2000 to December 2003. 
Reference: IP/00/251 Date: 2000-
03-14 : Commission opens 
proceedings into aid for Technische 
Glaswerke Ilmenau 
Reference: IP/00/211 Date: 2000-
03-01 :European Commission 
launches formal investigation into 
reduced social contributions in 
Sweden 
Reference: IP/00/210 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission opens 
proceedings against aid to five 
Italian steel companies for energy 
conservation 
Reference: IP/00/209 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission clears capital 
injection into Italian leisure park 
Reference: IP/00/208 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission approves part 
of the regional state aid map for 
Italy for 2000-2006 and opens 
scrutiny procedure regarding 
proposed regions in Centre-North 
Reference: IP/00/207 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission approves 
France's regional planning grant 
map (PAT) for 2000-2006 
Reference: IP/00/206 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission approves aid to 
Delon Filament GmbH (Germany) 
Reference: IP/00/203 Date: 2000-
03-01 : Commission closes 
investigation into proposed Belgian 
regional aid map 
Reference: IP/00/182 Date: 2000-
02-23 : Statement by Commissioner 
Monti concerning the control of 
fiscal state aids 
Reference: IP/00/161 Date: 2000-
02-15 Commission authorises R&D 
aid in motor vehicle sector in Spain 
Reference: IP/00/160 Date: 2000-
02-15 : Commission decides that 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft GmbH 
will have to reimburse DM 12.6 
Mio ( 6.3 Mio) of aid due to 
exceeding of capacity limitation in 
1997. 
Reference: IP/00/159 Date: 2000-
02-15 : The Commission bans 
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regional aid of LIT 46 billion (24 
million) for Fiat Rivalta (Italy) 
Reference: IP/00/158 Date: 2000-
02-15 : Commission approves aid to 
SIDMAR for five environmental 
projects One negative decision 
Reference: IP/00/157 Date: 2000-
02-15 : Commission authorises 
continued ecological tax reform in 
Germany under state aid rules 
Reference: IP/00/103 Date: 2000-
02-02 : Commission opens formal 
investigation into State aid to 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft 
Reference: IP/00/102 Date: 2000-
02-02 : Commission approves 
settlement between Elf Aquitaine 
and German authorities in the Leuna 
case Decision regarding initial State 
aid still suspended. 
Reference: IP/00/101 Date: 2000-
2-02 : Commission investigates 
State aid Dutch manure processing 
companies 
Reference: IP/00/100 Date: 2000-
02-02 : Commission approves 
restructuring aid for Armaturen 
Technik Magdeburg (Germany). 
COURT OF JUSTICE / COURT 
OF FIRST INSTANCE 
DEVANT LE TRIBUNAL 
Aff.T-318/99 
Avia Nederland Coöperatie 
UA/Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C( 1999)2539 def, du 
20 juillet 1999, relative aux aides 
accordées par les Pays-Bas à 633 
stations-services situées dans la 
région frontalière entre les Pays-Bas 
et l'Allemagne 
Aff.T-319/99 
Federación Nacional de 
Empresas, Instrumentación 
Científica, Médica, Técnica y 
Dental (FENIN) / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG(99) D/7.040), du 
26 août 1999, rejetant la plainte 
déposée par la partie requérante 
contre «Entes Gestores del Sistema 
Nacional de Salud» espagnols sur Ie 
fondement de l'article 82 CE, 
concernant les conditions de 
paiement imposées par les «Entes 
Gestores del sistema Nacional de 
Salud» (organismes gestionnaires 
du système public de santé) 
espagnols à leurs fournisseurs de 
produits sanitaires ainsi que d'autres 
pratiques prétendument anti-
concurrentielles desdits organismes 
Aff. T-320/99 
W.F. Milder/Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-318/99 
Aff. T-321/99 
Garage en Tankstation 
M ilder/Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-318/99 
Aff. T-323/99 
Industrie Navali Meccaniche 
Affini SpA Società in 
Liquidazione (INMA) et Italia 
Investimenti SpA (Itainvest) / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C( 1999)2532 def, du 
20 juillet 1999, déclarant 
incompatible avec le marché 
commun l'aide accordée par l'Italie, 
par l'intermédiaire du holding public 
Itainvest (ex GEPI) au chantier 
naval Industrie Navali Meccaniche 
Affini (INMA) 
Aff. T-328/99 
Anthony Goldstein/Commission 
Une demande en indemnité visant à 
obtenir la réparation du préjudice 
prétendument subi par le requérant 
suite au refus de la Commission 
d'adopter les mesures provisoires 
demandées par celui-ci dans le cadre 
de la procédure administrative 
relative à une plainte tendant à faire 
constater l'infraction aux articles 81 
et 82 du traité CE par le «Bar 
Council» 
Aff. T-339/99 
Achten vof / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T-318/99 
Aff. T-342/99 
Airtours pic / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 22 septembre 1999. 
relative à une procédure 
d'application du règlement (CEE) n. 
4064/89 du Conseil (affaire n. 
IV/M.1524 - Airtours/First Choice) 
déclarant incompatible avec le 
marché commun et le 
fonctionnement de l'Accord EEE 
l'opération de concentration visant à 
l'acquisition du contrôle total de 
First Choice pic par Airtours pic 
Aff. T-346/99 
Diputación Foral de 
Alava/Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG(99)D/7814), du 29 
septembre 1999, d'engager la 
procédure prévue au paragraphe 2 
de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerne 
les aides fiscales à l'investissement 
octroyées par la «Diputación Foral 
de Alava» sous forme d'une 
réduction de l'assiette imposable de 
l'impôt des sociétés applicable aux 
entreprises nouvellement créées 
Aff. T-347/99 
Diputación Foral de 
Gipuzkoa/Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG(99)D/7814), du 29 
septembre 1999, d'engager la 
procédure prévue au paragraphe 2 
de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerne 
les aides fiscales à l'investissement 
octroyées par la «Diputación Foral 
de Gipuzkoa» sous forme d'une 
94 Competition Policy Newsletter 2000 Number 2 June 
>* INFORMATION SECTION 
réduction de l'assiette imposable de 
l'impôt des sociétés applicables aux 
entreprises nouvellement créées 
Alf. T­348/99 
Diputación Foral de 
Bizkaia/Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission (SG(99)D/7814), du 29 
septembre 1999, d'engager la 
procédure prévue au paragraphe 2 
de l'article 88 CE en ce qui concerne 
les aides fiscales à l'investissement 
octroyées par la «Diputación Foral 
de Bizkaia» sous forme d'une 
réduction de l'assiette imposable de 
l'impôt des sociétés applicables aux 
entreprises nouvellement créées 
Aff. T­354/99 
Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland) 
BV / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­3 18/99 
Aff. T­5/00 
Nederlandse Federatieve 
Vereniging voor de Groothandel 
op Elektrotechnisch Gebied / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 26 octobre 1999, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 81 du traité 
CE (Affaire n. IV/33.884 ­
Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging 
voor de Groothandel op 
Elektrotechnisch Gebied en 
Technische Unie) concernant le 
marché de l'électrotechnique aux 
Pays­Bas 
Aff. T­l3/00 
S.W.M. Baltussen e.a. / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­318/99 
Aff. T­14/00 
CAV Ulestraten­Schimmert­
Hulsberg e.a. / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­318/99 
Aff. T­l5/00 
Auto­ en Carosserie bedrijf 
Ambting BV e.a. / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­318/99 
Aff. T­29/00 
Deutsche Post AG/Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 14 décembre 1999. 
infligeant à la requérante, 
conformément à l'article 14, 
paragraphe 1, b) et c) du règlement 
CEE n. 4064/89 du Conseil, du 21 
décembre 1989, relatif au contrôle 
des opérations de concentration 
entre entreprises, une amende d'un 
montant de 100.000 Euros, pour 
avoir donné des indications 
inexactes et dénaturées à l'occasion 
d'une notification présentée en 
application de l'article 4 dudit 
règlement et, pour avoir fourni des 
renseignement inexacts en réponse à 
une demande de renseignement faite 
en application de l'article 1 1 (affaire 
IV/1610 ­ Deutsche Post/trans­o­
flex) 
Aff. T­35/00 
Anthony Goldstein / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 21 janvier 2000, 
concernant une demande de 
renseignements adressée à la 
Commission par les représentants 
du requérant suite à la décision de la 
juridiction nationale saisie par celui­
ci de demander certaines 
informations en application de 
l'article 10 du traité CE (ex article 5) 
et conformément à la 
communication relative à la 
coopération entre la Commission et 
les juridictions nationales pour 
l'application des articles 81 et 82 du 
traité CEE 
Aff. T­40/00 
Consorzio industrie fiammiferi 
(CIF) / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 29 mars 1999, 
refusant de communiquer au 
requérant certains documents 
transmis à Γ «Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza» aux fins d'une 
enquête relative à l'application des 
articles 81 et 82 du traité CE menée 
par ladite autorité 
Aff. T­44/00 
Mannesmannröhren­Werke AG/ 
Conseil 
Annulation de la décision C(1999) 
4154 final de la Commission, du 8 
décembre 1999, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'article 
81 du traité CE (IV/E­1/35.860­B 
tubes et tuyaux en acier sans 
soudure) 
Aff. T­45/00 
Conseil national des professions 
de l'automobile (CNPA) e.a. / 
Commission 
Annulation du règlement de la 
Commission (CE) n. 2790/1999, du 
22 décembre 1999, concernant 
l'application de l'article 81, 
paragraphe 3. à des catégories 
d'accords verticaux et de pratiques 
concertées 
Aff. T­48/00 
British Steel Ltd, anciennement 
British Steel pic / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­44/00 
Aff. T­50/00 
Dalmine SpA / Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­44/00 
Aff. T­52/00 
Coc Clerici Logistics SpA/ 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 20 décembre 1999, 
de classer la plainte de la requérante 
relative à un prétendu abus de 
position dominante de la part de la 
société concessionnaire d'un des 
quais du port d'Ancona, en ce qui 
concerne les activités de 
déchargement de charbon sur ce 
quai 
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Aff. T­58/00 
Bond Van De Fegarbel­
Beroepsverenigingen e.a. / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­45/00 
Aff. T­59/00 
Compagnia Portuale Pietro 
Chiesa scarl / Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 22 décembre 1999, 
de ne pas donner suite à la plainte 
de la requérante visant à faire 
constater la violation des 
dispositions combinées des articles 
86 et 82 du traité CE de la part de la 
Compagnia Unica Lavoratori Merci 
Varie (CULMV) en sa position de 
fournisseur privilégié de services 
portuaires et de main­d'oeuvre au 
port de Gênes 
Aff. T­67/00 
NKK Corporation / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C( 1999)4154 final de la 
Commission, du 8 décembre 1999, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 81 du traité 
CE (IV/E­1/35.860­B tubes et 
tuyaux en acier sans soudure) ou, à 
titre subsidiaire, la réduction de 
l'amende infligée à la requérante 
Aff. T­68/00 
Nippon Steel Corporation / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­67/00 
Aff. T­71/00 
Kawasaki Steel Corporation / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­67/00 
Aff. T­77/00 
Esat Telecommunications Ltd / 
Commission 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission SG(2000) D/l00598, 
du 18 janvier 2000, portant rejet de 
la plainte de la requérante relative à 
un prétendu abus de position 
dominante de la part de Telecom 
Éireann, l'opérateur titulaire de 
télécommunications en Irlande, 
visant à empêcher ou retarder 
l'accès de la requérante au marché 
irlandais de services de 
télécommunications (COMP/35.979 
Esat Telecom/Telecom Eireann) 
Aff. T­78/00 
Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd / 
Commission 
Voir l'affaire T­67/00 
DEVANT LA COUR 
Aff. C­462/99 
Connect Austria Gesellschaft für 
Telekommunikation GmbH et 
Telekom­Control­Kommission 
Mobilkom Austria AG 
Préjudicielle ­ Verwaltungs­
gerichtshof ­ Interprétation de l'art. 
5 bis, par. 3, de la directive 
90/387/CEE du Conseil, du 28 juin 
1990, relative à l'établissement du 
marché intérieur des services de 
télécommunication par la mise en 
oeuvre de la fourniture d'un réseau 
ouvert de télécommunication, telle 
que modifiée par la directive 
97/51/CE du Parlement européen et 
du Conseil du 6 octobre 1997 ­
Pourvoi devant une instance 
indépendante contre les décisions de 
l'autorité réglementaire ­ Effet direct 
­ Interprétation de l'art. 86 du traité 
CE (devenu article 82 CE), de l'art. 
90 du traité CE (devenu art. 86 CE), 
de l'art. 2 de la directive 96/2/CE de 
la Commission, du 16 janvier 1996, 
modifiant la directive 90/388/CEE 
en ce qui concerne les 
communications mobiles et 
personnelles, et des art. 9 et 11 de la 
directive 97/13/CE du Parlement 
européen et du Conseil du 10 avril 
1997 relative à un cadre commun 
pour les autorisations générales et 
les licences individuelles dans le 
secteur des services de 
télécommunications ­ Législation 
nationale en matière d'attribution de 
fréquences dans la bande 1800 
MHZ 
Aff. C­475/99 
Firma Ambulanz Glöckner et 
Landkreis Südwestpfalz 
Préjudicielle ­ Oberverwaltungs­
gericht Rheinland­Pfalz 
Interprétation des art. 90, par. 1, du 
traité CE (devenu art. 86 CE) et 85 
du traité CE (devenu art. 81 CE) ­
Législation nationale qui restreint 
l'accès à l'activité du transport de 
malades en fonction de la demande 
objective et crée, de fait, des 
monopoles locaux 
Aff. C­480/99 P 
Gerry Plant e.a. / Commission ­
South Wales Small Mines 
Association 
Pourvoi formé contre l'ordonnance 
du Tribunal de première instance 
(deuxième chambre) du 29 
septembre 1999, J.G. Evans e.a. / 
Commission (T­l 48/98 et Τ­
Ι 62/98), par laquelle le Tribunal a 
rejeté comme irrecevables des 
recours visant à l'annulation d'une 
décision de la Commission, du 30 
juillet 1998 (affaire IV/E­
3/SWSMA), rejetant les plaintes 
déposées par les requérants contre le 
Central Electricity Generating 
Board (CEGB) et British Coal, 
relatives à une prétendue entente 
concernant les prix de vente du 
charbon destiné à la production 
d'électricité 
Aff. C­482/99 
France / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
C( 1999)3148 final de la 
Commission concernant les aides 
accordées par la France à 
l'entreprise Stardust Marine 
Aff. C­497/99 P 
Irish Sugar pic / Commission 
Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal de première instance 
(troisième chambre) du 7 octobre 
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1999, Irish Sugar pic / Commission 
(T­228/97) ­ Annulation de la 
décision de la Commission, du 14 
mai 1997, relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 86 du traité CE 
(devenu art. 82 CE) (IV/34.621, 
35.059/F­3­ Irish Sugar pic) 
Aff. C­499/99 
Commission / Espagne 
Manquement d'Etat ­ Défaut de 
s'être conformé aux décisions 
91/1/CEE de la Commission, du 20 
décembre 1989, concernant les aides 
accordées en Espagne par le 
gouvernement central et plusieurs 
gouvernements automomes à 
MAGEFESA. producteur 
d'ustensiles de cuisine en acier 
inoxydable et de petits appareils 
électriques et C( 1998)3211 final de 
la Commission, du 14 octobre 1998, 
relative à une aide accordée aux 
entreprises du groupe MAGEFESA 
Aff. C­509/99 
Portugal / Commission 
Annulation de la décision C (1999) 
3370 final de la Commission, du 20 
octobre 1999, relative à une 
procédure au titre de l'art. 21 du 
règlement (CEE) n. 4064/89 du 
Conseil, du 21 décembre 1989, 
relatif au contrôle des opérations de 
concentration entre entreprises 
(Proc. IV/M. 1616 ­ A. 
Champalimaud/BSCH) 
Aff. C­36/00 
Espagne / Commission 
Annulation de la décision 
2000/131 /CE de la Commission, du 
26 octobre 1999, concernant l'aide 
d'Etat octroyée par l'Espagne aux 
chantiers navals publics (notifiée 
sous le numéro C( 1999)3864) ­
Conformité d'aides de 
restructuration avec l'art. 1, par. 4, 
deuxième tiret, du règlement (CE) n. 
1013/97 du Conseil, du 2 juin 1997, 
concernant les aides en faveur de 
certains chantiers navals en cours de 
reconstruction 
Aff. C­43/00 
Andersen og Jensen ApS et 
Skatteministeriet 
Préjudicielle ­ Vestre Landsret ­
Interprétation de l'art. 2, sous c) et 
sous i), de la directive 90/434/CEE 
du Conseil, du 23 juillet 1990, 
concernant le régime fiscal commun 
applicable aux fusions, scissions, 
apports d'actifs et échanges d'actions 
intéressant des sociétés d'Etats 
membres différents ­ Notion 
d'«apport d'actifs» et de «branche 
d'activité» ­ Possibilité de dissocier 
une somme empruntée et les 
obligations de l'emprunteur 
Aff. C­57/00 P 
Freistaat Sachsen / Commission 
Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal de première instance 
(deuxième chambre élargie) du 15 
décembre 1999, Freistaat Sachsen et 
Volkswagen / Commission (Τ­
Ι 32/96 et T­l 43/96) ­ Aides 
octroyées au développement 
économique de certaines régions de 
la République fédérale d'Allemagne 
affectées par la division de 
l'Allemagne (art. 87. par. 2, lit. c 
CE) ­ Aides destinées à remédier à 
une perturbation grave de 
l'économie d'un Etat membre (art. 
87, par. 3, lit. b CE) ­ Aides 
approuvées par la Commission sous 
condition de respecter par ailleurs 
des règles en vigueur dans un 
secteur déterminé ­ Règles 
d'encadrement décidées 
postérieurement à l'approbation 
d'une aide 
Aff. C­61/00 P 
Volkswagen AG et Volkswagen 
Sachsen GmbH / Commission e.a. 
Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal de première instance 
(deuxième chambre élargie) du 15 
décembre 1999, Volkswagen et 
Volkswagen Sachsen / Commission 
e.a. (T­l32/96 et T­l43/96) ­ Aides 
octroyées au développement 
économique de certaines régions de 
la République fédérale d'Allemagne 
affectées par la division de 
l'Allemagne (art. 87, par. 2, lit. c 
CE) ­ Aides destinées à remédier à 
une perturbation grave de 
l'économie d'un Etat membre (art. 
87, par. 3, lit. b CE) ­ Aides 
approuvées par la Commission sous 
condition de respecter par ailleurs 
des règles en vigueur dans un 
secteur déterminé ­ Règles 
d'encadrement décidées 
postérieurement à l'approbation 
d'une aide 
Aff.jtes C­74/00 P et C­75/00 P 
Falck SpA / Acciaierie di Bolzano 
SpA (ACB) Italie / Commission ­
Acciaierie di Bolzano SpA (ACB) 
/ Falck SpA Italie / Commission 
Pourvoi formé contre l'arrêt du 
Tribunal de première instance 
(cinquième chambre élargie) du 16 
décembre 1999, Acciaierie di 
Bolzano / Commission (T­158/96) ­
Refus d'annuler la décision de la 
Commission 96/617/CECA, du 17 
juillet 1996, concernant des aides 
octroyées par la province autonome 
de Bolzano (Italie) à la société 
Acciaierie di Bolzano 
C O M P É T I T I O N DG's A D D R E S S 
O N T H E W O R L D W I D E W E B 
http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dg04/index_en.htm 
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